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SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

By

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CHAPEL HILL

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TO THE MEMORY OF

MY MOTHER

The Companion of My Student Days

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PREFACE

SOCIAL Differentiation is at once a chapter of general sociology and an approach to social psychology. Within recent years sociological literature has been enriched by a number of well-written general treatises. But there are many chapters of general sociology greatly in need of more minute analysis than they can receive in a general treatise. The present study is offered with the hope that it may make some small contribution in the analysis of one of these chapters.

Various social sciences have contributed to the material presented in the study. The writer is thoroughly convinced of the essential unity of the social sciences. Any discovery that throws new light on any phase of human affairs and human relations should become the possession of the whole group of those students who are seeking to understand human conduct. In seeking to analyze the nature and significance of social differences the writer has therefore drawn upon recent materials from the fields of Psychology, Economics, Political Science, and Anthropology as well as from strictly sociological contributions.

On the other hand it is believed that a sociological interpretation of these differences has significance for a wider circle of students than academic sociologists. Particularly does it have significance in the fields of public welfare and political policies, education and industrial organization. In the end all social science must be tested by its validity in the practical organization of society. Within recent years democracy has ceased to be merely a shibboleth of political discussion. As equality of privileges for all sections of the population in other fields of life has been demanded by those previously discriminated against, the principle has been sharply challenged as a valid one for general application in many phases of social relations. In the face

of these doubts concerning the practicability of democracy for modern life, many of them expressed by students of the social sciences, it appears to the writer particularly important that we subject to fresh scrutiny the whole question of the social differences of the population, in the light of the most recent data available from any scientific source.

This study was begun ten years ago with a notion that social differences were almost entirely a matter of arbitrary social determination, that biological differences had little vital significance. The conviction has grown, however, that the biological bases of social differences have very essential significance. The study of individual differences in recent years has compelled the writer to believe that the biological variations provide a very great deal of foundation for social distinctions.

This is not to say that it is apparent that all the prevailing social distinctions associated with age, sex, race, and individuality are correctly based. In fact it becomes more and more apparent that we have been greatly mistaken about many of them, and the social distinctions that have prevailed have been due as much to ignorance and prejudice as to actual biological cause. We are greatly in need of a more correct understanding of what the biological differences imply socially, and what they do not imply.

In the next place, as this study has progressed the writer has become increasingly convinced of the necessity for a rational and intelligent control of social differences. In this as in other aspects of social policy the control that has been thus far achieved has been chiefly based upon temporary expediency rather than upon any well formulated social philosophy. We are greatly in need of more clearly perceived objectives in any policies undertaken for a better adjustment of the status of individuals or of social classes to one another.

My obligations to others in such a study are naturally very heavy. I have tried to indicate these where-

ever possible. In many cases the obligation has been so indirect that is has not been possible to indicate it. Certainly no one can complete such a study without a very lively sense of his dependence on the work of many painstaking predecessors.

CECIL CLARE NORTH.

COLUMBUS, OHIO.
April 22, 1926.

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PART I

THE NATURE AND KINDS OF SOCIAL DIFFERENCES

I

THE PROBLEM STATED

IF THE traditional and much travelled tourist from Mars, on one of his hypothetical visits to our human society, should be asked the usual question as to what impressed him most, it is of course entirely conjectural what his reply would be. If he were of a sociological turn of mind, however, it is highly probable that the differences that he observed among human beings would come in for considerable attention. In fact it is doubtful whether the social unity which mundane sociologists have been at such pains to establish and describe would, at first sight at least, come in for nearly as much attention as social differences. Without raising the question as to which is the more fundamental aspect of human society we may safely assume that our visitor or any other observer of earthly affairs would want an explanation of the differences observed between human beings.

The differences that manifest themselves between the members of a group fall into two rather distinct types; namely, individual differences and social differences. Individual differences are those which distinguish persons from one another as members of the human race. Sex, age, color, size, temperament, mental capacity, and other such traits, are qualities which inhere in the individual as a human being and cannot be dissociated from his self-hood. On the other hand the members of a given social group differ in the occupations they follow, in the degree of authority or subserviency that they maintain in the group, in the habits of life that they have acquired, in the interests that they pursue. Such differences have to do with the particular place the individual occupies in the group, which position may be changed from time to time.

The nature of the individual differences is the concern of the biologist, the anatomist, the physiologist, the neurologist, the psychologist, the anthropologist. These students study the individual human being as an isolated specimen. While influences of environment are regarded as essential to an understanding of their problems, these students are necessarily concerned primarily with aspects of human beings which do not depend for their analysis on the relations of the individual to other human beings.

The sociologist, however, is concerned essentially with this very fact of human relations. To him individual differences are important only as throwing light on the relation of people to one another. It is true that he must go to these other students for many facts, but in the main he accepts their conclusions as starting points for his own investigations. He is not interested in the nature of sex or of race or of individual mental variations as such. What he is interested in is what light these individual qualities may throw on the different positions that persons occupy in the social group of which they are parts and on the nature of the process of reactions that take place between these socii. In the following pages the writer will draw on whatever conclusions are available as to the precise nature of individual differences. But our essential problem will be to analyze the nature of social differences and the significance of these differences for social life.

Our first problem is to determine the precise nature of the social differences that distinguish members of a group from one another. The question we have to answer is this: What are the various ways in which to classify individuals on the basis of their positions in the group? At first view these differences seem innumerable. And in fact they may be as numerous as the points of view from which a population is viewed. The easy generalization, indulged in by the average individual in a philosophic mood, can always produce some new way of classifying people. The merchant may divide them into those who pay their bills and

those who do not; the ecclesiastic into those who go to church and those who stay at home or who work, and those who play on Sunday. Others may divide them into the learned and the ignorant, the rich and the poor, and so on without limit. The student of society, however, wants something more significant and fundamental than casual observations. And he wants to know especially what part these differences play in the life of the community. When we undertake to select the significant social differences and classify them, we find that they fall into four types; namely, differences of *function*, differences of *rank*, differences of *culture*, and differences of *interest*.

Next to an understanding of the ways in which a social population is differentiated, we need to know the foundations or bases on which these social differences rest. There are a number of individual biological differences; namely, age, sex, race, mental variation, that furnish a large part of the explanation of why individuals occupy different places in the group. Thus many differences of social function grow directly out of differences of sex or of age; and variation in mental capacity or aptitude accounts for much in the social positions of many members of any group. Social differences resting on these biological or psycho-physical factors may be regarded as natural and, to some extent, inevitable. But there are also many differences in rank and even in occupation or in culture that manifestly rest upon nothing in the nature of the individual but upon certain artificial arrangements that the social policy of the group has imposed arbitrarily on the individual. It is essential to any proper understanding of social differentiation that some effort be made to distinguish between the biological and the social in the sources or causes of social distinctions. It is not assumed that never, under any considerations, should a function or a rank fall to an individual that is not directly indicated by his physical or mental nature. But at all events, in order to have an intelligent basis for social policy, a clear understanding should

prevail concerning the distinction between natural and artificial causes of social distinctions. For example, the exclusion of women from particular occupational fields and political status, or assigning an inferior rank to a particular racial section of the population is frequently based upon an entirely insufficient understanding of the real significance for social life of the biological facts of sex or race. A clearer grasp of the social aspects of these biological differences would go far toward improving much social policy. We shall therefore examine somewhat in detail the foundations on which social differences rest.

Finally, the question is to be answered, What is the effect of social differentiation upon the welfare of the group? This after all is the problem of chief importance to the sociologist because it is the one of chief concern to the citizen. Analysis and description of social forces and conditions are valuable primarily because they help us to know how to shape social policy.

With the severing of the shackles that have bound individuals and classes in social positions based upon privilege and arbitrary power, there comes a real need to understand the type of differentiation that is really consistent with the highest social good. As we abolish one type of social differentiation, what do we want to put in its place? Wherein is social differentiation socially valuable, and wherein is it harmful? What is the significance of the social order that we call democracy? How much differentiation do we want? Can we shape and guide the placing of the individual in the particular niche of the social order that will bring him and the whole group, at the same time, the largest good?

QUESTIONS

1. Show the distinction between individual differences and social differences.

2. What is the interest of the sociologist in individual differences?

3. Explain the two different foundations on which social differences rest.

4. What do you understand by the relation of social differentiation to social welfare?

EXERCISES

1. Select several persons with whose careers you are rather familiar and show to what extent their respective stations in life have been determined by influences outside themselves.

2. What social differences exist among the people of your neighborhood or in the immediate circle of acquaintances?

II

DIFFERENCES OF FUNCTION

PROBABLY the most obvious difference in the positions occupied by different members of a social group is that of the kinds of work that they perform. At first thought it would seem that every member was pursuing his own way independently of all others, bent on the performance of a task that seems distinct from that of all others. A very little insight, however, reveals the fact that these tasks all have an interrelation. Not only are the different kinds of work done by the laborers in a factory seen to be parts of a common task, the production of a single finished product, but different establishments are seen to depend on one another. The shoe store looks to the factory for its supply of goods, the shoe factory to the tanner, the tanner to the farmer, and the farmer goes to the store to purchase his shoes. On closer observation the banker, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the journalist, the governmental official, each is seen to depend for some item on all the others. In short, the whole social group is found to be a unit for the performance of certain large tasks, while the work of each member turns out to be merely a small part of the larger process. These larger tasks are the efforts of the group to satisfy certain human needs.

The essential needs of social groups are the same everywhere, at least for all people at the same level of culture. One of these is the maintenance of numbers. From the standpoint of the mere physiological process of reproduction it might well be regarded as an individual function. But the life of the group is affected by the appearance of a new life. And if the group is to maintain its existence as a group, it cannot fail to be interested in the appearance of at least enough new lives to take the place of those dying. Hence follow all the devices that some groups from time immemorial

have adopted to promote increase in the birth-rate and devotion to the rearing of children. The bearing and rearing of children must therefore be reckoned essentially a social function.

A second essential function is the securing of the material means of living. This involves the production, transportation and exchange of wealth. While every person engaged in any of these activities may exhibit the most narrowly selfish spirit, if his work has results that are valuable for other members of the group, it cannot be denied the designation of a social function. In a preceding paragraph it was noted that at least in modern society every producer of goods or services is furthering the satisfaction of the needs of other members of his group at the same time that he satisfies his own. Wherever that is true, the task of producing goods or services, or engaging in any of the activities involved in production or exchange, is a social function.

A third essential need is the preservation of order and defense against enemies, either members of other groups or anti-social members of one's own group. But the social machinery called into existence for this function has gradually taken on other tasks which have grown naturally out of this primary one. The coördination of all the members of the group for military and police purposes leads to the coördination of effort for other purposes, such as the determination of rights and privileges, the adjudication of these rights, the expression of the common will of the group, etc., etc. Hence the whole governmental process appears and takes on ever new tasks as the solidarity and complexity of the group life become more evident. We finally find the executive, the judicial, and the legislative branches of government organized and set up, each calling for the services of a vast number of persons. The military and police functions, originally alone, become simply branches of one department of government.

In addition to these fundamental needs of maintenance of numbers, production of goods, and protection

and control, there are various intellectual, aesthetic, and moral needs that appear in the life of every group. There must, for example, be some who devote themselves to discovery and invention, some to the education and training of the young, some to the creation of aesthetic products, some to appeasing the spirits, or directing the expression of religious sentiments. That is, these needs exist and some provision must be made, either by separate individuals or through cooperative activity, to meet them.

By functional differentiation is meant the distribution among the members of the group of the tasks of supplying these needs. Probably the most significant distinction between a primitive and a highly civilized society is the degree to which this functional differentiation has taken place. We know of no group where some degree of it does not prevail, but its progressive refinement and minute subdivision is one of the marks of an evolving society.

The term by which functional differentiation is generally described is the division of labor. Adam Smith, although not the first to use the concept, is responsible for its wide acceptance in the thought of the nineteenth century.[1] As used by Smith it was applied to the economic aspect of three different phases of occupational differentiation. In the first place it connotes the subdivision of the process which is included in one single business. For example, Smith's classical illustration of the making of pins shows how the total process within the pin factory is divided into eighteen distinct subdivisions, each one of which can be assigned to a different person. All are necessary, however, to the manufacture of a single pin.

Second, there is included in the division of labor that between similar but distinct industrial plants. For example, specilization or narrowing of one particular business down to some one line of products. The farmer may specialize in the raising of one particular

[1]See Bücher, *Industrial Evolution*. Translated by Wickett, chap. 8.

kind of grain, or the baker may confine all the work in his baking establishment to the production of one brand of bread or cake, or the lawyer may confine his practice exclusively to criminal cases.

In the third place, the term may apply to the separation of one large task into several distinct and dissimilar economic units. For example, the production of bread involves the work of the farmer, the miller, the baker, to say nothing of such intermediaries as the transportation company. Each of these three fundamental processes involved in the production of bread implies a separate business establishment and organization.

Bücher would include in the term two other kinds of differentiation also; namely, the formation of trades and the supplanting of one kind of labor by another. Early society produced its goods through the unit of the family. Each family was the producer of all the goods it consumed. Later society has seen this domestic system displaced by the factory system, whereby separate trades become responsible for particular articles and services, and a system of exchange makes possible a circulation of goods so that each person works at one trade and depends on commerce supplying him with all his needs. By supplanting of labor is meant the development of new factors in production, as the introduction of a machine. The machine itself must be made and this calls for the work of a considerable number of new workmen. Hence when the machine becomes an indispensable part of a process, there are created new kinds of work. When, for example a type-setting machine becomes a factor in the printing business, the various people necessary to manufacture the machine must be reckoned with in the printing of a newspaper. Whether the appearance of distinct trades to take the place of the domestic system of economy, and the creation of new kinds of work through the supplanting of hand-work by machine work, should be considered phases of the division of labor, or corollaries of it, is immaterial to the purpose here. It is

evident that both facts are important aspects of the functional differentiation which takes place in a society.

A final form of division of labor is the geographical. Different localities, even of the same nation or state, because of different environmental factors, come to devote their productive energies to different ends. The production of cotton, tobacco, and sugar in the Southern part of the United States, corn and grain in the Middle West, manufactured products in certain urban centers, minerals and metals elsewhere, furnishes a conspicuous example. Even primitive society furnishes illustration of this form of differentiation.

Our discussion of the division of labor thus far has been in terms of the economic aspects of group life only. But although it is the economists who originated the term and make the greatest use of it, the economic is but one of the needs of a group. Every occupation has its economic aspect, but it may at the same time have many others. And there are many tasks which have significance and value for the group life with which the economist has little or nothing to do. For example the functions of bearing and rearing children, the gratuitous service of public-spirited individuals in the interest of community welfare, the giving of a cup of cold water without price, the performance of such tasks as these have frequently little or no economic significance but very great significance for other aspects of group life.

The concept of a division of labor should not, therefore, be confined merely to the economic aspects of social life, but should be thought of as a differentiation of activity of every sort that has significance for the group. In short, it is a social concept and not merely an economic one.

The particular groupings that result from functional differentiation will vary of course with the particular nature of the tasks confronting a society. In primitive society the sex and age groupings are the principal ones, although there is some industrial specialization

even in very primitive groups.[2] In the early barbarian period when slavery is in its flourishing stage, the principal functional division is that between the leisure class and the laboring class. The former is engaged in the activities of government, religion, sport, warfare; the latter in the industrial and agricultural activities. Within each there will appear some subdivision. Somewhat later the mercantile and the professional groups begin to appear.

These four main divisions continued down to the beginning of the modern period: the leisure class group, made up of those engaging in government, religious control, warfare, and sport; the professional group; the mercantile group; the manual laborers. With the advent of the democratic movement and the capitalist system of production, a modification of this situation has taken place. The rulers are replaced by a staff of public servants, civil and military. The professions have become a more distinct group. The financier and entrepreneur have appeared, somewhat distinct in function but closely associated with each other in activities and in sociable intercourse. The laboring group has become differentiated into the agriculturalists, the skilled mechanical workers, the unskilled or non-mechanical laborers, the clerical or office workers, and salesmen. The function of the housewife who manages a household and bears and rears children has changed least of all. It still claims the services of the great majority of women, although an increasing number of women are now to be classified in one of the other occupations. The occupational groups in the modern western world may, therefore, be designated as follows: public servants, civil and military; professional persons; financiers, managers; small tradesmen, agriculturalists and other producers of raw materials; skilled mechanical workers; unskilled manual laborers; clerical workers; sales people; housewives. Of course each main group has many subdivisions.

[2]Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, p. 267.

It is not implied that this arrangement of modern western society presents hard and fast divisions that make it possible to classify finally every definite division. The lines are not sharply drawn and every person performs many social functions. He may therefore appear in several of these divisions or subdivisions. But for purposes of rough grouping of the members of western society, such division is useful in showing the main lines of functional differentiation.

The significance of functional differentiation for social organization is obviously very great. Its development is in fact a primary phase of the evolution of social organization. It is a part of the emergence of the coöperative element in human society, as opposed to the conflict element. It occasions a high degree of dependence of persons, one on the other, and thus is a chief factor in weaving that network of interrelations which is the very essence of human society. Society, as an entity that may be considered apart from the life of its individual members, rests upon the interdependence and interworking of its parts. It is in fact nothing less than human beings living a common life and experiencing a series of mutal reactions. It is therefore evident that anything which increases the extent to which every member of a group becomes dependent upon every other member makes for a larger expression of what we call the social process or, simply, society.

The effect upon the individual is of course correspondingly pronounced. Since a person is social to the extent that his life is merged into and becomes a part of a group, it is obvious that this process of increasing his dependence on others has the effect of enlarging his social personality in proportion as his self-sufficiency declines.[3] The more complex and varied the life of the group becomes, the larger and wider may be the life of the individual whose existence comes to be an expression of this group life. While this dependence on others might, at the outset, therefore, appear as a

[3]See also Simmel, *Soziale Differenzierung*, pp. 41-42.

limitation on personality, it is as a matter of fact a means of enlarging it.[4] That this is not merely an abstract notion is evidenced by the greater richness of the lives of those persons whose wants are supplied by the goods and services of many different kinds of workers, as compared with those who may still be found in backward communities or corners of the world consuming only the goods of their own production. It is not only, however, in the consumption of goods that we find a richer human existence following upon a differentiation of work. The intellectual and spiritual consequences that accompany the exchange of goods and services has been one of the chief elements of the expansion of the human mind and spirit through social organization.

It was noted above that the division of work was one aspect of the emergence of coöperation as a phase of human existence. It is in fact one type or method of coöperation—namely, an indirect method. The exchange of goods and services which it implies increases the productive power of the individual worker as do other forms of coöperation.

Durkheim has pointed out,[5] however, that it follows rather than precedes social organization. That is, there can be no coöperation of any sort, outside the small primitive horde, no exchange of goods and services, until there is established some sort of moral order, some confidence of men, one in another. It is a mistake, therefore, to think that coöperation is the initial process. It must be preceded by the removal of hostility and some development of confidence. When once set going it, of course, reacts on social organization and increases the feeling of goodwill and comity. From this point they must be regarded as reacting upon and strengthening each other, so that we can see the development *pari passu* of division of work, exchange and commerce, social organization and good will.

[4] Cf. Durkheim, *De la Division du Travail Social*, chap. 6.

[5] *De la Division du Travail Social*, pp. 305-312.

QUESTIONS

1. What are the elementary and universal needs of all social groups?
2. What is functional differentiation or division of labor?
3. Explain the different phases of division of labor as described by Adam Smith.
4. Explain the statement that the concept of division of labor has a broader significance than the merely economic.
5. How does the occupational grouping of modern western society differ from that of primitive society? From that of barbarian society?
6. What are some consequences of functional differentiation for society? For the individual?

EXERCISES

1. Compare the city family and the rural family with respect to functional differentiation.
2. List the principal occupational groups of your community.
3. Point out concretely some aspects of interdependence in your community that come from the functional differentiation.

III

DIFFERENCES OF RANK

BY THE rank or status which a member of a group occupies, we understand the rights and privileges he enjoys or the degree of appreciation or honor in which he is held by the other members of the group. No form of social differentiation is more fundamental than that by which a group is separated into subdivisions on this basis. For purposes of analysis we may distinguish five sorts of differences in rights, privileges, or esteem; namely, personal and civil, political, economic, religious, honorific.

Personal rights are those pertaining to control over one's person, to freedom of movement in the community, to the protection of one's person from attack, to the use of goods and services, to the engaging in any occupation. Civil rights, which are scarcely separable from personal, include such matters as privilege of marriage, inheritance, holding and transmission of property, rights of contract, the use of the courts. Political rights are those of participation in the control of community policies, the most important being the rights of franchise and of holding public office. While political rights are less fundamental than the personal and civil and are attained later than many of the latter, the attainment of political rights has frequently brought personal and civil rights that had not previously been attained. Economic rights are privileges which have to do with one's share of the goods produced by the group, and participation in the control of the processes of production, exchange, and distribution. Religious rights are those of access to the deity, control of religious activities, recognition of spiritual worth.

Whatever may be said of the philosophical validity of the doctrine of natural rights, the actual determi-

nation of rights is always in the hands of the community or the authoritative part of it. The kind and degree of privileges and opportunities which the individual enjoys are determined by the group policy. There is no enjoyment of any right of any kind, from the control of one's own person to the degree of honor received from one's follows, which is not determined by the group policy. Whether one enjoys freedom, or what degree of it he enjoys, or whether he is but a slave whose every act is at the whim of another, is a question which the group determines for every member in it.

Since all persons desire the maximum of advantage for themselves in the way of goods and opportunities for unlimited self expression, and, at the same time, enjoy control over others, both for its immediate pleasurableness and for its ultimate advantages, it follows that there will always be an unequal distribution of rights and privileges. Those who can, will reserve freedom of action for themselves, and deny it to others in so far as it is to their own advantage to do so. Entire equality of rank is probably, therefore, an impossibility, so long as there are innate differences in persons and circumstances that give some an advantage over others. Any society may for this reason be studied with reference to the distribution of rights and privileges.

From one standpoint human history might be said to be an unceasing record of struggle by those occupying an inferior rank to secure equality with those above them. No group occupying a superior rank has ever been known voluntarily to relinquish its superior position. The thirst for equality and the struggle for its attainment have always been a thirst and a struggle for equality with those just above. It is true that the inferior group has sometimes secured the assistance of the enemies of their superiors, as when the slaves in America were freed as a political measure by the North in its struggle against the South. But no group has attained any degree of equality with those above them without a struggle waged by themselves or by some one for them.

The most fundamental of rights and privileges are the personal and civil. Because these have to do with the elementary processes of life, a deprivation of them affects happiness and welfare most seriously. To be allowed the control of one's person, to go and come as one chooses, to engage in any occupation to which one is adapted, to choose a mate and live with him on the basis of mutual desire, to enter into contracts voluntarily, to have recognition as a person in the courts and in all the processes of social intercourse—such rights as these have always been deemed sacred, and denial of them a limitation on the very life process. And yet full equality in all these respects for all the members has never existed in any society. There have always been some members who demanded them for themselves and made use of any opportunity available to deny them to others. Generally there has been a gradation whereby the possession of all degrees from complete rightlessness to complete independence has been exemplified in one and the same society. The two most conspicuous examples of entire rightlessness are the position of childhood in primitive society and the position of absolute slavery. While in both of these conditions many children and slaves enjoyed much personal freedom, it was in such cases the personal gift of the individual in whose charge they were. The community recognized no grounds of interference between the parent or owner, and the child or slave. From that condition to the present one in modern western society of approximate equality in personal and civil rights of all members of a society, there have been all possible stages of development.

Political rights have been more slow in becoming equalized. There have been two reasons for desiring equality in this field; first, because of the power it secures to gain other rights. The gaining of political power by any part of the population has always put a weapon in their hands with which to fight for other rights. It follows, therefore, that the equalization of personal and civil rights has frequently waited on the

securing of political equality. In the second place, participation in shaping group policies is in itself a form of personal self-expression, and in that sense desired on its own account. To be denied it is to be denied one avenue for the exercise of personality.

It would be difficult to determine which of these motives has been the most powerful in the fight for equalization of political rights. The period of the world's history in which most progress was made in this equalization was the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, known as the period of the democratic movement in the western world. It is true that a near equality in this respect exists for the adult male population in primitive society. But this is because political organization is itself so loose and meagre. So soon as group life began to take on definite political organization and to construct a machinery of government for its expression, political rights became grossly unequal. The barbarian and early civilized periods were the times of the efflorescence of this inequality. The democratic movement in western society was the somewhat tardy reaction against this situation. It cannot be said yet to have attained more than a good beginning, even in those states where it has had its greatest development. In the eastern world it is as yet only a cloud on the horizon.

Differences in religious rights and privileges include distinctions with reference to freedom of access to the deity, to control of the religious activities of the group, and to the possession of spiritual worth. A large number of the religious systems of the world are based on the assumption that access to the deity must be made by the large part of the community through others who are conceived as occupying a more favorable position with reference to the confidence of the supernal being or the ease of approach to him. A fundamental tenet of the Protestant movement in Christianity was that of the priesthood of all believers. According to this doctrine all persons may commune with the Deity with equal propriety and with equal success. That this

principle has not been accepted by all the members of the western world, much less of the eastern, is a fact of common knowledge. And even in those Protestant communities in which the principle has been accepted we still see a monopoly of control of certain religious activities in the hands of a special clerical class. And this class is nearly always exclusively masculine. The extreme of religious ranking is seen in some parts of the eastern world, where not only are access to the deity and control of religious activities the prerogatives of a few but also there is a recognized distinction in the possession of spiritual qualities. Thus the higher and lower castes of India are conceived of as proceeding from different parts of the body of the Deity, and in many communities a large part of the population is regarded as not possessing souls while others do. Frequently the possession of a soul is a masculine privilege not participated in by the feminine portion of the group.

Economic rights, being concerned with one's share in the goods of the group and in the control of the economic processes, have been the subject of sharp conflict. As in the field of political rights, there is little inequality in economic standing in primitive society. It is only when artificial production, in the form of stock raising and agriculture, supplant a desultory hunting and fishing stage that economic inequalities appear. From that time onward, every society shows a division between those who have and those who have not, or at least between those who have much and those who have little. If it is true that "the poor you have with you always," it must be true that the wealthy are equally omnipresent, with many gradations between the two extremes. Every social group, such as a nation, is in a certain real sense an economic unit. In proportion as a division of labor prevails, all parts depend for their existence in that measure upon every other part. If the problem of producing the means of living is considered as one unitary task, where a division of labor prevails, every member is working on

but a small part of the whole task. The goods produced must, therefore, in a very real sense be considered the property of the whole group which produces them. The problem of the distribution of wealth in any society is, therefore, that of determining the share of the total product that shall go to the various members or sub-groups. Since human wants increase faster than the means of satisfying them, those who can, arrogate to themselves as large a part of the available wealth as is possible. Every society, therefore, presents a differentiation on the basis of the amount of the total wealth of the group which the different members are able to secure. In terms of consumption this is spoken of as difference in the standard of living.

And since the control of the process is essential to securing an advantage in the distribution of the product, we note a differentiation in the possession of the control exercised by different members of the group over the process of production and exchange. Here as in the case of political rights, it is true that the control is desired also for the satisfaction it gives in the expression of personality. On these two foundations rest all the historic struggles for wealth and mastery in the economic field. Slavery, while an institution of inequality in personal, civil, and political rights, had its chief foundation in the desire for economic advantage. Serfdom and the modern system of capitalism likewise have rested upon a differentiation of social groups with respect to income and to the control of the economic process.

There has probably been less progress in the equalization of economic rights and privileges than in any of the other fields. The democratic movement has done much toward removing differences in personal and civil rights, and much also toward equalization of political rights. But the economic organization of society still shows much of the same inequality in sharing the group wealth, and in control of the economic process, as has existed from the earlier periods. The

abolishing of slavery and the substitution of the free wage labor system for serfdom were principally movements in the equalization of personal and civil rights. The proportionate share of the total wealth, and participation in real control of the economic process, both rest in much the same relative position as before. This is not denying a very real improvement in the actual standard of living of the laboring classes. But the production of wealth has increased so greatly that the level of income has been raised all along the line. It is very questionable whether the gap between the actual income of the upper and lower classes is not wider under capitalism than under slavery. The organized labor movement and social efforts of the modern period have resulted in some increase in the share received by the laborer. It has not, however, succeeded in securing for the laborer any considerable participation in the control of the economic process.

Honorific distinctions of rank are somewhat more subtle than the personal and civil, the political, the religious, and the economic, but are none the less real and fundamental in every society. That is, in every social group of any size the members receive different degrees of appreciation or honor from their fellow men. This does not refer to the natural and spontaneous expression of appreciation in the presence of individual worth. This latter sort of honor is conferred on any or all individuals whose worth attracts especial attention. Such recognition of individuals here and there in the group does not result in a permanent division into ranks or classes. Such honor is enjoyed for a brief period until some one else catches the popular eye or ear. The person who can maintain such distinction for any considerable length of time is very exceptional. The caprices of fame are notorious. But there is observed in all societies a somewhat permanent division of the members in accordance with the honor attached to the positions they occupy.

In its origin this is simply a corollary of superiority in other matters of rank. Those possessing the advan-

tage in personal and civil, political, religious, and economic rights will be looked up to with greater appreciation than are those possessed of inferior rights. It thus comes about that the position of master, or noble, or free citizen, or senator, or millionaire is more honorable than that of servant or plebeian, or serf, or member of the proletariat. So long as there is a real distinction in the rights and privileges possessed, distinction of honor will be merely an incident in this other form of differentiation. But when the upward pressure of the lower classes has abolished many of these earlier distinctions, the distinction of honor clings like a shell about the old forms. Thus, because manual labor was one time forced while mental labor was freely chosen, the modern highly paid mechanic occupies a lower social position than the poorly paid lawyer. Because men have occupied the position of masters, and women that of those who obey, men's occupations are more highly honored than women's. The nobility at one time carried with it superiority of all kinds of rights. While an appointment by the king to-day to the nobility carries with it few advantages in the way of superior rights, yet the honor attaching to the position still remains. Hobhouse well observes:

> So modern is the change whereby law and public institutions have turned towards equality rather than subordination as their ideal. An ideal such equality must perhaps always be. Wealth and influence will always have their weight, not only in social life, but in the business of government and even in the administration of justice. Yet the true spirit of caste is gradually being reduced to a shadow of its former self. Expelled by slow degrees from the sphere of law and government, it has been left to amuse itself with a mock kingdom in the region of ceremonial and social intercourse in which the ghosts of by-gone realities keep up a mock state for the amusement of the philosopher.[1]

Persistent demand for some sort of honorific distinction that will secure recognition and elevate one out of the common herd is an omnipresent trait of human nature. Where the democratic movement has removed the more obvious distinctions of rank, a large

[1] *Morals in Evolution*, Vol. I, p. 330.

number of exclusive societies and orders come into existence, the chief object of which is to give to the members some claim to distinction over their fellows. To be a descendent of a passenger in the Sunflower, or a Colonial Damsel, or a Daughter of the Civil War, or a member of the Ancient Order of the Town Clock, or of the Village Two Hundred, or of a college organization with a cryptic name and an esoteric ritual, brings to many individuals a deep and satisfying peace of soul.

The term applied to a section of a population, other than an age group or a sex group, distinguished by a peculiar status with respect to rights and privileges is "social class." While distinctions of right and status are drawn between age groups and between the sexes, the term "class" is not usually used except in reference to a whole section of the population, including all ages and both sexes, although there are societies in which the distinctions of rights between the sexes are so marked as to constitute the two sexes separate classes.[2]

It is true that classes are generally thought of as differing in more respects than in the rights or privileges enjoyed. These other peculiar marks of class are, however, the result of the possession or deprivation of rights and privileges. Thus a privileged class may arrogate to itself peculiar occupations from which others are excluded. A slave or laboring class may be assigned a particular type of work. The culture, habits of thought, mental and moral peculiarities, standard of living, which characterize a class,—all follow, as a consequence, the type of activity pursued or the cultural privileges enjoyed. Whatever the peculiar characteristics are, therefore, by which a social class is distinguished, the possession of rights or privileges must be regarded as the foundation on which they rest.[3]

[2]Lowie uses the term to distinguish age groups. *Primitive Society*, p. 314.

[3]Park and Burgess (*Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 204) observe that the psychological bond of a class is community of interests. This is doubtless true when a class becomes self-conscious. But the interest that binds, in this case, is an interest in preserving rights and privileges now possessed, or in securing those which are at present out of reach.

Generally the term designates a sub-group which in all or several of these respects occupies a distinct position, for it generally happens that a difference in one kind of rank is accompanied by a difference in others When, however, a movement begins for the removal of differences of rank, but one difference at a time succumbs to the attack. It thus comes about that a lower class which has succeeded in wiping out most of the marks of inequality that separate it from the others still finds itself rated as a distinct class because of some remaining difference. The honorific is generally the last distinction to disappear. When all other differences have vanished, the thirst for superiority finally takes refuge in this distinction which the elect defend desperately against the attacks of the "climbers." Some writers have used the term, class, in a somewhat looser sense, as Cooley, who says: "Speaking roughly, we may call any persistent social group other than the family, existing within a larger group, a class."[4] Popular usage, however, tends to imply a sense of rank in the term. It seems better, therefore, for our purposes here to confine it to any sub-group of the whole population which occupies a distinct rank. The term, caste, frequently associated with it, applies more directly to those classes which have become fixed, and membership in which is derived through birth. All classes tend to become castes.

The particular system of social classes that exists in any population is peculiar to that group. Scarcely any two nations show the same class divisions. Thus two modern nations as similar as Great Britain and the United States have many significant differences in this respect. In all countries the peculiar system that prevails is the result of a long historical development. Nations will differ therefore in this in proportion as their histories differ.

Some examples of class divisions may make the nature of this form of social differentiation clearer.

[4] *Social Organization*, p. 209.

Hobhouse well describes the situation prevailing in most primitive and early barbarian communities:[5]

The primitive community is as a rule small but compact and homogeneous. There is always the distinction between its own members and outsiders; there is also a greater or less distinction in the rights enjoyed by the two sexes. In other respects the obligations constituting its ethical life are fairly uniform. But as society grows and its industrial life develops, as primitive barbarism gives way to some degree of culture, this simplicity of the early social organization breaks up, and now the group principle obtains a fresh development. Distinct groups arise within each society, within the limits of a single community, under one king or one governing body. Besides the group of free men—to use that term provisionally—who constitute the members of the community in the fullest sense of the word, there arise inferior classes, slaves or serfs or low-caste men, who are in the community and yet not of it, who are subject to its laws and customs, but not possessed of all the civil rights, which membership confers. These inferior groups within the community occupy a position which is morally and legally analogous to that of strangers and enemies. In extreme cases they are wholly devoid of rights, in other cases their inferiority is marked by a more or less serious lack of the civil rights enjoyed by their superiors.

* * *

Not merely political privileges, but civil rights, the right of holding property, the right of personal freedom, the right of marriage, even the right of protection of life or limb, are wholly or in part denied to classes excluded from full membership in the community. Such distinctions of personal status are found in one form or another in the great mass of societies, civilized or uncivilized, which stand above the lowest stages of culture. They persist well into the modern period, and are but slowly modified, and partially abrogated in proportion as the whole principle of group-morality yields to ethical criticism. Of these distinctions the commonest is, of course, the distinction between slave and freeman, but slavery is in many cases replaced by serfdom and in others by caste. What is common to all three institutions is the derogation from full rights which they imply. In detail they are distinct, though the line of demarcation is not always easy to draw. We may say that the slave, properly regarded, is a man whom law and custom regard as the property of another. In extreme cases he is wholly without rights, a pure chattel; in other cases he may be protected in certain respects, but so may an ox or as ass. As long as he is for all ordinary purposes completely at his master's disposal, rendering to his master the fruits of his work,

[5] *Morals in Evolution*, Vol. I, pp. 281-283.

performing his work under orders, rewarded at his master's discretion, and liable to punishment on his master's judgment, he may, though protected in other relations, fairly be called a slave. If, on the other hand, he acquires a certain position of his own, obtains property from which he cannot be dislodged except for some default, enjoys the right of marriage and protection for life and limb, he becomes, though still liable to labor under his master's direction, still subject, perhaps, to punishment and, still in an inferior legal position, no longer a slave strictly so called but a serf. Serf and slave alike belong as a rule to private masters. A servile caste, on the other hand, is not necessarily in the ownership of any man or body of men. It is distinguished by a greater or less lack of personal rights, by social inferiority, and probably by a taboo cutting it off from intercourse with others. And as there may be servile castes falling below the normal level of free men, so there may be privileged castes of nobles possessing, as it were, an excess of rights, and these privileges may indirectly depress the position of the ordinary member of society and impair his freedom by withholding protection from him in relation to one of the nobility. Finally, the whole community may suffer a similar depression in relation to the king, who, in the extreme development of the despotic principle, becomes, as we have seen, eminent owner of all property and lord of the persons of his subjects. In such cases, though there may still be distinct grades in society, yet all subjects alike are in principle destitute of rights.

India furnishes an excellent example of a system of rank that has persisted from the barbarian period down into the civilized. The classes here have become rigid castes to a greater extent probably than in any other society. The four castes are the Brahmans or priestly caste, the Kshabuya or warriors, the Vaisya or agriculturalists, the Sudra or servile caste. In addition there are the pariahs who are out-caste, excluded from all castes. The subdivision of each caste has resulted in the creation of several hundred distinct gradations. In such a caste system the functional differentiation is closely associated with the possession of rights and privileges. The occupation, however, is secondary to the matter of rank. There are many sub-castes and mixed castes within the main divisions. The rights and privileges are strictly graded from the Brahman down to the Sudra, and the distinctions concern personal and civil, political, economic, religious, and honorific rights and privileges.

Another historical example of interest is the Roman. Here the rigidity of caste was broken by the constant shifting of the lines whereby those occupying a lower rank were granted additional rights of various kinds. The broad distinction was between freemen and slaves. The latter were practically devoid of rights. Freemen were divided into citizens and aliens. The aliens might be either clients or plebeians. The clients were outsiders who had put themselves under the protection of powerful citizen families. Their protection was entirely a personal one and they had no rights which the laws undertook to enforce except certain personal ones. The plebeians were also outsiders who had no personal protectors but who at first enjoyed personal and civil freedom under the law. They gradually, because of their increasing numbers, secured a larger measure of political and economic privileges. The citizens who exercised full political privileges were divided into two groups on the basis of family relations. Those who had no father living, or who had been emancipated from his power, were independent in all matters. Where a father was living and had retained his *patria potestas*, all his descendents were subject to his personal control.

The Greek classification was not greatly different from the Roman. "In Athenian times a while previous to Solon the proportion of the population was as follows: Citizens of all classes, 9 per cent; strangers, subject to severe restrictions, 18 per cent; slaves 73 per cent. The warrior, magisterial and priestly classes were the higher classes; the merchants, the artisans and the agriculturalists formed the middle class; the common laborers, the lower class or plebs."[6]

In the modern western world, classes have come to rest chiefly on economic distinctions. In Europe there are some traces of gradation in political rights which have survived the democratic movement; and in the United States the disfranchisement of the negro and

[6] Topinard, *Science and Faith*, p. 201.

other discriminations against him rest upon a racial basis. But all over the western world the economic differences are the most significant and far-reaching in creating class distinctions.

Occupation and the amount of wealth possessed are the chief marks of this differentiation. Although cleavages are not sharp and individuals constantly pass from one class to another, in general four classes are recognized; the class of capitalists and large employers; the smaller merchants and employers and the professional group; the wage-earning class; the agricultural class. There are, of course, many subdivisions recognized within each division. Sometimes when the possession of wealth alone is considered we hear of three classes; the wealthy, the middle class, the poor class.

In many respects the present economic situation represents the stage of absolutism prevailing in the political field in the early eighteenth century. The distribution of wealth and the control of the economic processes are frankly based on a relation of superior and inferior with a middle class between. One modern writer describes the present order as a "benevolent feudalism" with the professional group filling the place of retainers to the over-lords. While a description in such terms contains much exaggeration there is also much actual fact to justify the use of the terms.

Perhaps complete equality of rank is an ideal never to be attained. But whenever any particular sort of inequality in privilege or station enjoyed by a few becomes oppressive enough, and the many who are victims become conscious of their power, that distinction will disappear. The present economic unrest presages undoubtedly the same end to the excessive and artificial distinctions in this field as came to those of the personal and the civil and political type during the latter part of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

In the Eastern world, while there are some indications here and there of unrest among the lower

classes, the battle may be said hardly to have begun for equalization of even the most fundamental of human rights between the classes. It would seem that for the greater part of that section of the world the idea of a permanent differentiation of rank is as firmly fixed an element of the social consciousness as is the need for air. The penetration of the East, however, by Western commerce and education has there started going forces that will eventually completely change the character of all Eastern society.

Difference of rank has much greater power than difference of function to isolate the life of one part of society from another. It forms sub-groups which live in physical proximity to one another, but who inhabit worlds as different as though separated by thousands of miles. Human society presents no stranger phenomenon than this, that persons in daily contact, breathing the same air, frequently sheltered by the same roof, consuming much the same sort of goods, should regard themselves as separated by eternal barriers which even prevent the operation of the ordinary human obligations toward one another.

As illustrating one phase of this isolation, namely a lack of sympathy between the classes, Westermarck cites a typical group of cases:[7]

> As descendents of different ancestors, members of noble families keep up their separate position, and remain almost as foreigners to the people among whom they live. Speculating on the want of sympathy among the various classes in societies in which such distinctions are recognized, Count de Tocqueville says, "Each caste has its own opinions, feelings, rights, manners, and modes of living. Thus the men of whom each caste is composed do not resemble the mass of their fellow-citizens; they do not think or feel in the same manner, and they scarcely believe that they belong to the same human race.
>
> . . . When the chroniclers of the Middle Ages, who all belonged to the aristocracy by birth or education, relate the tragical end of a noble, their grief flows apace; whereas they tell you at a breath, and without wincing, of massacres and tortures inflicted on the common sort of people. Not that these writers felt habitual hatred

[7] *History of Human Marriage*, pp. 369-370.

or systematic disdain for the people; war between the several classes of the community was not yet declared. They were impelled by an instinct rather than by a passion; as they had formed no clear notion of a poor man's sufferings, they cared but little for his fate." Then, in proof of this, the writer gives extracts from Madame de Sévigné's letters, displaying a cruel jocularity which, in our day, "the harshest man writing to the most insensible person of his acquaintance" would not venture wantonly to indulge in; and yet Madame de Sévigné was not selfish or cruel; she was passionately attached to her children, and ever ready to sympathize with her friends, and she treated her servants and vassals with kindness and indulgence.

Many modern instances might be cited showing the same sense of isolation of classes and inability to appreciate the sufferings of members of another class. Newspapers, in reporting serious industrial accidents, frequently indicate whether it was a "foreigner" or "American" who was injured, in recognizing the fact that the readers' feelings will be less harassed if it is "only a foreigner." Many persons are not greatly concerned about bad housing conditions or high infant mortality or sufferings from poverty, so long as it is among negroes or immigrants, or members of the "lower class."

This class isolation thus favors in the same way as does geographical isolation the operation of a group morality. In fact the consciousness of class difference is generally more keen than the consciousness of a difference from those separated by many geographical barriers. And human brotherhood generally finds more ready expression between those separated by leagues of space than between those separated by a difference of rank.

QUESTIONS

1. Define each of the different forms of distinction in status.
2. Why has the securing of equality of political rights been regarded as so valuable by so many rebels against the established order?
3. Define social class; caste.
4. Describe the social classification of primitive society; of India; of ancient Rome.

5. What are the foundations on which class distinctions in modern western society rest?

6. What are some consequences of differentiation of status for human relations?

EXERCISES

1. What are the distinguishing marks of the various social classes in your community?

2. How does differentiation of rank in the modern American city compare with the situation of the pioneer community? What has caused the change?

3. Are American classes becoming castes? What is the evidence?

4. What unfortunate cleavages in human relations have you observed as a result of class distinctions?

IV

DIFFERENCES OF CULTURE

IN ADDITION to differences in social function and in rank or status, we are constantly confronted in human society with differences in the culture of people. Culture is defined by Tylor as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capability and habits acquired by man as a member of society."[1] That is, we have to deal here with the content of men's minds and the forms in which that content is expressed.

On the side of content, mind is essentially a thing of social origin. While we no longer accept the espistemology of Locke that would describe the mind of the newly born infant as a *tabula rasa*, we do recognize the fact that the mind is built up out of materials furnished by the social environment. Undoubtedly each individual organism reacts differently to like stimuli, and in that sense each human mind has about it a certain uniqueness which is dependent on the biological inheritance. But the mind is also colored by the kind of materials that it feeds upon. And any group of persons supplied with the same set of mental impressions will show a striking similarity in thought and character and habit, in spite of the variety of individual reaction.

It is for this reason that we recognize outstanding differences of thought and habit between groups, in fact, all differences of culture, as social differences. They are traceable to a difference in the environmental influences of the groups and sub-groups. We no longer think that particular religious beliefs and practices, political convictions, moral standards, aesthetic norms, peculiarities of language, types of institutions, methods of living, are matters of biological inheritance. When

[1] *Primitive Culture*, p. 1.

we find groups of people different in these respects, we immediately begin searching for differences in the environmental influences that have supplied their minds with the raw materials out of which their beliefs and opinions have been built, or different situations to which they were compelled to adjust themselves.

There are, of course, an almost infinite number of possible differences in culture that may exist between two groups. But the outstanding differences in their psychic life, those that are generally thought of when one undertakes to characterize any one group or distinguish it from another, are comparatively few in number. These more significant differences are: language, political, economic, domestic and other institutions, religion, mores, art, fundamental notions, types of intellectual process, forms of amusement and recreation, economic technique. A difference between groups in any one of these items is generally accompanied by corresponding differences in others, since the development of most items of culture proceeds *pari passu* with others. As in the case of differences of rank, however, the disappearance of previously existing culture differences generally occurs a step at a time, so that where one group is adopting the culture of another a very considerable number of differences may have been eliminated while some glaring distinction remains to mock the thirst for consistency. Thus the manners of the new rich may have come to correspond with the manner of their newly found associates, but their conversation will reveal the absence of complete assimilation of the foreign culture.

There is no community made up of more than a single family which does not present some differences in numerous items of culture. Even in language every family has particular shades of meanings associated with words which are different from the meanings current in other families of the same immediate neighborhood. In moral standards, beliefs, amusements, etc., the differences are still more marked. The lines of cultural cleavage do not, however, follow family

lines chiefly. In fact family lines are among the least important of cultural cleavages. The deepest cleavage in the cultural elements of a population tends to follow functional and class lines, although the cultural distinction is scarcely ever completely identical with either of these.

Like differences of function and of rank the cultural differences have little place in the earliest human society. Certain essential differences in direction of attention, modes of amusement and recreation, moral standards, technique undoubtedly follow sex and age differences in primitive society. But apart from these the primitive community presents almost a dead level of cultural homogeneity. The psychic processes are confined within a narrow area, and while all of the phases of culture may exist, they are so little evolved, and there are such small differences of social opportunity, that such culture as exists is for the most part assimilated by all. Moreover, custom is so rigid that practically all the activities of all individuals are minutely defined by group habits that all must observe, with little place for individual preferences.

As in the case of functional and class differences, the subjection of one group to another was the beginning of the earliest cultural differentiation. The separation into leisure and working classes immediately set up a difference in the direction of attention and in technique. Freedom for intellectual, predatory, religious, and aesthetic pursuits was secured for the dominant class, and within this circle were developed additions and refinements of psychic activity. The working group remained for a considerable period totally outside this development and never acquired all of it. On the other hand, the laboring group has developed a specialized psychic and manual technique associated with the occupation pursued.

When conquest takes place, any one of three possible situations may prevail. The conquerors may have reached a stage of cultural development superior to the conquered; they may occupy the same level; or

they may be inferior. If the conquerors are greatly superior in culture, they will impose certain elements of their culture upon the conquered in order to increase the utility of the latter, and the conquered will gladly absorb the proffered culture. So long, however, as class lines are drawn, the inferior class will never quite succeed in attaining the entire content of the upper class mind. Moreover, the upper class will seek to prevent a complete psychic amalgamation, because some cultural distinction is useful to sustain the pride of the upper class and also to prevent the acquisition of ability on the part of the lower class to revolt.

If the conquerors and the conquered occupy the same level of refinement or nearly so, but with a different content of culture, the cultural cleavage will remain from the first sharply defined unless removed by force. The upper class will scorn to copy from the lower and the latter, conscious of its own worth will hold to its peculiar culture as the essential mark of its national identity. Force, however, if sufficient, may succeed in imposing the culture of the upper class on the lower. But so long as a distinction in rank prevails the lower class will attempt to maintain its culture. With the removal of class distinctions a friendly exchange takes place in which each group gives and takes. The result is a compound made up of elements of both.

If the conquered occupy a higher level of civilization than the conquerors, the institutions, gods, technique, et cetera, of the conquered are taken over by the conquerors, and culture differences rapidly disappear. Differences of rank cannot long survive such a situation.

From abundant evidence gathered in recent years it seems clear that the fundamental culture differences of practically all nations whose origin goes back any considerable distance originated in the subordination of one group to another. In the *Theory of the Leisure Class* Veblen has well shown that these fundamental differences become transfused into a complex system

of subtle distinctions that persist between the leisure classes and the industrial classes, and the wealth of illustration that Veblen draws from the modern life of the western world shows that class lines and culture lines still have strong affinities for each other.

There are two ways in which rank may determine culture. In the first place, rank may prescribe the social function to which one is assigned. Function determines the direction of attention and from this follows most of one's mental content. The occupations that people are engaged in have always had profound influence on their religion, morals, art, intellectual processes, recreations. Since we now know that mind is built up out of the adjustments we are forced to meet in practical situations, we cannot escape the corollary that to define one's occupation means to define much of his mind.

In the second place, rank influences culture by prescribing one's opportunity of access to the sources of thought material. Progress in psychic efficiency depends on the accumulation of racial achievement. Until man began to utilize past experience and to build upon the thought of the past there was no progress. These past achievements are stored up in records of various kinds. Access to these records is therefore a *sine qua non* of all refinement of mental process. Leisure and the requisite economic means are the principal items in this opportunity of access. Differentiation of rank has provided this access for some and denied it to others. Class distinctions become, therefore, the determiners of culture distinctions to the degree that they control access to the raw materials of thought. It must be borne in mind, moreover, that this does not refer alone to access to formal education, but also to that cultural environment which when enjoyed from childhood to age is the most potent of all agencies for the development of the cultured man.

Within the modern period of Western society the removal of old class distinctions has removed more and more of the cultural distinctions. Are we to expect

therefore in modern society an approach to cultural homogeneity? It would seem not, for the modern world is experiencing along with the removal of old class lines a tremendous increase of variety and heterogeneity in most of the items that make up the culture of all civilized societies. Never before has the world been so rich in variety of intellectual conception, of religious thought and practice, of artistic and moral standards, of recreational methods, of manual technique. Far from bringing cultural homogeneity, the removal of class distinction is accompanied by just the opposite situation.

What is the explanation? Three influences may be named. First, as the minds of all members of society have had freer access to the materials of thought, the individual traits of men have found free expression in myriad directions. Human individuality has had an opportunity to show itself as never before. In the second place, functional differences have grown apace and these have shunted men's attention into such a variety of channels that their minds have shown a thousand different kinds of stamps. Finally, society, growing more sure of itself and encouraged by the attitude of the scientist, has become more tolerant and less insistent upon orthodoxy. We have discovered that there may be more than one way to express truth, or more than one right way of doing anything.

We are yet, however, far from such an equalization of leisure and economic income as would give to all the same opportunity for mental development. So long as this inequality exists the primary cultural distinction must continue to be that between those, on the one hand, who are devoid of technical skill of any kind and ignorant of the fundamental concepts necessary for successful living, and, on the other hand, those whose training enables them not only to meet successfully the ordinary issues of life, but to exploit the ignorant and spend their surplus on the refinements of intellectual and aesthetic pursuits.

Ward, in speaking of the ignorance of the lower classes well says:[2]

To realize the social import of this, it is only necessary to contrast the condition of the members of society classed as intelligent with that of the members classed as unintelligent or ignorant. In even the most advanced societies the latter always exceed the former numerically, usually constituting at least three-fourths or four-fifths of the population. They are as a rule very poor, often indigent, but industrious and overworked. The others are as a rule well-to-do, and if they work at all, as most of them do, it is at the lighter kinds of labor, mostly intellectual. This is considered by many as a natural, proper, and advantageous spontaneous classification of the population. The control of society is also entirely in the hands of the intelligent few, and the ignorant mass can only submit to whatever regulations their superiors choose to impose. Of course these regulations are always in the interest of the intelligent class, and the ignorant mass is made to bear the chief burdens. In democratic communities where the uninformed have votes, it is found easy to deceive them and cause them to vote against their own interests and for the interests of the well-informed, so that this vaunted right does them quite as much harm as good. If any one protests against any of these things, the answer is that it is a law of nature that intelligence shall rule, and this usually closes the argument.

* * *

The intelligent classes of modern society possess a certain amount of knowledge of a highly practical character, which serves them as a guide to conduct looking to their personal advantage. It is for the most part superficial knowledge, it is true, but this is all that is required for the purpose. They have the tools necessary to keep familiar with current events, to look after their business interests, and to forecast such future prospects as are needful in determining their action from day to day. They know enough of human nature to see how the uninformed class can be utilized in promoting their interests.

It is to the removal of this sort of cultural distinction that the energies of many of the best minds of the present day are devoted, and such removal is undoubtedly one of the fundamental ends that the democratic movement is striving for. In the meantime, because of the reasons cited above, we must expect a continual increase within each class of variety of beliefs, ideals, moral and aesthetic standards, modes of recrea-

[2] *Applied Sociology*, pp. 91-92.

tion, habits of living, and any other element of human culture that expresses a difference in personal reaction or previous experiences. That is, while deprecating the cultural differences which arise from class distinction, we look with favor on those which, within each class, arise from variety of personal reaction.

Another aspect of cultural differentiation is its relation to social disorganization. Without some degree of like-mindedness no social group can continue. A high degree of cultural differences may endanger the existence of the group. Whether we consider the voluntary group, the community, the nation, or the state, we have the problem of maintaining a sufficient degree of likeness of mind to make it possible for the members of the group to live together.

Different elements of culture have varying influences in this direction. A difference of language is perhaps the most dangerous of all forms of cultural differences, from this standpoint. By preventing communication it makes impossible a development of comradeship; it makes the adjustment of small differences difficult so that they rapidly become disruptive; it directs the minds of the members to different sources of tradition, since different literature will be read. The very sound of a foreign tongue has a peculiar influence on the mind in creating a sense of disharmony with those who speak it.

The practical side of this problem has been recognized whenever a state has confronted the task of assimilating a new people. The first effort has been in the direction of securing the use of a common language. It is true that the methods used have frequently been so harsh and impolitic as to nullify any assimilative influence that the common language would secure, and actually create a wider cleavage. It is also true that language must be regarded as merely a tool to secure actual spiritual oneness and that merely to secure a common tongue is but the beginning of a genuine assimilation. Yet when these facts are recog-

nized, it is still true that to leave a permanent difference of language in a group is to permit the existence of an influence that will constantly tend to increase social disorganization.

Next to difference of language, a difference of religion has been probably the most disrupting influence in a social group. This arises from the fact that religion enters so vitally into the deeper experiences of men, and is held to be of such serious import that it is extremely difficult for anyone to live in full social coöperation and fellowship with those whose religion is widely different from his own. This was particularly true under forms of religion that rested largely upon a fear of the gods or contained a large element of the supernatural. To tolerate or fraternize with those who did not honor one's own god or who indulged in practices that were abhorrent to him was to endanger one's own welfare. The god being vindictive and jealous would visit wrath upon those who did not exterminate his enemies. Or at least it was not meet and proper to live on friendly terms with those who denied his existence or who openly engaged in practices that were displeasing in his sight. The only thing permissible is to attempt to convert the unbelievers. This leads to proselytism which breeds jealousies and factionalism.

It is only when the character of religion itself changes, that toleration and mutual respect is possible between groups differing in religious faith. As individualistic, otherworldly salvation as an ideal is replaced by social salvation, and the fear of God becomes translated into love for one's fellow men, the inconsistency of religious intolerance becomes apparent. This is evident in the history of even so advanced a religion as the Christian. A slight acquaintance with European history since the advent of Christianity will furnish sufficient evidence of the disrupturing influences of Christianity in the period marked by an over-emphasis on individualism and supernaturalism. From the separation of the Roman empire into the Eastern and Western empires to the British-Irish con-

troversy of the twentieth century, religious intolerance has been the most powerful ally of political jealousies in disrupting states and nations. And even America is familiar with the obstacles to the working solidarity of local communities that creedal and denominational jealousies and intolerance have created even to the present day. The present indications of a more tolerant and coöperative attitude between religious bodies is contemporaneous with the growth of a more human, social conception of religion. It is in this change in the character of religion that our hopes lie that differences of religious belief and practice will cease to be a bar to social unity.

Next to language and religion, the most disruptive cultural influence is national tradition. Nationality is based largely upon commonness of tradition. Traditions are created out of the past experiences of a people, around which time and literature have woven a halo of glory. Given a body of such group memories, including accounts of dead heroes and achievements and exploits by representatives of the group, we have an exceedingly strong national bond. When now it is sought to unite such a national group with another group having a different set of traditions, the assimilation is difficult. It is this rock upon which many empires and states have broken. There are many examples, however, where wise statesmanship has succeeded in solving the problem. Those successful examples, quite as much as the failures, show that the secret of success lies in not permitting allegiance to two traditions to come into antagonism. The success of Roman administration of new territory lay largely in adding the glory of Roman tradition to that of local tradition instead of trying to supplant the old by the new. The citizens of the new territory were permitted to retain their old traditions, but along side of these was built up an allegiance to Roman tradition. Successful assimilation of new peoples in modern times has followed similar methods. Whenever it is sought to supplant one with the other, by forceful methods, the

loyalty to the old develops an antagonism that widens the cleavage between the groups. But where the traditions of the new are laid side by side with the old, allegiance to the new is gradually acquired without any sense of shock arising from antagonism between the two.

With a common language, toleration and coöperation between religious groups, and possession of a common tradition, there is little danger in the permission and even encouragement of variety in religion, political and economic thought, scientific theory, artistic expression, mode of recreation, habit of daily life, so long as in actual practice the demonstrably antisocial is not reached. It is now recognized that social disorganization does not proceed from differences in these latter fields. In fact a policy of repression of variety in culture is recognized to be more dangerous to the maintenance of a stable social order than is a policy that gives free expression to the human spirit.

This freeing of the human spirit by the removal of old restrictions on thought and practice has made variety of culture one of the leading characteristics of modern society. And instead of deprecating differences in thought and in habit, we find in those communities most thoroughly modern a positive encouragement of variety.

It is true that intolerance has nowhere completely disappeared and, in many communities, it still is the dominant attitude. Many public officials and legislators still reflect this ancient fear of any departure from a narrow orthodoxy and provincialism. The unfortunate sequelæ of the World War gave particular opportunity for a recrudesence of this attitude. A narrow conception of nationalism and a fear inspired by the breaking up of many elements of the old social order very naturally gave encouragement and temporary advantage to those elements in all communities which have always been ultra-conservative and intolerant. The result was that for a time freedom of thought and

speech seemed to be relegated again to the dungeon, and a brutal intolerance, that masked itself under the guise of patriotism, held sway.

But nothing is more evident than that the human spirit, at least in the western world, will never again permanently endure the bonds of an orthodoxy, whether religious, scientific, political, economic, aesthetic, that would confine thought and expression within restricted boundaries, or be content with a reduction of all members of a community to a dead uniformity in mode of daily life.

There are other influences, however, besides law and public opinion that may more subtly tend to reduce all thinking and action to a standardized type. The newspaper and popular magazines, the theatre, rapid and widespread communication, the influence of mechanized industry, all tend to bring before large numbers of people simultaneously the same stimuli and thought pattern. The congestion of large numbers of people in cities, where the mode of life as to housing, feeding, recreations, transportation requires a highly mechanized type of existence, forces the thinking and acting of many into fixed moulds.

It is only the more vigorous and trained minds that may resist these more subtle standardizing influences. The attempts of law or of organizations, created to enforce intolerant attitudes, contain the seeds of their own destruction. They engender an antagonism that eventually, and rather quickly to-day in the western world, will react strongly against such attempts at coercion. But the more subtle influences of mechanized living and working and of feeding the mind on standardized materials arouse no such antagonism. Under such influences uniformity steals upon the mind unawares and works its results painlessly, with no glorious resistance such as comes from those whose liberties are threatened by force.

The protection from such a creeping mental paralysis can come only from those educational and scientific agencies that see clearly the advantage to society

of the fullest expression of the great potential variety that exists in the minds of men. Under proper educational stimulus minds may be trained to independent thinking and put on the track of interesting pursuits of original projects. A mind that has once experienced the thrill of experimentation and exploration, that has discovered the joy of pioneering independently in untrodden paths, can be proof against even the constraint of the modern newspaper and of conventionalized conduct. To start minds on this spiritual quest is the great function of science and education.

QUESTIONS

1. What are the three possible situations with respect to culture that may exist when one group conquers another?
2. How may rank determine culture?
3. Why may we not expect a continual progress toward cultural homogeneity?
4. What foundation of cultural distinction in modern western society is undesirable?
5. How are differences of language, religion, and national tradition related to social disorganization?
6. Is it safe for modern governments to permit variation in religion; political theory; economic thought?
7. What modern influences, other than government, tend to repress cultural variation and how may they be neutralized?

EXERCISES

1. What broad distinctions in cultural levels exist in your community?
2. Need religious differences separate a community into factions? How may such a result be avoided?
3. Should foreign language newspapers in the U. S. be suppressed? Why?
4. How can the school prepare the mind to resist the forces working toward mental standardization?

V

DIFFERENCES OF INTEREST[1]

HUMAN activity springs from the efforts of men to satisfy fundamental wants or needs. Whether or not we choose to call these wants "social forces" it remains true that the conduct of human beings must be traced back directly to these impulses. These wants or needs are numerous. One essential distinction between human beings and animals is in the greater variety of wants that members of the human species evince. Man shares with animals his need for food, shelter, companionship, sex gratification, muscular activity, rest, play. But beyond these he wants many things that never appear on the mental horizon of the animal. And even in those wants that he shares with animals there is much greater variety of forms of gratification, so that in actual expression we find man demanding many more qualitatively different objects for the satisfaction of each organic need. Man's food demands, his sex needs, his seeking after muscular activity and rest and play, all express themselves in a greater number of wants than we find in the expression of animals. And when we get beyond these elementary animal wants into the region of intellectual, sociable, moral, aesthetic wants, we find an almost unlimited variety of things that man is seeking after.

These subjective wants and the objective things that will satisfy them have been termed "interests." A man's interest is nothing more nor less than his attitude toward those things which will satisfy his wants, and anything is "to my interest" which will aid in satisfying one or more of these wants.

[1]The use of the term "Interest" in American sociology comes directly from the late Professor A. W. Small. In his *General Sociology* he set forth the concept and developed in considerable detail its bearings upon the social process. This chapter takes its starting point from the position established by him.

In seeking these various satisfactions men find themselves opposed by others who are equally bent upon their own satisfaction. It may be that both want the same thing, the supply of which is insufficient to satisfy both, as in the case of food. Or it may be that the two differ on what is desirable, each seeking to accomplish a different end, as when those holding diverse religious beliefs combat one another. In either kind of situation, struggle or competition ensues. Then, in order to accomplish his purpose, one, or probably both, will seek an alliance with others who can help in the struggle. We find then the creation of groups and sub-groups, made up of those whose "interests" are identical or similar and who share a common purpose.

These groups created for the purpose of accomplishing some definite purpose in which the members agree, by derivation, come also to bear the designation "interests." The group as such becomes the embodiment of the interest or want which originates in each of the members, and hence the group becomes known as a factor in the community which exists for the purpose of promoting this particular interest. Taking the state as the most inclusive group within which these sub-groups find their field of expression, Small well summarizes the situation as follows: "The interests which lodge in the individuals who compose a state sooner or later prompt those individuals to form groups within the state, in promotion of common purposes, by offense and defense against opposing or retarding interests. In general, we may call the contacts between these groups the relations of parties. The term 'parties' for the present includes such minor groupings as factions, cliques, coteries, cabals, which are distinct factors in the rivalry of interests within the state."[2] This use of the term interest to designate a group of persons which embodies some particular demand or want of these individuals is significant for

[2] *General Sociology*, p. 286.

our purposes in this study. It is the sociological use of the term as distinct from the subjective or psychological use.

Any great society contains various interest-groups of the kind just described and may be said to be made up of sub-groups competing with one another. The whole process or any phase of it may be called the social conflict of interests. Hence, in addition to finding the members of a community divided into functional groups, into social classes, and into cultural groups, we also find them divided according to the interest with which they are identified, the cause which they are promoting. With reference to any phase of the community's life, each group represents a particular demand in competition with the demands of other groups, and every individual is known by the particular interests with which he is identified. We give particular names to these interest groups, as, the labor interests, the capitalist interests, the ecclesiastic interests, the educational interests; and in case any one of these is divided into factions, we give names to these sub-groups, as, the union labor interest, the non-union interest, the Protestant or the Roman Catholic or the Jewish interest. The important fact for our consideration at this point is that each individual in any given society occupies a particular position in the competitive struggle that is going on in that society, and the differences of interest resulting from this fact are an important item in the social relations of the members of society. The fact that the process assigns to individuals and to sub-groups distinct positions in the larger social group makes interest differentiation one of the primary forms of social differentiation.

The degree of complexity of interest differences will depend upon the variety of wants that the members of society manifest and upon the size of the society. In proportion as men desire more things—that is, more objective conditions favorable to the satisfaction

of their wants—there must of necessity be a larger number of points at which the members of a society find themselves in conflict with other members. So long as the wants are few, the competition may be very keen, but it will be comparatively simple. Thus when food and sex gratification fill most of the mind, the determination of the interest of any particular member of society is easy. But when men want property for display, when they want fame and recognition, when they want specific types of legislative or social organization, when they want means for satisfying far-reaching intellectual, aesthetic, and moral longings, their points of competitive contact with their fellows are very greatly increased, and the formation of groups around these various interests, with their many subdivisions, may place a given individual in numerous and diverse relations of coöperation and conflict with other members of the community.

This identification of each individual with many different interest-groups within the society brings about the situation that friends and comrades in some one relation may be opponents in another. There is a proverb to the effect that "Politics makes strange bed-fellows." As a matter of fact any phase of modern society brings together for coöperation many persons who in other phases of community life occupy positions as widely separated in interest as the poles. It follows that the interest groupings are thus constantly forming, breaking up, and reforming, as the social process shifts the situation.

Moreover, as the size of societies increases, the number of persons who become competitors is increased. The horde or pack, or even the tribe is always a small group in comparison with the nation or the modern state. The number of points of competitive contact is thus proportionate to the size of the group as well as to the variety of wants.

Modern interest conflict differs from the primitive primarily in the greater complexity brought about by these two factors of increasing size of the group and

increasing variety of wants. The growth of both has been so great that modern society presents a bewildering array of conflicting and inter-crossing interests. To disentangle and analyze any particular situation, such for example as that presented at a meeting of the United States Congress, into all the interests involved and to identify the particular role that each legislator and lobbyist fills in the legislative battle would be a difficult task.

Certain broad lines of interest differentiation may, however, be indicated, although to secure a complete exhibit we should have to analyze every separate society by itself. Class divisions are familiar lines of interest division. All the members of a privileged class will generally fight to maintain the *status quo*, while the members of a lower class will struggle to remove the class distinction. The differentiation of interest that follows from class difference is the one that probably has lain at the bottom of more human struggle than any other. Ratzenhoffer and Small[3] have well pointed out that the very existence of the civilized state in the early stages is involved in this differentiation of class interests within its boundaries. As the modern state had its origin in the more or less tyrannous subjection of one class to another, so also the existence of the state must be fraught with much uncertainty until there is an adjustment of the class struggle.

As a phase of the class struggle, or independently of it, functional differences also breed somewhat permanent interest differences. In the distribution of the wealth of a society the different occupational groups form competitive interest groups, whether there is a difference in their rank or not. Manufacturer, farmer, professional man, laborer, merchant are all seeking the largest possible share in the product. Some of the bitterest conflicts of interest take place between those who occupy the same level of right and privilege.

[3]Ratzenhoffer, *Wesen und Zweck der Politik*, and Small, *op. cit.*

Moreover, the interest differences of functional groups are seen in other than the economic realm. The conflict between the scientific group and the religious group or between the religious and the political shows a sharp interest differentiation that is not at all economic in character. Lines of interest differences also sometimes follow lines of cultural differences. The conflict with one another of religious creeds, of educational systems, of artistic standards, of moral ideals, of philosophic concepts, of modes of recreation—all form groups which owe their existence to the desire of conservative to crush radical, of sporting man to crush Puritan, of Calvinist to crush Arminian, of the classical scholar to crush the vocationalist. Every variety of mental activity of any sort finds an opponent in its own field to dispute its right to exist.

But the lines of interest differences do not follow class or functional or cultural lines exclusively. Within the same class, within the same functional group, and within the same cultural group, interest differences are brought sharply to the fore. Mercantile competition, the competition of professional men against one another, of one educational institution against another, one church against another of the same denomination, all show that interests are unique forms of differences and not merely incidents of functional, rank, or cultural differences, although both are intensified when the lines of one coincide with those of the other. We must, therefore, think of the differentiation of interests within a society as one of the four primary forms of social differentiation.

We now have before us the four kinds of differences that constitute the distinctions that mark off the social position of the members of a society from one another. While the lines of demarkation with respect to any one of these differences frequently run along those of another kind of difference, no two sets of lines are ever identical. Every type of difference exists of and by itself, although any one may at times be the cause of the appearance of another.

The next problem is to describe the foundations on which these differences rest, that is, the causes from which result the differentiation of function of rank, of culture, of interest. We shall find that these causes fall under two heads; namely, first the differences in biological traits between the individuals who compose societies, and second, those wrong inferences, or at best, matters of social necessity that make the particular differentiation a matter of expediency, though not a logical consequence of the biological basis.

QUESTIONS

1. What is an "interest?"
2. How are interest groups formed?
3. How does an increase in wants or in the size of the group affect the complexity of the competitive struggle?
4. Explain how functional, rank, and cultural differentiation accentuate interest differences.

EXERCISES

1. What are the outstanding expressions of conflict of interests in your community?
2. Show how your interests make some of those who are your allies in one struggle your opponents in others.
3. Describe the interest groupings that exist on your campus.

PART II

THE BIOLOGICAL FACTORS

VI

AGE AND SOCIAL DIFFERENCES

PROBABLY the most obvious distinctions in social activities and position that are to be observed in human society are those associated with differences of age. In general, we find a tendency to recognize four distinct life periods, most social distinctions of age breaking at the lines that separate these four groups. These periods are infancy and childhood, youth, middle life, old age. There are in most societies subdivisions of these periods falling at various points, as, for example, the distinction frequently recognized between infancy and childhood. But these four main periods are found to be separated generally by more definite and significant social distinctions than are other age periods.

While the division of the population into these four age groups with corresponding social positions has a definite physical foundation, the physical marks that indicate that a person has passed from one stage into another are sometimes so inconspicuous and the individual variations so numerous that societies differ considerably in the precise time in the life of an individual when the social distinctions become operative, and the real foundations for the distinctions have until recently not been clearly understood. In some cases we find a time fixed arbitrarily at what is considered an average age at which the physical change takes place, as twenty-one years for the assumption of certain civil, political, and personal rights. In other cases some margin is permitted within which personal choice can be exercised, as was true of the assumption of the *toga virilis* in Rome. In still other cases, as in passing from the social distinctions of middle life to those of old age, the individual variation is the principal factor.

The physical marks of the different age periods are, however, to a considerable extent definite and peculiar to the period, though not always apparent. Thus the child is not an adult in miniature but has a physical peculiarity of its own. The pubertal changes that accompany the onset of youth are definitely characteristic. The end of the adolescent period and the beginning of that of middle life is marked by the maturing of the sex organs, which is a somewhat precise physiological stage. The onset of old age is probably more gradual but it has its definite marks, as a heightened tension of the pulse, dryness of the skin, loss of color in the hair, increased weight, etc.[1]

Infancy and Childhood

An understanding of the social position to which childhood is entitled can come only from a knowledge of the physiological, anatomical, and neurological peculiarities that distinguish the human from the higher animals and the human infant from the mature person. One of the essentially human characteristics is the possession of plasticity or educability in the place of a large number of reflexes which characterize the animal.[2]

Because of this quality the human is under the necessity of acquiring practically all of the adjustments to his environment, that is, he must "learn" the ways of life. The greater part of these, especially the fundamental and elementary ones, must be acquired in childhood.

In addition to this task of acquiring adjustments, his whole physical mechanism must undergo the profound changes involved in growth. It must be recognized that the physical condition of infancy is essentially peculiar to the period. The body of the child is not merely a miniature copy of that of the adult. "By the time maturity is reached the heart is from twelve

[1]Lorand, *Old Age Deferred*, p. 1.

[2]See Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretation in Mental Development*, pp. 61-64.

to thirteen times larger than it is at birth, and the lungs have increased twenty-fold; but by contrast, whereas in the infant the weight of the liver is 1-18 that of the body, in the adult it represents 1-38; and, where the weight of the muscles amounts to forty-five per cent of the total weight of a grown man, they constitute but twenty-three per cent of the weight of a young and helpless body."[3] The phagocytes constitute about twenty-eight per cent of the total number of white blood corpuscles, as compared with seventy per cent in manhood. The heart and lungs, the stomach, kidneys, blood, bones, nerves, blood vessels, in childhood, all show definite and distinct peculiarities, and these are constantly varying. It is found also that prolonged physical effort has much more seriously detrimental effects in all stages before puberty than after. The whole condition indicates that nature regards the period as one of growth, of plasticity, and of need for protection from dangers of many sorts.

The voluntary and mental characteristics that accompany this condition are very generally recognized. Weakness, softness, pliability, lack of precision, involuntary movements, characterize the bodily side. On the mental side we see inability to carry on those logical processes that are the result of established associations. The child is incapable of responding to those moral requirements that call for a high degree of inhibition, of established habit, or of voluntary adjustment to perceived social needs. The imitative tendencies are very keen, and suggestions and impressions of all sorts are quickly assimilated without the critical examination that comes from the possession of a variety of experiences and associations. Moreover, impressions are retained by the memory more rigidly than are those that are made later. And along with these, some spiritual qualities are recognized as belonging particularly to childhood. Faith and trust of the deepest sort, naturalness and simplicity in motive and in act,

[3]Ravenhill, *Some Characteristics and Requirements of Childhood*, p. 5.

are evident, because there have been no experiences to shatter the trust or give prudence and caution to the motives and acts. Affection is given in abundance to persons and objects that appeal to the childish heart, and joy and sorrow quickly alternate as new pleasures fascinate or temporary disappointments cross the path. On the whole the childish mind and character may be said to reflect the passing situation and to respond to the need most immediate.

Nature has, therefore, evidently set off the period of childhood as a distinct and peculiar one. The social position assigned the child, however, has not always reflected this. In fact it is only in comparatively recent times that there has been any very clear understanding of the social significance of childhood.

Mr John Fiske[4] is responsible for the doctrine that the dependence of the child, extending over such a long period, is chiefly responsible for the institution of the family. This period of adjustment and growth renders the child so helpless that he must be protected from dangers of all sorts, supported, controlled, and supplied with copies that help him to make the adjustments that will be most useful for his own life and that of the community. Among animals this period of dependence grows longer and longer as we approach man, and in the human species dependence reaches its climax. Survival of the race, therefore, depends on a type of child-care that will supply his needs through this period. Coöperation between the male and the female in this care would secure through natural selection the most numerous survivors. Thus settled family life is directly fostered and made necessary by infantile dependence. Westermarck[5] well remarks that the child is the cause rather than the result of marriage. This was true not only in the early stages of society, but it is yet a well established fact that the family in modern society is much more stable when

[4] *Excursions of an Evolutionist*, Essay XII. Also, *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, chaps. 16, 21, 22.

[5] *History of Human Marriage*, p. 22.

there are children in it than when there are not. The very dependence of childhood, therefore, is a means of furthering the existence of one of the fundamental institutions of society. And the child thus becomes, involuntarily it is true, but none the less definitely, a real factor in the life of the community.

But this is not the sole social function of childhood. The child may be said to be the connecting link between the past and the future. He is at once the conservator of the achievements already attained by the community and the starting point for new and better types of activity and thought. As conservator he has poured into his mind and habits those ideas and ways of doing things that his predecessors have found to be the most successful. Each generation meets its obligation as steward of the accumulated riches of civilization by passing them on to its children. But each generation of children finds in the experiences of life the possibility of better ways and methods. In copying the old, the copy is never identical with the pattern. And the variations that survive make for better adaptations of human needs. The plastic period of childhood is the time when these departures from the old may be made.

The child, then, is the chief founder of the family, he is the conservator of the past, and the agent of progress, but is this all? Who will say that the community life is not richer for the trust and confidence of the child, its affections, its rich fancy, and its joy quickly returning after the cloud of sorrow has passed? The function of keeping these experiences and attitudes ever springing up in the life of the community is one that can be performed by no other group than the children.

These functions of establishing and maintaining the family, of conserving the past and building a new future, of keeping joy, simplicity, trust, playfulness ever fresh in the life of the race, evidently cannot be lightly regarded. And any society must eventually pay dearly for any denial of them. It is the recognition of this

that has led to a gradual prolongation of the period of economic dependence. That the performance of economic functions of any large proportions directly conflict with these other services that the child is particularly fitted to render, is evident from the facts cited above concerning his physical condition. The place assigned the child, however, and the treatment accorded him have never been fully consistent with his nature or with his potential usefulness to society. Such recognition has been built up very slowly and even in modern society is far from complete.

In primitive societies the child is very early compelled to assume a considerable share in the economic activities of the community. At five or six he is left to shift for himself, so far as he may, and very soon loses most of his dependence on his elders.[6] In barbarian culture, beginning with the more favored classes, childhood gradually acquired more and more freedom from economic pursuits. Among the laboring classes of civilized society, child labor has continued down to the present day to a remarkable degree. Thus the 14th United States Census reports that 378,063 children between ten and thirteen years of age were gainfully employed. And although the census does not report the number of working children under 10 years of age it is known that large numbers are employed.[7] The invention of machines that can be operated by children has naturally had a tendency to increase this condition. But as opposed to this has come the new insight, derived both from biological research concerning the real nature and significance of childhood and from a new ethical and social vision. The battle between this economic tendency and this new knowledge and vision marks a significant chapter in the history of the race. It is nothing less than a conflict to determine whether the child shall perform the functions assigned it by nature, or sacrifice them for the performance of a function that properly belongs to other

[6]Todd, *The Primitive Family as an Educational Agency*, pp. 108-110.
[7]U. S. Census, Population, 1920. Occupations of Children, p. 5.

age groups, for the sake of a small temporary economic advantage.

The rank—that is, the rights, privileges, and status of children, as distinguished from those of the adult groups—is also an important phase of their social position. Their physical weakness puts them at the mercy of those who wish to take advantage of them; their mental immaturity makes it not only impossible to give them a place in controlling the life of the community, but renders them in need of personal control and more or less autocratic government. Their moral instability makes it impossible to put any serious responsibility upon them. All these facts naturally call for a peculiar status in the community.

But here, also, a rational, conscious policy is very late in arriving. In those stages of culture in which physical force is the chief factor of control, the child's physical weakness manifestly places him at a great disadvantage. While it is true that affection for children and gentleness in handling them is an instinctive human trait always present, the instinct itself is not sufficient to insure the child the kind of treatment that rational thought indicates he should have. Poverty, bursts of temper, ignorance, lack of foresight will invariably lead to cruel and harsh treatment unless there is a social control that prevents it and demands the more favorable treatment. To know the type of care given to children in any group, we must therefore go to its customs, mores, legal enactments. It is here that there are accumulated those standards which the group has been able to achieve, by the more rational processes of its life, or which, in the absence of such rationalization, reflect the conditions of life under which the group lives. In many primitive societies, where this rationalizing process has not gone far enough to create group standards of adequate protection, we find illustrations of fiendish cruelty, and in modern societies where adequate group standards have not been worked out or enforced we find treatment approxi-

mating the primitive treatment, though the customs and mores of all civilized societies show advancement over the most backward of primitive groups.

Where cannibalism prevails it is the children and the aged who particularly are the victims. Todd[8] cites a large number of cases among primitive tribes and among ancient historical societies where it was common to sell children, in many cases the child being regarded simply as any other economic asset. Infanticide has been a very widespread custom in primitive and barbarian culture, arising from a variety of causes. Poverty and difficult conditions of life have been the most common, scarcity of food and difficulties of travel with small children being frequently mentioned by observers.[9] Religious sacrifices have been another prominent cause. But many less compelling motives have been sufficient to account for the practice, in many cases wholly trivial impulses being sufficient, such as whim, personal dislikes, anger, unwillingness to bother with rearing children, grievance against the infant for having caused the mother pain before birth.[10] Deformity or weakness or unusual appearance were common causes for the exposure of infants in Greek and Roman society. Westermarck notes a few instances in which the parent was permitted to kill an older child for certain causes,[11] but this was never so common as the killing of infants, which was in many cases a fixed population policy, and not a matter of indivudual parental choice.[12] Todd[13] notes frequent examples in which children are regarded as property by primitive peoples. The difficulties of enforcing child-labor laws and compulsory education laws in modern society show the wide extent of the notion that a child is an economic asset which the parent is entitled to enjoy without interference from outside sources.

[8] *Op. cit.*, pp. 116-117.
[9] Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, pp. 396-402.
[10] Todd, *op. cit.*, p. 128.
[11] *Op. cit.*, pp. 393-394.
[12] Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 311.
[13] *Op. cit.*, pp. 100, 104.

All the above evidence points directly to the conclusion that wherever the child is not protected by an adequately developed social standard, he is devoid of rights and subject to whatever caprice or selfish motive may possess a parent or whatever economic need may confront the group. The appreciation of childhood for its own sake or for its social worth depends on a rationalized point of view which becomes embodied in group standards. While it is true that many primitive tribes show a high degree of kindly treatment of children, and freedom from most of the revolting forms of cruelty noted above, the personal rights of the child were not adequately protected by thought-out group standards before modern times, and even yet not completely in many communities.

Closely related to personal rights are the rights of the child to a share in the property of the parent. In the primitive stage the child generally has no assurance of support beyond the instinctive parental feeling. And so long as the *patria potestas* prevailed in the extreme form that characterized barbarian culture, the child was at the mercy of the feeling of the parent. But as the power of life and death gradually was supplanted by the right of the child to life, which was enforced by the community, the parent become legally responsible for its support also. Civilized society thus has come to assure the child by right a share in the goods of the parent.

The status of the child is further shown in the degree of his responsibility for crime. Westermarck[14] points out that in early society while the child is generally not held responsible, his family is, and "the injured party can claim compensation from the parents if he likes to do so." The same was true among the Teutons. Even this limitation on holding the child responsible seems to be due to his inability to pay, for, Westermarck observes, when punishment came to be substituted for compensation the age of responsibility was lowered, and in the 15th century an infant of four was legally

[14]*Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, Vol. I, chap. 10.

held liable, although the judges showed a disposition to exempt the offender. In the Homeric period in Greece a child guilty of manslaughter was banished for life.

Roman law made a step forward by assuming inability to commit a crime before puberty. Mohammedan usage follows a similar custom. On the whole, modern life has shown a tendency to raise the age, although many modern states recognize an age of responsibility under puberty. Westermarck notes:[15]

> This irresponsibility is admitted by the laws of civilized nations. In England, Scotland, and the United States, children under seven are absolutely exempt from punishment. In other modern countries criminal responsibility does not commence until the age of nine, ten, twelve, or fourteen. In some it is to be decided in each case whether a child is punishable or not. Thus the French Code Penal provides that a person under sixteen years of age shall not be punished if it be decided that he has acted without discernment (*sans discernment*), whereas, if he has acted with discernment (*avec discernment*), his punishment is to be mitigated according to a fixed scale. Most laws set down an intermediate period between that of complete irresponsibility and that of complete responsibility. According to English law there is a presumption that children from seven to fourteen are not possessed of the degree of knowledge essential to criminality, though this presumption may be rebutted by proof to the contrary; and, according to the German Strafgesetzbuch, a person from twelve to eighteen may be acquitted if, when he committed the offence, he did not possess the intelligence requisite to know that it was criminal. Other laws, again, regard a certain age *eo ipso* as a ground of extenuation, its upper limit being fixed sometimes at sixteen, sometimes at eighteen, sometimes at twenty, sometimes at twenty-one.

The recent tendencies in the method of criminal procedure and forms of punishment for children show a similar tendency to give special consideration to child offenders. The establishment of the juvenile court and the separation of children delinquents from adult criminals, providing them with education rather than labor, mark a new conception of the moral responsibilities of the child, as well as a clearer understanding of its needs.

[15] *Op. cit.*, pp. 265-266.

In the less advanced types of culture the status of the child seems to be determined chiefly by the will of the parent or relative or the economic necessities of the occasion. Among more advanced groups, however, it frequently came to rest upon a religious basis. Under this situation the complete subjection of the child to the parent was made a religious duty. The system of ancestor worship on which it was founded became so prevalent that Westermarck holds that "this strengthened authority of the father . . . among peoples who have reached a relatively high degree of civilization . . . must be regarded as marking a stage in all human history."[16] In Japan, China, among Mohammedans, Indo-Europeans, Greeks, Romans, the *patria potestas* sanctioned by religion and the mores gave the father practically unlimited power over his children. Westermarck, however, doubts whether it was as marked elsewhere as among the Romans. He quotes (p. 230) Justinian, to the effect that "the power which we have over our children is peculiar to Roman citizens; for there are no other men possessing such power over their children as we have."

Gradually as the religious ideas on which it rested lost their influence, the *patria potestas* declined. Another powerful influence was coming into the Western world to change the social status of the child, namely, Christianity. The tradition of the infant Jesus was in itself a tremendous factor, and the teachings of the gospels very greatly stimulated a new appreciation of children. Denunciation of the exposing of infants and the establishment of foundling asylums were among the earliest of the activities of the Christians. It remained, however, for the social philosophy of a still later period to usher in what has become known as "the century of the child." Everywhere, although in varying degree, the rights of the child have come to be recognized in civilized communities. We have passed from a distinctly religious to a moral and social basis which would recognize the interests of the child and the

[16] *History of Human Marriage*, p. 225.

interests of the community in having his rights respected. Eventually civilized communities have reached the point where the conception now prevails that "children . . . are in no respect the property of their parents; that the birth of children gives the parents no rights over them other than those which conduce to the children's happiness."[17]

The child has become the center of community concern. More is spent on education in the United States than on any other single item of public effort. The family is judged by its efficiency in child nurture. The health of communities is measured by the infant death rate. Amusements and recreations are controlled from the standpoint of their effect upon children. Literature and art are censored in the interest of the young. Natural resources are conserved for the newer generations. Industrial activities are being denied the right to sacrifice childhood for economic gain. The ideals of the modern world center around a future society which shall be better than the present, and the child is valued as the citizen of the future.

It would be hard to conceive of a more complete reversal of the principle or point of view than that involved in the passage from ancestor worship to the position that is becoming the dominant one in modern society. It would be incorrect to say that this transition has been completely accomplished. But an appreciation of the rights of childhood probably claims a higher degree of unanimity among all classes of modern society than does any other sentiment. We are confronted frequently with such phrases as, "the age of the child" or "the child first." There are still, however, enough obstacles in the way of a complete realization of such an ideal to make the battle for it a keen one for a considerable period to come.

Adolescence

Within the last quarter of a century adolescence, as revealed by psychological and physiological research,

[17] *History of Human Marriage*, p. 239.

has come to be known as a most significant and definitely marked off period in human life. The social significance of the period of youth has therefore assumed an importance never before recognized. The essential physical facts of the period are the rapid growth of the body and the development of the sexual functions. These are accompanied by such definite intellectual and emotional changes as to make the period one of peculiar psychic importance.

The investigations into the subject are so new that there is yet little unanimity of opinion as to what constitute the normal phenomena of adolescence. It is urged with some plausibility that the unusual and striking characteristics evinced by individuals outside the large number of normal cases would first attract attention and thus claim a significance out of proportion to their real place in the whole. Nevertheless, in spite of these qualifications, it is possible to state some of the leading characteristics of adolescence concerning which there is considerable unanimity.

On the physical side it is evident that the body is rapidly increasing in stature, girth, and weight. While the sexual organs are capable of performing the function of reproduction in the early stages of puberty they are not fully developed in most individuals until from twenty to twenty-five years of age. The assumption of full sexual activities, therefore, in the earlier stages of adolescence must be accompanied by some impairment of physical vigor. Races seem to differ in this respect, however, and warm climate seems to have some effect in stimulating an earlier development.

The psychical characteristics are more intangible and estimates of them vary to a great degree. A large group of these characteristics are summed up in the general term of emotional instability. In some cases this manifests itself in "storm and stress," in others in doubt, or in brooding and introspection. Uncertainty, impulsiveness, and inconsistencies seem, however, to mark most cases. Hot enthusiasm for some interests and frigid indifference for others seem to be a

general trait. This general instability is accounted for by Starbuck in the statement that "adolescent storm and stress is due to the functioning of new powers which have no specific outlet and are driven to force for themselves an expression in one way or another."[18] The credulity of childhood gives way to a more sophisticated skepticism, but impressionability and suggestibility seem to be almost as highly marked as in the years of infancy, especially if the suggestion is indirect. The imitativeness of the earlier period is supplanted, especially in the later stages of adolescence, by a marked tendency toward a strong self-expression, a somewhat exaggerated "I" feeling. And yet, at the same time, there is little facility in self-direction.

There is throughout it all a strong feeling of incompleteness, a yearning toward a larger and completer personality and existence, which is doubtless the psychical expression of the nervous and physical growth that is taking place. Says Starbuck: "Back of the whole adolescent development and central in it is the birth of a new and larger spiritual consciousness." And Hall[19] summarizes it by saying that "adolescence is a new birth, for the higher and more completely human traits are now born. The qualities of body and soul that now emerge are far newer."

External influences in the social environment also play their part in causing disequilibrium. Because of the increase in size and strength, and sexual powers, increased demands are made on the individual at this time. The process of adjustment to new responsibilities is always difficult, and especially so when the body and mind themselves are undergoing serious change. The heavier the responsibilities, therefore, the more occasion is there for failure to meet the social expectations. Even in modern society, with all the assistance that various social agencies offer, there is much failure of adjustment. Hall points out that 12 to 14 years is the period that shows the most marked

[18] *Psychology of Religion*, p. 227.
[19] *Adolescence*, Vol. I, chap. 13, also Vol. II, p. 250.

increase in crime and the largest part of all first commitments to penal institutions occur in the adolescent period.

It is evident from all these facts that adolescence is a period that demands particular social treatment. While the growth, both physical and mental, is different in nature from that of childhood, it is none the less a period in which the whole organism is undergoing pronounced changes. Manifestly, the direction which the habits and adjustments will take will depend markedly on the external influences with which the adolescent comes in contact. Full social responsibility, self-direction, tasks that call for established habits of bodily and mental process, are clearly inconsistent with a period marked by instability, impulsiveness, inconsistencies, and self-examination.

It is manifest, however, that social recognition of adolescence in any rational manner is even more tardy than it is in the case of childhood. The physical strength of young people and their sexual capabilities have given the impression all too generally that they are mature. And the tendency has been to grant the social position of maturity as soon as the strength and sexual abilities appeared. All available evidence seems to indicate that primitive society gives little or no recognition to the period as entitled to a social position distinct from that of maturity. Especially is this true with respect to sex life and economic functions. The initiation rites and the ceremonies taking place generally about the time of the first signs of puberty seem to be calculated to induct the youth into full adult responsibilities.[20] These ceremonies in some form are practically universal in all savage society. Says Webster:[21] "Puberty institutions for the initiation of young men into manhood are among the most widespread and characteristic features of primitive life. They are found among peoples considered the lowest of mankind: among Andamanese, Hottentots, Fuegians,

[20]See Lowie, *Primitive Society*, chap. 10.
[21]*Primitive Secret Societies*, p. 32.

and Australians; and they exist in various stages of development among peoples emerging from savagery to barbarism. Their foundation goes back to an unknown antiquity; . . . . Though varying endlessly in detail their leading characteristics reproduce themselves with substantial uniformity among many different peoples and in widely separated areas of the world."

The purposes of the ceremonies seem, in the main, to be three: namely, to indicate to the community that the individual is now ready to assume a new position in society; to impress upon the novice the seriousness of his new responsibilities; to impart to him certain ideas and attitudes deemed to be necessary to the correct performance of his duties. They undoubtedly have considerable utility for these purposes.

Immediately upon the completion of the ceremonies the young man or young woman assumes for the most part adult responsibilities. The young woman soon marries or at least begins sexual relations. The young man, if the initiation ceremonies have taken such a short time that he is still not over twelve or fourteen when they are completed, may, probably, have to defer marriage for a while, but generally may begin sex relations if he has not already done so. In the case of both the young man and the young woman they begin to perform the work of adults. In some cases they have to assume considerable responsibility for their own support even before this. In some instances, the less difficult phases of military duty are begun first, but the youth very soon assumes full functions of all sorts.

In the matter of social rank the situation is very similar, although frequently the attainment of full adult status in the tribe takes somewhat longer than does the assumption of adult functions. For example, in many cases the younger man may not have a young woman for a wife, for these are monopolized by the older men, while the young men must content themselves with the old women. They may have to attain thirty years before they have full marital privileges.[22]

[22]Thomas, *Sex and Society*, pp. 178-182.

In other cases a man may not hold office until he is married, or his right to vote or to participate in council proceedings may be limited until he has killed a man or participated in a hunt or gone through one or more probationary periods.[23] On the whole, however, while the attainment of full adult privileges and status seems to be deferred slightly longer than the assumption of adult functions, and while there is some slight competitive relation between young men and adult men in securing wives, it may be said that primitive culture does not assign to youth, as a distinct period, any particular function or rank. The passage from childhood to full mature life is almost direct, and with respect to most functions and items of status occupies but a few months. The same may be said of early barbarian culture. This fact must affect to some extent the mental content of savage and barbarian youth, since the form of activity so greatly influences the direction of attention. But nature will not be completely denied, even in primitive society; and there is much evidence of certain amusements and activities that are peculiar to young men and women. Many of these naturally have to do with courtship. Youth has had its visions and dreams, its peculiar joys and sorrows, its ambitions and enthusiasms, in all societies, regardless of social function and social rank. But it is evident that if no especial function and rank are assigned to the period, the mind of youth will show a less striking differentiation from the mind of other age periods than is the case where a special function and rank are recognized.

In the later barbarian stage and in civilized societies there has been a decided tendency toward assigning to youth a special function and rank. But a complete differentiation has yet to be made, and in so far as it has been accomplished it has come gradually by recognition of first one and then another peculiar need of the adolescent. The result of this is naturally the exist-

[23] Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*, chap. v.

ence in all these societies of many inconsistencies, whereby the adolescent in some respects will be treated in accordance with his real nature and in others as a mature person, and still others as a child.

Probably the least progress has been made in assigning to him a peculiar social function. Because of the appearance of sexual powers with the attendant appetites and passion, and the rapid increase in bodily size and strength, the line of least resistence has led to the assumption of full mature functions. Thus marriage soon after puberty has been the rule in most societies until recently, in the case of girls; and the boys married as soon as their economic condition would permit.[24] Military duty and economic activities have been assumed almost immediately after puberty, even when deferred to that time.

In Greece and Rome, however, among the upper classes there appeared a decided limitation of this in the introduction of educational activities for the young, especially the males. Hall says of the Grecian system: "The glory of Greece is that it best represented and understood youth as no other age or race has done. . . ."[25]

The instruction in music, literature, and philosophy was closely correlated with physical training, and in some cases military discipline. But the whole organized social life of the upper classes contributed to the education of the youth.

In Rome also education came to play an important part in the life of the upper class youth. Beginning at about sixteen, five to eight years were spent in study. At first literature and philosophy and physical training were the chief elements, but gradually law, medicine, and nature-study entered. Service to the state came later to be the dominant motive. But the important

[24]In 1925 fourteen states in the United States still permitted the marriage of girls at 12 years and boys at 14. Nine states fixed the legal age at 14 for girls eight states at 15, seventeen states at 16. According to the 1920 census, 18,388 girls married at the time the census was taken, were still under 16 years of age. See Richmond and Hall, *Child Marriages*, pp. 20, 45, 74.

[25]*Op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 250.

point for us is that the period of adolescence was recognized as peculiarly adapted to education, as it was in Greece.

This tradition of adolescent education was passed on into medieval Europe. Hall says:

> From the eleventh century through the feudal period, lords opened schools in their castles for the sons of their vassals. From the age of about seven to fourteen they attended ladies, and were taught obedience and courtesy as well as games, music, and religion. The young boy often chose a lady for his particular attention, so that his first thoughts were those of love, honor, bravery, and gallantry. The page was made a squire at the age of fourteen, and then had to attend his lord in battle or tourney, and keep near him to help or protect. After seven years of this work, at the age of 21, he was knighted with solemn and imposing ceremonies.[26]

In fact, in practically all civilized societies we find the upper classes gradually providing a system of higher education, devotion to which becomes the chief function of the youth. While generally less formal provision was made for young women than for young men, the age of marriage was deferred for both sexes and the maiden occupied her time in household and sociable activities that had some degree of educational value.

Higher education for youth has, however, remained even till today primarily an aristocratic institution. The laboring classes have imitated somewhat the upper classes in deferring the assumption of domestic responsibilities, although they still come much earlier for the lower classes. But the youth of the industrial portion of the population still is required to perform economic functions while his brother of the favored classes is acquiring a superior adjustment to the needs of adult life.[27] A tendency toward a change in the situation is shown in the efforts for raising the legal limit for employment from fourteen to sixteen years and even to eighteen in the United States.

[26] *Adolescence*, Vol. 2, p. 261.

[27] This explains why the content of higher education is almost everywhere a preparation for aristocratic pursuits. There seems among many educators to be the impression that all higher education must necessarily be of this sort. The recent development of technical high schools and higher institutions of technology shows a gradual departure from this conception, but one not yet widely prevalent.

The gradual substitution of education for participation in the economic functions of society is simply an extension of the principle of prolonged dependence as applied to childhood. And the recent investigation into the physical and mental aspects of adolescence reveal that a prolonged youth has almost as great significance for society as has prolonged infancy. The physical and mental characteristics of the adolescent shown by these studies establish clearly that the period is essentially one of preparation and adjustment, of finding one's self. This knowledge must eventually lead to the assignment to youth of those functions that will secure for each individual an adjustment which will guarantee the highest social efficiency at maturity.

It may be that some economic activity could be left in such a program. Certainly some occupations may be largely educational. But it is evident from our experience with modern industry that so long as the emphasis is exclusively or even primarily economic, the educational value of any vocation must be slight. If the educational emphasis is maintained as the primary one in the work of adolescents, a considerable amount of economic activity might be pursued. This would, however, involve a reorganization of some aspects of modern industry.

What is needed is the definite recognition that the chief function of youth, like that of childhood, is the making of a better future for both the individual and society by using the present time for training. And along with this function, youth can then also perform another task for society that is of measureless importance. This is in keeping alive for all the members of the community the enthusiasm, the hope, the idealism, and the optimism that are the peculiar possessions of youth and without which any community would be poor indeed.

The rank or status of youth among later barbarian and civilized peoples has not been in conformity with the functions assigned. The rights and privileges everywhere show a higher degree of limitation than

does function. This is well shown in the field of personal right, involving such matters as the control of one's person, freedom of movement within the community, freedom of choice in matters of general conduct.

Under the system of ancestor-worship, to which we have referred above, the youth was practically as much in the control of the father as was the child. As noted above this system was practically universal in later barbarian and early civilized culture. The choosing of mates under this system, for example, was entirely in the hands of the parents or older relatives, although both the young man and the young woman could find many means of having their wishes respected in the choice. Westermarck cites many cases in which, while the formal choice was with the parent, the son or daughter practically controlled the situation. It seems to be true, however, that while the *patria potestas* was in its flourishing period the youth was almost completely subjected to parental authority. The decline of the *patria potestas* and ancestor-worship weakened the control of the parent over the conduct of the youth as it did over the life of the child. The son acquired more freedom than did the daughter because of his physical strength, his economic independence, and his military function. There still exists, however, in all civilized countries a considerable degree of arbitrary power of the parent over both son and daughter until near the close of the adolescent period. Westermarck[28] notes that while among Teutonic peoples the position of the parent in both law and custom has come to be merely that of a guardian, in Latin countries even up to the present day the Roman notions of parental power have survived. In Asiatic countries much the same situation prevails. In England and America we find the highest degree of personal right accorded youth.

[28] *Evolution of the Moral Ideas*, Vol. I, p. 617.

The precise age at which the young man secures his freedom from parental control seems generally to coincide with the time of assuming military functions or political rights. Thus among the ancient Teutons "the ceremony of investing him with arms as a *wehrhaft* or weapon-bearing member of the community was the usual period for the assumption of rights and liabilities; and this customarily (not always) took place at the age of twelve."[29] And in modern states the "becoming of age" generally involves at once the assumption of personal rights, political rights, and property rights.

Closely connected with the degree of personal right is the degree of accountability for crime. Generally speaking, the adolescent has been held responsible by all civilized societies. Westermarck cites several cases in which liability is limited for some crimes up to sixteen, eighteen, or even twenty-one years. But for the greater number of offenses puberty seems to be the extreme upper limit of freedom from responsibility. The modern methods and facilities of the juvenile courts and schools for young delinquents, referred to above, generally are extended to youths up to sixteen or eighteen, or even twenty-one, and in this there is a special recognition of a difference in treatment from adult offenders.

Middle Age and Old Age

Our discussion up to this point has concerned the social differentiation of children and of adolescents from adults. There remains the difference between middle-aged and old members of the community. The study of the physical and mental nature of old age is more backward than that of adolesence or of childhood. Just what constitutes old age is still a much debated point among anatomical, physiological, and medical authorities. Until we know what old age is, it will be impossible to fix a time at which it begins, or accurately to describe its normal characteristics.

[29]Wigmore, *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 7, p. 447.

Some of the indications we do know. There are definite changes in the skeleton, in the bodily temperature, in cell-multiplying and blood-producing organs. The brain changes in weight and in the proportion of the parts. The nerve cells show a difference, and the working capacity is definitely lowered.[30] All these physical marks, however, have been only recently understood, and most of them are not outwardly apparent. In a purely practical, though unscientific way, the outward manifestations are clearly discerned by every one. And since it is on the basis of these external indications, physical and mental, that social differences are determined, we may safely take them as our starting point, without entering the field of debated scientific theories concerning the exact nature of the differences.

The most obvious physical mark is the change in appearance that comes with old age. The hair, posture, gait, expression are the most prominent features in which change is discernible. The loss of physical strength is another evidence that a change has occurred. This is shown in a slowing down of the speed of movement, in a reduction of endurance, and of the amount of force that can be put forth at one time. A third change is the dulling of the keenness of most of the senses, together with a weakening of the strength of most of the appetites and passions.

On the mental and temperamental side we observe first a considerable loss of aggressiveness. This is manifested in a reduced pugnacity, less keen partizanship, an increase of generosity, toleration, and sympathy. In the second place, there is a riper knowledge, more experience with different aspects of life, and a consequent broader and more balanced judgment. In the third place, old age is generally marked by a shifting of interests, so that the old person is generally interested in somewhat different topics and activities from those of middle life. The ambitions of earlier years are replaced by new ones. Finally, the old person

[30] Donaldson, *Growth of the Brain*, chap. 17.

is more conservative, less ready to embark on new enterprises, has a greater degree of caution, and values the past more highly.

Whether these mental traits directly follow from the physical changes as causes cannot be accurately determined until we know more of what actually takes place in the brain and nervous system of the aging person. Some of them can easily be accounted for on physical grounds. For example, loss of pugnacity and partizanship may easily be explained by the loss of the energy and the passion that are necessary for fighting. Some, at least, of the shifting interests may come from the dulling of some appetites, though probably not all could be so explained. On the other hand, the accumulation of experience and knowledge may account for some of the new traits, as the increase in catholicity and soundness of judgment. Does the conservatism of the old come from a nervous inability to become adapted to new knowledge or new experiences, or is it due merely to a preference for what one has already thought or done?[31] Only a more complete understanding than we have of the changes that age brings to the nervous system can tell.

These physical and mental changes are recognized, by all communities of which we possess any information, as constituting two separate groups of those who have reached adult life. There are several subgroups recognized in most communities, but the essential distinction between adults is that between the middle-aged and the old. The precise age at which the line is drawn varies so much, however, that every society furnishes a type of its own. In fact, the character of the life of the society is an important factor in fixing the line. Where strenuous physical performance is the prevailing kind of activity, the line will be drawn earlier than where the opposite is true, for declining physical strength is one of the first evidences of age. Moreover, in the same society the line may be drawn at different places in different occupations.

[31]Ross, *Social Psychology*, p. 220.

Among the industrial classes of modern society old age is recognized much earlier than among those engaged in intellectual pursuits, because of the difference in the nature of the effort required by each occupation. Then too, the individual and class variations in the time at which the symptoms of age appear are probably greater than are the variations in the time at which childhood or adolescence ends. Hygiene, nutrition, the vocation, health, and numerous other influences seem very greatly to affect the time when a person begins to age.

We must conclude, therefore, that no generally accepted time can be set down as furnishing a definite line that separates the middle-aged from the old. There are two factors in the situation: the person himself, and the social needs to which he must become adjusted. Both factors are variable. Hence the variation in the times when one may be considered old is great. And yet everywhere we find that there is a definite assignment of different social positions to the middle-aged and the old, at least among the males. In some cases the practical difficulty of determining a dividing line is met by fixing an arbitrary age for a specific position, as when the Spartans required sixty years as a minimum for election to the Council of Elders. In most situations, however, the adjustment is more elastic.

The differentiation in primitive culture is as definitely marked as in civilized. The nature of the occupation of fighting and hunting requires that most of these economic activities be performed by the younger men. But the old men have a definite function. "Old men for council, young men for war" is a principle that seems to have a very definite application in early culture. The old men teach the young the technique of weapon-making, stalking game, ambush, and the strategy of war. They carry on the ceremonies, are the guardians of the sacred relics, and preserve the traditions of the tribe. They exercise complete social control in many tribes, and the council of elders is frequently the source of all authority in the tribe.

This differentiation of function generally carries with it a definite distinction in rank. In many tribes the elders are the most revered and the most powerful group. The Australian tribes are conspicuous for this[32] and Westermarck cites a large number of other primitive groups among which marked veneration for the aged is a leading characteristic.[33] Goldenweiser remarks:[34]

> The exaggerated prestige of old age is one of the differentia of primitive civilization.
>
> While these (the old men and in some groups old women) take a less active part in the everyday activities, their leadership in ceremonial and political matters is pronounced, and they do everywhere constitute the great depositories of tradition, figuring as the mouthpiece, as it were, of the conservative *status quo*. They know the past, in fact, they know all there is to be known, and they see to it that this knowledge is passed on without much loss, as well as without much addition. They are the great stabilizing fly-wheel of the civilizational mechanism.

This distribution of functions and rank is somewhat disturbed when the tribal organization passes over into the state. The political state seems to have come into existence through the action of marauding war bands bent on conquest or booty. Such a band to be successful must have an organization based upon military efficiency and leadership. Its chief must be one whose native qualities give him preëminence. He selects his lieutenants on the same basis. Out of such an organization comes the machinery for political control, based on military power. And even among tribes who have not yet developed a strictly political form of organization, if warfare is a dominant activity of the group, the fighting men may supplant the aged in rank.[35] That is, where military pursuits predominate, age *per se* ceases to be a qualification for a position of control. With the passing therefore of the tribal organization and the entrance of the military state, old men as such cease to be the controlling element in the community at large.

[32]See Lowie, *Primitive Society*, pp. 359-361.
[33]*Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, pp. 603-606.
[34]*Early Civilization*, p. 257.
[35]See, for example, Lowie, *Primitive Society*, p. 315.

A considerable amount of power is, however, retained and reverence granted. The system of patriarchal family control and ancestor-worship makes the *pater familias* the most revered and powerful factor in family and personal affairs. And grown sons, themselves fathers and possibly grandfathers, owe obedience and reverence to the head of the household. In short, the distinction in rank between middle-aged and old men seems to have been the same as between children and youths, and adults. This situation seems to have prevailed to a very late day in practically all civilized states of ancient origin. It is still very much in evidence in most countries of Asia.

In the western world it has broken down with the religious ideas and other aspects of social life on which it was based, and both the functions and ranks of the old and middle-aged have greatly changed relatively to each other. In fact, in the matter of appreciation and reverence for the old we have reached a point almost the opposite of that maintained under the system of ancestor-worship. Probably the principal factors in this change, apart from the decline of the old religious ideas, have been the increased competitive character of modern economic activity, democratic government, individualism, and the cult of progress.

Wherever the pace in economic activities becomes rapid and the whole movement is speeded up, the old must be more and more at a disadvantage. The speed and intensity of the economic process of the modern western world must put a heavy handicap on the old in their effort to maintain their place. Only those possessed of the highest physical powers can hope to control the functions and enjoy the rank that goes with such control.

Democratic government like the modern economic process demands efficiency in those at the top. Natural leadership and capacity for organization and administration, not gray hairs, are the basis for positions of influence. Age may be an additional qualification for some positions like that of judge of the Supreme

Court. But in such cases age is not the primary but the secondary qualification. And the ideas of independence and self-direction that democracy inculcates in all citizens makes a sentimental subservience to age in personal and private affairs impossible. Mature men, who feel conscious of their dignity and personal worth, cannot voluntarily accept a control that is not representative of their own judgment or of that of the majority.

The individualism that has become rife in the western world has broken down the familyism of the ancient state. The family is no longer the center about which all the interests of life revolve. The individual has become the unit for more of the activities of modern society than is the family. Reverence for the old was a phase of a society that placed strong emphasis on family life. And the change cannot but carry with it a loss of reverence and authority for the old. The cult of progress works in the same direction. Whether the old are conservative from physical necessity or from neglecting to keep up, they are as a group more attached to the past than are the middle-aged. A society that has shaped its ideals about progress can never place its affairs in the hands of the old and give them the reverence that a society does that lives in the past. Those must be revered and placed in power who are capable of doing what society wants done. The decline of ancestor-worship, the competitive character of modern economic life, democratic government, individualism, and the cult of progress, have thus all conspired to reduce to a marked degree the functions and rank possessed by the aged in earlier society. Gray hairs instead of being an asset have become a liability. The greater part of carrying on the present work of society has fallen into the hands of men from twenty-one to fifty years of age, and the rank has become adjusted to the actual power exercised.

Must we, then, expect a continual decline in the functioning of the old in modern society and a lower

and lower rank assigned them as compared with the middle-aged? The situation must depend primarily on two conditions; namely, whether the society is a static or dynamic one, and what is the dominant type of the activity pursued. Wherever the situation is one that calls for strenuous physical exertion, daring risks, rapid, forceful execution such as has characterized the opening up of a new economic empire and the laying of the foundations of a new social order on the western continent, there old men must be at a grave disadvantage. Only those who are possessed of the most vigorous energies and aggressive temperament can lead or even fill the ranks. In such a situation the old must play a minor part and occupy a low rank. But where the construction lines are already laid out, where fame and wealth and social status are not to be blasted out with dynamite, where institutions and social relations have become more fixed, there the old must come in for an effective functioning and greater esteem. A society that has become more carefully poised, one in which more depends on maintaining that poise than in arriving at a new equilibrium, such a society needs the cautious judgment, the diplomacy, the tact, the dependence on tradition that only the old can supply. In such a society the old will exercise control and be revered for the qualities which the society so greatly needs.

But it depends not merely on whether the society is primarily static or primarily dynamic. It is largely a question of the dominant type of activity. Where the demands made upon individuals are chiefly physical, the younger man must have the advantage. But where the demands are chiefly intellectual, the old will have it. A recent study under the title of the *Age of Mental Virility* presents a convincing array of evidence to show that a very large part of the great intellectual achievements of the world has been accomplished by men who had passed middle life. And the duration of productive mental activity is found to extend far into old age. Of four hundred of the most

renowned names in history "thirty-five per cent ceased their mental activity in the seventh decade; twenty-two and one-half per cent in the eighth; twenty and three-fourths per cent in the sixth; ten and one-fourth per cent in the fifth; six per cent in the ninth; four and one-half per cent in the fourth; . . . . Seventy-eight and a fraction per cent closed their life-work between fifty and eighty years."[36]

Even in modern warfare the directing minds are for the most part past middle age. A compilation of the ages of modern military leaders shows the following facts:

> In the last great war between France and Germany the campaign was planned and led by elderly men. The Emperor William, the King of Prussia, was in his seventy-fourth year; von Moltke, the masterly strategist of the war, was seventy-one years old; General von Roon was sixty-eight; and Bismarck, the master-mind in the larger field, was in his fifty-sixth year.
>
> In the next great war in which high military efficiency was displayed Admiral Togo was approaching his sixtieth year when he took the field; Prince Oyama, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces in Manchuria, had passed his sixtieth year; Field Marshall Modzu was sixty-three; Field Marshall Yamagata was sixty-six; General Kuroki was sixty; and General Nogi, who took Port Arthur after a series of desperate conflicts carried on with unflinching energy and almost breathless rapidity, was nearly sixty years of age.[37]

In the recent World War practically every person whose name stands out conspicuously was far above fifty years of age. Kitchener, French, Haig, Joffre, Pau, Foch, Pershing, von der Goltz, von Kluck, Emmich, von Hindenburg, von Tirpitz, all were in the group generally classed as old men, many of them past sixty.

Even the younger of the western nations are entering a period in which, if their dynamic character is itself to be maintained, the activities must become more and more intellectual. Scientific research, literary and artistic pursuits, expert service in administration, must all come in for a much larger part of the

[36] Dorland, *The Age of Mental Virility.*

[37] *The Outlook*, Vol. 108, p. 567.

total social activity, and even the humble manual processes are demanding more and more skill and intelligence, rather than brawn and endurance. Wherever the activity becomes dominantly psychic there will be a large place for the riper abilities and saner judgment of the old. This can never be the exaggerated place assigned them by ancestor-worship, but it will be one consistent with their actual abilities and real worth.

QUESTIONS

1. Is the child a miniature adult? Explain.
2. What are the chief characteristics of childhood that indicate the need for a peculiar social position for children?
3. Sum up the social position of the child in primitive society.
4. What are the more important changes in the position of childhood that have come with the modern period in western society?
5. What are the outstanding characteristics of adolescence?
6. Explain the social significance of the puberty ceremonies of primitive society.
7. What contributions did Greece and Rome make toward a recognition of adolescence as a distinct period of life?
8. How has the status of adolescents differed from their function?
9. Describe the difference between the social position of the old in primitive society and modern western society.
10. What was the social significance of ancestor worship?
11. What circumstances will determine the position of the aged in modern western society?

EXERCISES

1. How far do the child labor laws of your state reflect the modern conception of the position of childhood and youth?
2. What are your state laws concerning the age of marriage; of responsibility for crime; for giving testimony in court?
3. What percentage of the youth between 14 and 17 years of age, inclusive, of your community are in secondary schools?
4. Are there any aspects of the present social positions of the old in American society that you believe should be modified?

VII

SEX AND SOCIAL DIFFERENCES

TOGETHER with the differences growing out of age distinctions, the most striking differences noted in the positions occupied by the members of any social group are those associated with the division of the population into two sex groups. Everywhere the activities, the status or rank, and the mental and moral characteristics of the sexes are observed to be sharply differentiated. We shall trace in outline the outstanding social differences as they have appeared in human society.

The first distinction to be noted is that of function. No social group has come under observation in which the functional differentiation of the sexes has not been highly marked. In many respects this is more striking in earlier than in later society.

The most striking contrast between the social functions of men and women is found among those connected with reproduction and the rearing of children. While not always so regarded by either the parent or the community, these functions are essentially social in character. Nature has provided that the chief burden of reproduction shall fall on the woman, the man's share in this being very slight, from the standpoint of the time consumed and the interference it imposes on other activities. Moreover, to a lesser but still marked degree the rearing of the children is by nature the woman's task. The feeding of the infant during the first twelve to eighteen months among all primitive people at least is the mother's task. And this is also true in later and in modern societies, save in exceptional cases which are more and more recognized as socially and physically undesirable. In all types of culture the mother plays a larger part in the control and education of the young child than does the

father. This function of nurture is also accompanied by a different attitude on her part toward the child than that maintained by the father. It is this attitude that renders the mother the natural nurse and educator of the child.

We are to recognize, however, that in all societies having the patriarchal form of family the father has performed a definite social function toward the child, though always different in kind and degree from that performed by the mother. The significant elements of this paternal function have generally been the authoritative control of the child, the shaping of his career, and very frequently, as in the modern period, providing economic support. In some cases the father has also played the role of instructor to his male children when they are entering upon duties of adult life.

The function of the mother has involved, on the other hand, an attention to the immediate personal needs, the early discipline and instruction, and carrying out, either in partnership with the father or as the representative of his authority, the control of the child's conduct.

The mother's attitude, like that of the father, has also changed with the softening of conditions of life and the growing of intelligence. It is not here implied that the mother started with a highly moral conception of her social function. The essential point to be recognized is that there is always a somewhat different attitude on the part of the mother and that this different attitude, as well as the difference in the reproductive process and lactation, must make the social function of the mother always different from that of the father. These constitute a differentiation that is obviously so natural and inherent in the sex distinction that it could never be changed by any social exigencies.

Another differentiation of social function not so inherently natural, but almost everywhere existing between the sexes is in economic production. The first division of labor was that existing between the sexes,

and the most primitive type of society of which we have any knowledge exhibits a very definite division along this line, although there seems to be no particular form of division that prevails among all those groups that occupy the same level of culture. In this respect, economic activities differ from those associated with children. At least many of the latter sex distinctions as noted above are inherent in the biological facts of sex. But with respect to economic activities the division of labor seems not to have followed natural lines, since wholly different forms of division of labor appear among tribes living essentially the same type of life. "Thus, the southern Bantu rigorously exclude women from their herds, while the Hottentot women regularly milk the cows."[1] Lowie cites many more similar inconsistencies between primitive tribes.

It is true, however, that the natural sex differences have had some influence in this differentiation of economic function among primitive peoples. Men are always the fighters and the hunters of big game, and generally the domesticators of animals. Women's work, while differing among different tribes as to the particular field, is practically always of a routine character and one not demanding great expenditure of strength, or rapid motion or danger to life. Thus, agriculture generally falls to the lot of the primitive woman, and the collection of small game, shell fish, herbs, etc.

In a higher type of culture where hunting and fishing cease to be the principle sources of food, and the more primitive form of agriculture gives way to one more elaborate, the division of labor continues to be distinct. The work of men and of women are as different as they are in the earlier stage.

Thus McMahon says:

When war declined and agriculture assumed greater importance, the family became a close social and economic unit with recognition of a division of work between the sexes. Women,

[1]Lowie, *Primitive Society*, pp. 74-76.

while still working in the fields, tended to leave the outdoor work to men and to confine themselves more exclusively to indoor work. . . . Only among the poorest people did women continue to hold their own in the field.

From the dawn of the industrial era men made inroads upon the industrial sphere of women. . . . Women left the fields for indoor work and as soon as there existed a surplus of labour out-of-doors they once again divided their employments with the men, the latter taking over those tasks allowing for the greatest play of skill and inventiveness, and most completely divorced from personal service. These became the textile industries and paved the way for the industrial revolution and the substitution of machine work for hand work. Women drew their work instinctively closer to the hearth; men away from it.[2]

But this system of home industry, whereby the family continued to be a definite economic unit, was destined to disappear almost as completely as the savage regime. Machine industry and capitalistic production brought on the industrial revolution which, together with other forces, has again occasioned in all western society a new division of labor between the sexes. The industries that women once were occupied with in the home have taken up their location in the factory, and women who must assist in bringing in the family income must go to the factory to work. But here again the work tends to divide along sex lines. In some cases the women are accused of driving the men out of certain employments, but a study of such situations seems to indicate that the women have taken up employment that men have left for the more remunerative tasks. The significant point for us is that women and men are not so frequently found working side by side, as they are found each dominating a particular industry, or each performing a separate part of one industry. Some new inventions and the newer organization of retail trade have created opportunities for women's employment that never existed before. Typewriting, salesmanship, telephone operation are examples. From a study of the United States Census returns for occupations, it is found that women are going into some occupations much more extensively

[2] *Woman and Economic Evolution*, pp. 116-117.

than into others,[3] thus indicating that the tendency is for some occupations to become more particularly fields for woman's work, while others remain more especially fields for men.

In all stages above the primitive, after artificial methods of production became prevalent and the male became an industrial factor, there has existed what Veblen has so well described as a leisure class, that is, one which lives from the industrial activities of others and engages in government, warfare, religious observances, and sports.[4] Within this class the differentiation of economic function between the sexes takes on a peculiar form which is not observed in the industrial classes. The male members of the class, having an abundance of economic resources supplied by the servile class, can afford to maintain a household of one or more wives, not for the sake of their labor, but for the pleasure they can afford their lord, since gradually slaves take the place of wife and child in work. And since such maintenance is an evidence of his superior position, a large household of economically parasitic females not only contributes to his immediate pleasure, but is an indubitable evidence to the community of his wealth.

In modern society there has been somewhat of a shift in the activities of the "leisure" class. Financial management of business has come to take the place of warfare. The pursuit of pecuniary profit is carried on, however, in the same spirit of predation as was war, and the object of the game is to display the ownership of more wealth than can one's rival. In this the female members of the household are useful, as in the barbaric stage. By existing in idleness and maintaining a high level of consumption, they display the economic prowess of their supporter. The ideal fostered by this class is therefore complete abstinence from useful occupations for all females. This "vicarious consumption" by the females permits, and, in the less successful

[3] Abbot, *Women in Industry.*

[4] *Theory of the Leisure Class.*

families, makes it incumbent upon, the male head of the house to dispense with many sociable and artistic pursuits, since the game of wealth getting is such a keen and all-absorbing one. Receptions, parties, dress, the pursuit of art and culture, become therefore the field in which the females seek self-expression.

The extension of education to women and the influence of democratic ideas have in recent years, however, caused a serious break in the adherence to such ideals on the part of the women of the middle and upper classes. The so-called "woman's movement," gathering its leadership and principal strength from these classes, has pushed an increasing number of women out of comfortable homes and parasitic activities into gainful occupations. Thus far the step to gainful occupation has been chiefly taken by unmarried women, but a similar step by married women who are not occupied with young children or the routine of household work must inevitably follow. Teaching, nursing, medicine, social work, and other professional pursuits are receiving large numbers. But here, also, some tendency is shown toward a sex division. While the movement of women into the professions is too new to indicate yet the ultimate tendency, signs are not lacking that sex lines will ultimately be drawn. The professional field into which women have gone most largely is that of public school teaching. The tendency of men to withdraw from this field is generally recognized. Trained nursing is almost exclusively a woman's field. In social work the division seems to be in the employment of men in administrative positions and of women as investigators and assistants and case workers. This may, however, be but a temporary condition due to the lack of women with administrative experience. With the increase of professional work by married women, some occupations may come to be known as part time vocations, permitting the woman to give a portion of her time to the home.

But work outside of the home, the so-called "gainful" occupations, is by no means the only economic

function performed by women. Household administration has always involved some degree of technique apart from the mechanical tasks associated with it. The complexity of the modern market is such that the adjustment of family income to needs is particularly one calling for considerable skill. The woman in the household, therefore, becomes the principal factor in apportioning the income to the various family needs, a task bearing with almost as much concern upon the welfare of the family as securing the income. She becomes the "director of consumption." Manifestly this division of labor between earning income and expending it is a distinction of economic function that is highly significant for modern life. The whole business of household administration, involving as it does an attention to the health, the comfort, and enjoyment of the family, raises the function out of the field of mere economic effort and renders it a social function of very complex elements, as well as one of the most fundamental importance.

A third set of social functions is intellectual, religious, artistic, and mechanical creation. What sex lines do we find in this field? Mason has pointed out that in the field of primitive industrial art, woman is almost solely responsible for all achievement.

> It may be safely said that the whole body of decoration that has come out of the textile industry originated in woman's brain. The word "textile" in the aesthetic acceptation includes (1) the preparation and coloring or choosing the color of filamentary material; (2) the making of yarn, thread, string, twine, braid, and the endless catalogue of prepared material which enters into the textile art and adorns it; (3) the technique of thatching, basketry, matting, netting, lace making, weaving, sewing, and embroidery.[5]

To this is to be added the field of plastic art, particularly pottery, where until the advent of the potter's wheel women were the creators of whatever ornament there was.

When the production of art rises to a professional level, however, we find that it is men almost exclusively who have been the creators. Even in the practical arts

[5]Mason, *Woman's Part in Primitive Industry*, p. 171.

with which women are most concerned, such as cooking, designing, costuming, the creative element is generally supplied by men. The same fact is especially noticeable in the field of music, painting, sculpture, and literature. Some exception is seen in fiction, where a number of women have produced extensively. Ellis, however, says of this: "On the whole, however, even when we take fiction into account, it cannot be said that women have reached the summits of literature."[6] In the dramatic field and dancing it seems that a larger number of women have excelled than have men. In the fields of intellectual and religious creation similar differences are found. Ellis says: "In my own study of British genius from the earliest period to the end of the nineteenth century (based on the *Dictionary of National Biography*) I found that among the most eminent British persons in all departments, 1030 in number, only 5.3 per cent were women, and it has at the same time to be admitted that a minor degree of ability sufficed to ensure the inclusion of the women."[7] And again: "I have searched *A Dictionary of All Religions*, published in the early part of the last century. Some record is here given of about 600 religious sects, and I found that of these only seven were founded by women. That is to say, that of all the great religious movements of the world nearly 99 in every 100 have received their primary impulse from men, however willing women may have been to follow."[8]

In mechanical devices it is notorious that women have shown no tendency to make contributions, and but little even in the manipulation of those of the more complex sort.

The difference in the rank and status of the sexes corresponds somewhat closely with the differences in their function. There are three factors in the comparative rank and status of the two sexes that are

[6] *Man and Woman*, 3rd ed., p. 372.
[7] *Op. cit.*, pp. 375-376.
[8] *Op. cit.*, pp. 214-215.

especially worthy of note: the rights and privileges enjoyed, the degree of worth in which they are held, and the ethical and aesthetic standards by which they are judged.

In the field of rights and privileges the situation may be generalized by saying that the males have always enjoyed a higher degree of rights than females. This is true whether applied to the control of the person, to the position occupied in the household, to the control of one's children, to the inheritance and control of property, to opportunities for intellectual and educational development, to access to occupations, or to participation in the political life of the community. It is true that the balance of rights between the sexes has changed with each new generation and that the rate of change has been faster in some of the kinds of rights than in others. But at no period of history can it be said that women's and girls' rights have been equal with those of men and boys.

In those societies having the maternal family the woman enjoyed a higher degree of equality in the control of her person than she did under the patriarchal type. She could send the husband away on almost any pretext and her place of abode was that of her blood kin. But there is plenty of evidence to show that though independent of any control by her husband she was still subject to the dominance of her male relatives. She might be sold or have her children sold into slavery by a father or brother, and the men of her clan or tribe were the real rulers. Since, however, those of her own blood would probably deal more gently with her than a strange owner, woman probably enjoyed a higher degree of personal right under these circumstances than under the patriarchal order.

Undoubtedly this system gave to the woman a position of advantage and respect and freedom that has not prevailed elsewhere. But there is no evidence that it gave her the place of control in the group. Among the North American Iroquois we do find by way of exception a considerable degree of control exercised

by the women. But even here the actual carrying out of the policies lay in the hands of the men, although the women nominated the chiefs and could "'knock off the horns' from the head of a chief and send him back to the ranks of the warriors."[9] Thomas in speaking of this situation among the North American Indians says:

> . . . the numerical recognition of women is striking, and indicates that they are the original core of society. They are still responsible for society, in a way, but all the offices involving motor activity are deputed to men. Thus women, as heads of households, choose four women councilors of the clan (gens), and these choose the fifth member, who is a man and the head of the council and chief of the clan. The tribal chief is, however, chosen by males, and in the military organization, which represents the group capacity for violence, the women have not even a nominal recognition. The real authority rests with those who are most fit to exercise it. Female influence persists as a matter of habit, until, under the pressure of social, particularly of military, activities, the breaking up of the habit and a new accommodation follows the accumulation of a larger fund of social energy.
>
> The men of any group are at any time in possession of the force to change the habits of the group and push aside any existing system. But the savage is not revolutionary; his life and his social sanctions are habitual. He is averse to change as such, and retains form and rite after their meaning is lost. We consequently find an expression of social respect for women under the maternal system suggestive of chivalry and even a formal elevation of women to authority in groups where the actual control is in the hands of men.

* * *

The discoverers of the Friendly Islands found there a king in authority over the people and his wife in control of the king, receiving homage from him, but not ruling. In these and similar cases woman's early relation to the household is formally retained in the larger group and in the presence of an obviously masculine form of organization.

But, in contrast with the survival in political systems of the primitive respect shown mothers, we find the assertion of individual male force within the very bosom of the maternal organization, in the person of the husband, brother, or uncle of the woman.[10]

[9]Morgan, *Houses and House Life of the North American Indians.* Also, Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization,* chap. iii.

[10]*Sex and Society,* pp. 72-75.

And Howard says:

> In short, if among many peoples at some stage of progress, research has clearly demonstrated the existence of mother right, it has just as clearly shown that the notion of a gynocracy, of a period of female supremacy, is without historical foundation. [11]

The patriarchal type of family secured a settled family life and permanent regular relations between the sexes, at the price of the complete subjection of the woman to the man with respect to every conceivable right. Even the power that the father exercised over the children was, and still is, greater in the case of girls than in the case of boys. This at first, doubtless, is due to the fact that the boy soon grows to a point where his physical strength compels more respect for his rights. And then the fact that his activities take him outside the home and make him economically independent at a comparatively early age extends greater privileges of self-direction to him than to his sister. This situation prevailed down to the time of the later days of Rome, when women gradually had secured a comparatively high degree of right, though not yet completely equal with men.

Marriage ceased to be a ceremony by which the daughter passed from the control of her father to the control of her husband, under the legal fiction of being his daughter. It became a contract freely entered into by both parties, where the conditions were named in the agreement. The woman retained the ownership and control of her property. If for any reason either party became dissatisfied, the contract could be set aside through legal means, and the privilege was equally free to both. Donaldson notes that men who looked back on the good old days of male control complained that women were too independent.[12] Many of the women were highly educated. They participated in literary and philosophical discussions. They assisted their husbands in political affairs and in administration. Those of wealth built public baths and gymnasia. They

[11] *Matrimonial Institutions*, Vol. I, p. 46.

[12] *Woman: Her Influence and Position in Ancient Greece and Rome.*

presided at public festivals, being regularly elected to such positions. They were elected to the priesthood. Their influence on legislation was marked, and the mother of the Gracchi who inspired her sons to fight public wrongs merely exercised a power that was possessed by every Roman mother in proportion to her duties and those of her offspring. They had the greatest freedom in movement about the city and country and could entertain whom they chose.

Christianity tended to change all this and to put woman back into the rank accorded her in the early patriarchal family. In the very beginning of the Christian Church, women filled many places of responsibility and were accorded places of influence, but gradually woman's sphere in the church became more and more limited until she was permitted the performance of no office save that of deaconess, doorkeeper, and messenger. These two latter were taken away in the mediaeval church. She was forbidden to teach or to perform any spiritual task. The "ignorant practice of the atheism of the Greeks to appoint priestesses to the female deities,"[13] was held up to scorn.

But outside the church organization the influence of Christianity on the position of women was still more marked. Appalled at the licentiousness of the period and greatly affected by the ascetic philosophy, the church fathers came gradually to look upon all carnal appetites as sinful, or at least inconsistent with the highest spirituality. Hence marriage when permitted must be rigidly controlled. Women being a temptation to men to indulge in carnal practices must be confined and limited in freedom. Tertullian makes the duties of the wife simple: "She had to obey her husband, for he was her head, her lord and superior; she was to fear him, reverence him, and please him alone; she had to cultivate silence; she had to spin and take care of the house, and she ought to stay at home and attend to her children. The only occasions for her going out were

[13]Donaldson, *op. cit.*, quotation from the *Constitutions*.

when she went to church or with her husband."[14] Taken all together, the influence of the church must be regarded as not only retarding the equalization of the rank of the sexes, but as setting society back for several hundred years from the point attained in this respect by the later Roman civilization.

In the eighteenth century began the modern movement in western civilization toward removing the differences which in recent years has attained to such proportions. The eastern world, however, still assigns to the sexes the comparative rank characteristic of the patriarchal family. And even in the western world, in the nation that has gone farthest in readjusting the relations of the sexes, the husband is legally the head of the household; he has the greater degree of legal control over the children; married women have fewer rights than men with reference to control of property; young women have less freedom from parental influence than young men in choosing mates; there are many occupations the entrance into which is less free for women than for men. The movement for equalization of the rights of the sexes has therefore still a great distance to go.

In the matter of the relative worth or esteem in which the sexes are held, we find a situation very similar to that of the rights enjoyed. Among some primitive peoples in which the maternal family prevailed, considerable honor and esteem for women seem to have existed. Says Thomas: "We find an expression of social respect for women under the maternal system suggestive of chivalry."[15] But among the most primitive people, even under the maternal system, to be a girl or woman was a much less honorable lot than to be a male. The puberty-initiation which marked the entrance for the boy into manhood gave him the right to despise the females with whom he had formerly associated. These ceremonies acquainted him with the secret mysteries which are known only to the adult males of the tribe. It would be a calamity for any

[14]Donaldson, *op. cit.*, p. 176.
[15]Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

of these to be made known to children or women. The women acquiesce in this exclusive possession of the tribal secrets by the men.[16] Moreover, the occupations of the women are less honorable than those of the men. There is an "invidious distinction" whereby all occupations of women are regarded as menial and despicable in comparison with those of man. Contempt is perhaps not too strong a word to describe the attitude of the average savage man toward women as a group.

Under the patriarchal family the distinction is still more pronounced than under the maternal. Even the reproductive function of the woman is minimized in comparison with that of the man. Todd notes:

> And did not Swedenborg declare that the soul, which is spiritual and is the real man, comes from the father; while the body, which is natural and, as it were, the vestments of the soul, is of the mother? "Among the Greeks," says Wake, "the father was endowed with creative power, was clothed with the divine character but not the mother, who was only the bearer and nourisher of the child." Aeschylus in the *Eumenides* expresses the idea thus:
>
> " . . . Mark me! whom we call
> The mother begets not; she is but the nurse,
> Whose fostering breast the new-sown seed receives.
> The father truly gets; the dam but cherishes
> A stranger-bud, that, if the gods be kind,
> May blossom soon, and bear. Behold a proof!
> Without a mother may a child be born,
> Not so without a father. Which to witness
> Here is this daughter of Olympian Jove. . . . "

Gothic language had no common term for "parent," the nearest approach being *fadrein*, literally "fatherhood." M. Menard in his *Vie Privee des Anciens* says that the idea of the father as creator of the child, and the mother as merely its nourisher, was common to all antiquity. This accords with the classical tradition that among the Egyptians no child was reputed illegitimate, even though he was born of a slave mother, as they looked upon the father as the sole author of the being of the child, to whom the mother was but the purveyor of food and lodging. Some Australian natives are said to hold the same opinion. Mr. Howitt relates that a black fellow once remarked to him, "The man gives the child to a woman to take care of for him, and he can do whatever he likes with his own child." Among the Tupinambas of Brazil it

[16]Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*, chap. 5.

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was common for a man to give his own women as wives to male captives, and then without scruple to eat the children when they grew up, "holding them simply to be the flesh and blood of their enemies."[17]

Wherever the patriarchal family in highly accentuated form has prevailed, the woman has been regarded as "undeveloped man," the "weaker sex," a thing, rather than a personality. It is significant that in Oriental countries where the system has reached its highest development, the possession of a soul has been seriously denied to woman, and the birth of a female child is frequently a disgrace. In some cases inability to bear male children may be a sufficient reason for a wife being divorced. Even Shakespeare's Macbeth regards it as the height of excellence that his wife should bear male children only.

In Greece and Rome some progress was made toward a lessening of this difference in honor. Even in Homer we find a representation of large influence exercised by women. "Ulysses and Penelope as every one knows are the subject of the Odyssey. The husband consulted his wife in all important concerns, though it was her special work to look after the affairs of the house. Arete is a powerful peacemaker in the kingdom of her husband Alcinous, and it is to her that Nausicaa advises Ulysses to go if he wishes to obtain his return. All the people worship her as a god when she walks through the streets. Penelope and Clytemnestra are left practically in charge of the realms of their husbands during their absence at Troy, each with a wise man as counselor and protector. Fear also for the contempt of the women was one motive for bravery. And Laertes, though he honored Eurycleia as he honored his dead wife, behaved in a seemly manner to her because he shunned the anger of his wife. Altogether the influence of Homeric women must be reckoned great and their condition happy."[18] In a later period Plutarch says "that the Lacedaemonian men

[17] *The Primitive Family as an Educational Institution*, pp. 84-85.

[18] Donaldson, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

were always obedient to their wives and they allowed them to meddle in public matters more than they allowed themselves to meddle in private affairs." In spite of such evidences of progress, however, it cannot be said that the Greeks reached a very advanced position in their estimate of the equality of the sexes. Aristotle probably voiced the general opinion of his day when he said: "We see the male formed for government and the female for submission."

It remained for Roman culture to raise woman to the highest position of public honor. The rights and privileges, which as we have seen were also accorded her, were necessarily accompanied by a high respect for her judgment and wisdom. And it was not the exceptional woman alone who was honored at Rome. The matrons of most of the influential families were regarded almost equal with their husbands in public and literary affairs.

But Christianity, as it lowered the rights of women, also lowered to a marked degree the respect for them and the approbation in which they were held. Under the influence of the ascetic philosophy, woman came to be regarded primarily as an instrument of the devil to lure man on the rocks of passion. A very charitable estimate was that "the race of women is prone to slip and is unstable and low in their thoughts."[19]

The tendency of Christian thought, as the ascetic influence declined, was to go to the other extreme and place woman on a moral pedestal that lifted her far above the evil plane of men. But it was always associated with the idea of her inferiority in mental powers. This strange combination of the "angel and the idiot" has continued to very recent times as the dominant conception of the nature of woman, while man was still regarded as an ordinary good-and-bad human being who represented what was to be expected in the way of human worth and ability and weakness. In much of the literature which still has considerable

[19]Donaldson, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

vogue woman continues to stand on a moral and spiritual pedestal, while from an intellectual and civic standpoint she is regarded as beneath serious consideration.

In the mediaeval period the rise of chivalry and of romanticism marked the beginning of a movement that had an important influence in increasing a certain kind of honor for women. It was confined almost exclusively to the aristocratic class, but its influence later percolated into the lower classes. In so far as it affected the relations of the sexes it cultivated an attitude of romantic sentiment on the part of men toward women. It encouraged protection, respect, and lofty appreciation. That it was, however, often more a ceremony than a real sentiment of respect is now well understood. Says Ellis: "The dominant attitude of the chivalrous age toward women, as Leon Gautier has shown in his monumental work on chivalry, was one of indifference, or even contempt. . . . Theoretically a thousand chivalrous swords should leap from their scabbards to succour the distressed woman. In practice this may mean only that the thousand owners of these metaphysical weapons are on the alert to take advantage of the distressed woman. . . . Mediaeval romantic love implied in women a weakness in the soil of which only a spiritual force could flourish."[20]

Arising in a period of brutality, the appreciation of woman to the point of protecting her may be said to have had real social significance. But when the need for protection from brute violence disappeared, the institution of chivalry had no foundation on which to rest. It left behind it, however, a deposit of ceremony that consists chiefly in the performance of a variety of trivial and useless services which indicate little as to the real attitude toward women.

Since the mediaeval period there has undoubtedly been a great increase in the genuine respect and appreciation with which women as a group are held in the

[20] *The Task of Social Hygiene*, pp. 119-126.

western world. On the one hand there is less tendency to endow them with an impossible sort of spirituality or to regard them as so much in need of male support and protection, and on the other a tendency to evaluate them as men are evaluated, on the basis of their essential human qualities and their ability to contribute to every day social needs. It can hardly be held, however, that even yet do women and men occupy equal positions with reference to an appreciation of the worth of their occupations or of their general social utility. Men still, even in the minds of most women, are the more important element of society. Teachers in coeducational institutions of higher education are frequently heard to express a feeling that their time is less advantageously employed in teaching women than in teaching men. And by many, woman's role is still reckoned as that of the helpmeet, the comforter of man, the assistant in his work. In the minds of a comparatively few only has woman come to be evaluated in terms of her own social worth, independently of her relation to some man.

Another phase of the relative status of the sexes is the standard of morality and propriety by which each is judged. This phase of the matter may be generalized by saying that each sex has been held to an entirely different standard with respect to most aspects of life. What are virtues for one may be vices for the other. At least what is required for one may not be expected of the other.

This is shown in nothing more sharply than in the standard of social efficiency. For the man, in the days of warfare and the hunt, bravery, daring, prowess were the essential virtues. Since he took over the more inventive side of industry, he has been judged by a standard of initiative, resourcefulness, skillfulness of technique. In the business and political world the same qualities of daring and predatory resourcefulness that the battle demanded are the ideals of masculine efficiency to-day. Woman's efficiency, on the other hand, has been judged by her ability to perform well

the routine tasks, and to bring success and honor to her lord. This is true even in primitive culture, and increasingly so under the patriarchal regime, when she becomes merely an agent of the will of the man. Her work has not been any less exacting and onerous than his, but, owing to its routine character and to the fact that it has been performed under the direction of a man, her efficiency has been measured by her ability to carry out the tasks assigned her with an eye single to the welfare and honor of her lord and his children.

In the field of social relations the woman's position has been that of a house dweller. Her non-economic functions have had to do with the rearing of children and contributing to the sexual gratification of her lord. Hence her conduct is judged by what has been called the morals of the person. And not only was this inevitable from the standpoint of her social function, but the man had the physical power to enforce a standard that accorded with his right of possession. Female chastity seems to have arisen as a requirement of the husband who insisted on a non-infringement of his rights. The frequent loaning of wives shows that it was the interference with the husband's property rights, not the fact of extra-connubial intercourse, that was wrong. And pre-nuptial obligations to the prospective husband, together with the fact that the virgin brought a higher bride price at her betrothal, established chastity in the same way for the unmarried girl.

Chastity thus became the fundamental virtue for the woman. And as her economic function among the higher classes declined, her sex function became practically her whole sphere of action. Hence morals of the person became more and more important. The proprieties for the female also all have to do with the carrying out of the idea of keeping her body sacred for her lord. That is improper which suggests in any way the expression of the sex interest on her part, because such expression would lead her into relations with other men. And here again male authority is able to establish firmly the standard.

Since the male has social functions of much greater variety than merely carrying out his part in reproduction or contributing to the sexual happiness of the female, sex standards are of less relative importance in his world than they are for the female. Moreover, the woman is in no position to enforce upon him standards of chastity and propriety as he does upon her. As a result the man is judged less by a code that pertains to personal contacts, and more by one that pertains to impersonal relations in a world of business and political activities.

As a result of these differences, we find the so-called "double standard" of sex morals, and an equally real double standard in the matter of non-sexual social relations. Honesty, truthfulness, above-board dealing, courage, justice are the traits of the man-as-he-should-be. But we expect much less of conformity by the woman with such standards, because they constitute the code of a world to which she is foreign. But modesty, faithfulness, sympathy, loyalty, tactfulness, patience, meekness,—to such a code as this every true woman conforms.

Even more obvious, at least in modern society, than the differences of function and rank between the sexes are those of mind and character. It is these differences that give content to the concepts womanly and manly, to the peculiar qualities of masculine and feminine. The essential differences of this sort may be grouped into two classes; namely, the direction of attention, and character.

By direction of attention is meant that selective action of the mind in appropriating certain items of the community life for contemplation. These items, for the time, become the mind of the individual, viewed from the standpoint of content. The differences between the sexes in this respect have not been marked to the same degree at different stages of social development. It is commonly held that they become greater somewhat in proportion to the degree of civilization that a

people attains. This is not strictly correct, since primitive peoples show different customs with respect to the community of mental life between the sexes. In some of the most primitive, such as the Veddahs, we find the men and women occupied with about the same activities and showing little difference in the contents of their minds. Among others the social organization compels a strict separation of the sexes. Thus Crawley notes: "In New Caledonia you rarely see men and women talking or sitting together. The women seem perfectly content with the company of their own sex. The men who loiter about with spears in most lazy fashion are seldom seen in the society of the opposite sex. . . . The Ojibway, Peter Jones, thus writes of his own people: 'I have scarcely ever seen anything like social intercourse between husband and wife, and it is remarkable that the women say little in the presence of the men.' . . . In Senegambia the women live by themselves, rarely with their husbands, and their sex is virtually a clique. In Egypt, a man never converses with his wife. . . . "[21] The institution of the men's house, widely prevalent, furnishes a center for the men where most of their time is spent, especially the unmarried men, although the married ones are there much during the day. The secret traditions of many tribes are the exclusive possession of the men in many cases and would not under any circumstances be communicated to the women.

It is therefore evident that even among many primitive peoples the minds of men and women are occupied with different things. The widest differences appear, however, in the patriarchal family where the woman is isolated to a much greater degree than in the matriarchal. From this point on, woman's mind is confined to those objects of attention that are involved in house life and the sex and economic functions that are carried on there. The man's mind is occupied with the new industrial technique that he has taken on, with the

[21]Crawley, *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, Vol. 24, p. 233.

problems of social control, with sport, and with such intellectual and artistic pursuits as his leisure will permit.

With the increase of educational technique, scientific knowledge, and the widening of the contacts between groups, the man's mind becomes more and more specialized in these various pursuits. Almost none of this, however, affects the mind of the woman isolated from the affairs of the world that go on outside the confines of the house, since the increase of leisure simply releases her from economic pursuits and places more time at her disposal for making herself sexually attractive to the man.

The result of all this is that in a highly civilized society we find the minds of men and women running along such different lines that there are few points of contact. Personal ornamentation, household details, children, the more trivial incidents of personal relations, for those who can afford it, the incidents of polite society—these are aspects of life on which women's minds are centered, with an occasional dash of romance furnished by the novel or drama. For men's minds the technique of industry, the affairs of state, sport, scientific, literary, and artistic pursuits furnish the pabulum. Those who live on a low level of culture occupy their minds largely with the gratification of the food, drink, and sex appetites.

Even more profound than the difference in direction of attention is that in character or quality of the personality. It is this that makes up a large part of the so-called "charm" of one sex for the other, and also renders each difficult of understanding by the other. Here, also, the differences are much more profound in the more highly developed societies. One of the most significant of these differences is the attitude toward the expression of the sex interest. The male is direct, open, aggressive in his expression. The female is shy, timid, indirect, and much more passive. Civilized society has very greatly accentuated this. It has regarded the whole matter of sex so dangerous for the female to

recognize that it has shut out knowledge of it from the girl to a degree that resulted in absurd ignorance of the commonest phases of physiological processes, until within recent years.

The sex traits for both men and women are extended to cover an attitude toward many sides of life not directly connected with sex. The male applies his aggression and fierceness to the pursuit of gain and fame, while the female becomes shy, timid, gentle in all her relations. Says Thomas: "Not only are women unable and unwilling to be communicated with directly, unconventionally, and truly on many subjects, but men are unwilling to talk to them. I do not have in mind situations involving questions of propriety or delicacy alone, but a certain habit of restraint, originating doubtless in matters relating to sex, extends to all intercourse with women, with the result that they are not really admitted to the intellectual world of men; and there is not only a reluctance on the part of men to admit them, but a reluctance—or rather a real inability—on their part to enter. Modesty with reference to personal habits has become so ingrained and habitual, and to do anything freely is so foreign to women, that even free thought is almost of the nature of an immodesty in her."[22]

Along with this goes a high degree of the attitude of dependence of the female on the male. This, resting primarily on differences of physical strength, is extended to include economic dependence and moral dependence. Says Cooley: "In a girl *das ewig weibliche*, not easy to describe, but quite unmistakable, appears as soon as she begins to take notice of people, and one phase of it certainly is an ego less simple and stable, a stronger impulse to go over to the other person's point of view and to stake joy and grief on the image in his mind. There can be no doubt that women are as a rule more dependent upon immediate personal support and corroboration than are men. The thought

[22] *Sex and Society*, p. 302.

of woman needs to fix itself upon some person in whose mind she can find a stable and compelling image of herself by which to live. If such an image is found, either in an actual or an ideal person, the power of devotion to it becomes a source of strength. But it is a sort of strength dependent upon this personal complement without which the womanly character is somewhat apt to become a derelict and drifting vessel."[23]

This attitude of dependence in the woman is matched by pride in self-support and self-direction in the man and a still greater pride in serving as a pillar of strength to the dependent woman.

It is probable that this difference is largely responsible for the difference in religious and moral expression. It has everywhere been noted that women are much more devoted to religion and more faithful in the performance of conventional, religious, and moral duties. Religion furnishes them an ideal to follow, and in the performance of required duties they are following the established habits of obedience to and dependence on a higher authority. But this outward respect for authority, ingrained by habit and enforced by convention, sometimes conflicts with inner impulses. In such a case the end is to be obtained by indirectness, apparent obedience, and concession, but an ultimate arrival at her desires by a roundabout course. On the other hand, the man, self-sufficient and accustomed to independence, breaks directly with the injunction, if he dares, and proceeds to his goal in the open. It thus occurs that indirection and subtlety are expected from the female; openness and directness from the male.

Beside this there have been cultivated in the woman qualities calculated to captivate, entertain, and interest the male—gayness, vivacity, loquacity. Over against this the man has been encouraged to maintain a gravity and seriousness calculated to impress one

[23] *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 171-172.

with the idea that the affairs of the world that rest on his shoulders are so weighty and numerous as to make light-heartedness quite improper.

From this brief account of the social differences which have accompanied sex differences at different stages of social development, it is apparent that no type of social differentiation goes more deeply into the very structure of the social order than that based upon sex. The extent, however, to which these social distinctions have been based upon the natural differences inherent in sex, and to what extent on artificial differences is not always so clear. The fact of sex is one of the most subtle and one of the least understood aspects of human life, and in many ways has as yet defied clear analysis. It very clearly is less understood than are the differences of age. Because of this fact more false inferences and more purely speculative conclusions have prevailed concerning sex than concerning any other natural difference between human beings. And while many of the social differences which have been drawn between the sexes are inevitable or at least natural, many others are purely artificial and arbitrary, based on wrong inferences, speculation, expediency, or brute force.

In any attempt to evaluate the natural differences between the sexes, a distinction must be drawn between the primary and the secondary sex characters. While there is great lack of unanimity in the actual classification of characters, the general principle is to regard those characters as primary which are essential to the particular part which the individual must play in the process of reproduction, and those as secondary which are inevitable accompaniments of the former, but not necessary for the biological act of reproduction. This would limit the term primary to include the so-called sexual organs and the glands necessary to their functioning. The term secondary is to be applied to such characters as the beard for man and lack of it for woman, the quality of the voice, contour of body, etc.

Ellis defines a secondary character as "one which by more highly differentiating the sexes helps to make them attractive to each other."[24] He indicates still another group, the tertiary, which seem to have no function in sex attraction and yet are inevitable accompaniments of the other differences. Thus:—

> There are, however, other sexual differences which do not so easily fall into this group. These differences are less obvious; many of them are relative, or only perceptible when we take average into consideration; but they are very numerous. Thus we have, for instance, the much greater shallowness, proportionately, of the female skull; we have the greater size and activity of the thyroid gland in women and the smaller average proportion of red blood corpuscles; and we have a different average relationship of the parts of the brain to each other. These differences are probably related indirectly to primary and secondary sexual differences; they are not of great importance from the zoölogical point of view, but they are of considerable interest from the anthropological point of view, very often of interest from the pathological point of view, and occasionally of great interest from the social point of view. They cannot be put easily into the same group as the secondary sexual characters as usually understood; and perhaps it would be convenient if we were to agree to distinguish them as tertiary sexual characters.

For purposes of our present discussion we may omit any distinction between secondary and tertiary, and regard, as Ellis himself practically does in his later discussion, all those characters as secondary which are not necessary for the actual process of reproduction, but which regularly distinguish one sex from the other.

Concerning the primary traits there is little if any controversy, but the secondary traits have furnished a rich field for difference of opinion. It is in the enumeration of these secondary traits that so much of speculation, illogical deduction, and metaphysics have prevailed. Many of these secondary traits are so obvious as to call for no discussion, such as the beard, quality of voice, bodily contour, size of brain. On the other hand many others are so subtle and intangible and difficult of measurement that they are not well understood, and the necessary existence of social differences dependent upon them is a point of dispute. These are

[24] *Man and Woman*, p. 20.

especially such traits as type of response to stimulus, degree of affectability or emotionality, method of the rational process, sensibility, tastes, and temperament. The difference of opinion concerns both the existence of such differences between the sexes and also the effect that they have, if they do exist, upon the social positions of the sexes. On the one hand, and this is the older view, are those who hold that the sexes differ very radically in all mental and moral traits, and that because of this fact they are by nature adapted to essentially different forms of activity and occupation and rank. On the other hand, especially in recent years, the opinion has been gaining ground that the natural secondary differences of sex are much fewer in number and less marked in degree than was formerly supposed, and that the different social positions of the sexes are to be explained on other grounds.

The application of scientific method to the study of the subject of sex differences is very recent. It has been essentially the field for conjecture and unfounded assumption, and even yet these methods play a very large part. The physical anthropologists and biologists have been the first to collect reliable data and formulate theories. These students have succeeded in making out a very strong case for some very definite physical sex differences.

But not satisfied with resting their case here the biologists have gone on to infer certain innate psychological qualities as necessarily accompanying these physical qualities. The male is said to be more inventive, more ready to take up new ideas, more impulsive and intense, more given to prolonged concentration and abstract processes of reasoning. The female, on the other hand, is said to be conservative, to have greater capacity for retaining details of knowledge, to be quicker in perception, and in sudden grasp of situations, but less capable in going to the depths.[25]

The important thing to note about this set of conclusions on the psychological differences of the sexes is

[25]Thompson, *The Mental Traits of Sex.*

that they were reached not by direct investigation but by an inference or deductive process from the physical facts which were established by a more methodical inductive process. It is also evident, as Miss Thompson points out, that the inferences are not logically drawn. For example, it is hard to see how a mental tendency to abstraction and prolongation of attention is consistent with the intense activity and tangential physical characteristics of the male, while the passive and conservative female should show an intellectual tendency toward incapability for prolonged attention and an interest in the empirical only. The whole set of inferences as to psychic differences, from the biological facts, is full of inconsistencies.

Thomas, referring to the general conclusions of the biologists, makes the observation that "the testimony of anthropologists on the variability of men and women is to be accepted with great caution. As a class they have gone on the assumption that woman is an inferior creation, and have almost totally neglected to distinguish between the congenital characters of woman and those acquired as the result of totally different relations to society on the part of women and men."[26]

More recently there has been an attempt to get away from the method of deducing psychological parallels from biological facts, and to get at the mental processes at first hand by methods of the psychological laboratory. Manifestly this is the only method that can produce results which can be accepted with any degree of assurance.[27]

The net result of most of these studies, however, seems to be simply a confirmation of the generally understood fact that men and women are interested in different things, without throwing any light at all on the question as to whether that difference is due to innate sex differences or to post-natal experience.

The only general study of more fundamental mental sex differences by the method of experimental psy-

[26] *Sex and Society*, pp. 50-51.
[27] See, for example, Jastro, *New Review*, 1891, pp. 562.

chology which has come to the writer's attention is that of Thompson. Other studies have dealt with single senses or psychological processes. Miss Thompson studied motor ability, skin and muscular sensations, taste and smell, hearing, vision, intellectual faculties, affective processes. Her conclusions, so far as they bear upon our problem, are as follows: I quote at length since this is the only general study.

It has been found that motor ability in most of its forms is better developed in men than in women. In strength, rapidity of movement, and rate of fatigue, they have a very decided advantage, and in precision of movement a slight advantage. These four forms of superiority are probably all expressions of one and the same fact—the greater muscular strength of men. In the formation of a new coördination women are superior to men. The greater muscular strength of men is a universally accepted fact. There has been more or less dispute as to which sex displays greater manual dexterity. According to the present results, manual dexterity, which consists in the ability to make very delicate and minutely controlled movements is slightly greater in men; that which consists in the ability to coördinate movements rapidly to unforeseen stimuli, is clearly greater in women.

* * *

. . . The thresholds are on the whole lower in women; discriminative sensibility is on the whole better in men. Those sensory judgements into which sensations of movements enter directly, such as the discrimination of lifted weights and of visual lines and areas are somewhat better in men. All differences, however, are slight.

As for the intellectual faculties, women are decidedly superior to men in memory, and possibly more rapid in associative thinking. Men are probably superior in ingenuity. In general information and intellectual interests there is no difference characteristic of sex.

The data on the life of feeling indicate that there is little, if any, sexual difference in the degree of domination by emotion, and that social consciousness is more prominent in men and religious consciousness in women.

Let us now turn to the question how well or how ill these results accord with the prevailing biological view of the mental differences between the sexes.

It is evident that, on the surface at least, the results at which we arrived accord very well with this theory. Men did prove in our experiments to have better-developed motor ability and more ingenuity. Women did have somewhat keener senses and better memory. The assertion that the influence of emotion is greater in the life of women found no confirmation. Their greater tenden-

cy toward religious faith, however, and the greater number of superstitions among them point toward their conservative nature —their function of preserving established beliefs and institutions.

But before we accept the theory advanced as the correct interpretation of the facts, it would be well to examine a little more closely the evidence on which it rests, and consider whether or not there is any other possible interpretation with equal claims to a hearing.

* * *

The biological theory of psychological differences of sex is not in a condition to compel assent. While it is true, therefore, that the present investigation tends to support the theory, it is just as true that the uncertain basis of the theory itself leaves room for other explanations of the facts, if there are other satisfactory ways of explaining them.

* * *

The point to be emphasized as the outcome of this study is that, according to our present light, the psychological differences of sex seem to be largely due not to difference of average capacity, nor to difference in type of mental activity, but to differences in the social influences brought to bear on the developing individual from early infancy to adult years. The question of the future development of the intellectual life of women is one of social necessities and ideals, rather than of the inborn psychological characteristics of sex.[28]

Alongside these conclusions derived from a comparative study of men and women in the psychological laboratory, we may place the conclusions derived from a comprehensive survey of the literature of sex differences.

We have not succeeded in determining the radical and essential characters of men and women uninfluenced by external modifying influences. Sometimes a sufficiently wide induction of facts (as in the question of the alleged sexual differences in respiration) suffices to show us what is artificial and what is real; at other times (as in the question of differences in sensibility) the wider our induction of facts the more complex and mobile become our results. We have to recognize that our present knowledge of men and women cannot tell us what they might be or what they ought to be, but what they actually are under the conditions of civilization. By showing us that under varying conditions men and women are both within certain limits indefinitely modifiable, a precise knowledge of the actual facts of the life of men and women

[28] *The Mental Traits of Sex*, pp. 169-182.

forbids us to dogmatize rigidly concerning the respective spheres of men and women. It is a matter which experience alone can demonstrate in detail.[29]

Thus these two most complete surveys of the field, the one a thorough-going laboratory study, the other a critical survey of the entire literature of the subject, agree in the conclusion that the secondary sex characters are not found to include such differences as predetermine the social positions which the sexes have occupied relative to each other. At least, then, our present state of knowledge is such that the relative positions of the sexes cannot with accuracy be derived from recognized differences of mental and moral quality. This is not to deny the very obvious existence of many and significant secondary qualities in which the sexes differ. It merely holds that among these secondary sex differences are not to be found any which with any degree of certainty can be held causally responsible for the differences in the social positions of the sexes. In the present state of psychological knowledge, there are no grounds for dogmatizing on either side. To assert that there are no congenital psychic differences of sex influencing social position would be to go as far into error as have those who have deduced a large variety of such differences from the biological traits of sex. But there is at present lacking any evidence to prove that the prevailing social differences between the sexes are due to such causes.

The psychic differences usually observed between the sexes are, in fact, differences also observed between the members of the same sex. Because of this fact, to regard femininity and masculinity as two exclusive types of psychic manifestation, to one of which every person must strictly conform, is to neglect evident facts of human nature. Every person undoubtedly presents some degree of all the traits possessed by any other person. Carpenter says: "It is beginning to be recognized that the sexes do not or should not normally form two groups hopelessly isolated in habit and feeling

[29]Havelock Ellis, *Man and Woman*, pp. 440-441.

from each other, but that they should rather present two poles of one group—which is the human race; so that while certainly the extreme specimens at either pole are vastly divergent there are great numbers in the middle region (who though differing corporeally as men and women) are by emotion and temperament very near to each other."[30] And Weininger remarks: "The improbability may henceforth be taken for granted of finding in nature a sharp cleavage between all that is masculine on the one side and all that is feminine on the other; or that any living being is so simple in this respect that it can be put wholly on one side or wholly on the other, of the line."[31] Moreover, if any one trait is selected in which the sexes generally differ it will probably be found that there are wider differences in the degree to which the trait is manifested between members of the same sex than there are between the average degrees manifested by the two sexes. Thorndyke says:

> What little scientific study of the differences between the sexes in intellect and character there has been, tends to minimize the traditional conception that they are two distinct kinds of beings, never understanding one another and requiring very different kinds of treatment. On the contrary, it appears that if the primary sex characters—the instincts directly related to courtship, love, child-bearing, and nursing—are left out of account, the average man differs from the average woman far less than many men differ one from another.
>
> In no trait of those studied has a gap been found between the distributions for the two sexes. The upper extreme of one sex always overlaps the lower extreme of the other. Some girls like to fight better than some boys; some men are fonder of babies than some women.
>
> The overlapping is, in most of the traits studied, very great.[32]

The conclusion that the sharp social cleavage existing between the sexes cannot be traced to secondary sex differences, while merely negative, is valuable in keeping us off a false track of explanation. It is also valuable in showing the error in many of the conclusions that have been reached as to what ought to be

[30] *The Indeterminate Sex*, pp. 16-17.
[31] *Sex and Character*, introduction, p. 3
[32] *Individuality*, pp. 29-30.

the relative social positions of the sexes. To say that men or women are necessarily predetermined by mental or moral qualities or inherent tendencies to fill a particular social position is to rest the case on entirely unproven suppositions, at least in light of what psychological and sociological knowledge is at present available.

We are still, however, under the necessity of finding some positive explanation to account for the wide disparity in the social positions that the sexes have always occupied. This explanation is to be sought in the fields of functional psychology and of social evolution. We know now that mind and character are built up out of the process of meeting particular situations, and that social relations are adjustments that societies have made in their efforts to meet social needs. Assuming that the differences in the social position of the sexes cannot be definitely traced to inherent secondary sex tendencies, the explanation must be found in the situations created by the process of adjustment to social needs.

The fundamental differences of need in the sexes are those intimately associated with the process of reproduction. The male's part in the process is very slight, so far as its interference with his other activities goes. But biologically he must be the seeker and the wooer, and he must contend with other males of his own species, and enemies of other species, for the privilege of having his mate. Hence, biologically, he is equipped for motion, for combat, for conquest. The female being the sought, has a less violent sex impulse. And the human method of reproduction requires that she be equipped for carrying the foetus for a long period in her body. Thus, both by structure and by the presence in her body of the foetus, on many occasions she is denied large freedom of movement for getting food or protecting herself. Moreover, this method of reproduction and lactation develops in her a different attitude toward the child. Her feeling for it compels a caring for it and defense of it which is a heavy addition to her

responsibilities. Her very affection for the child thus renders her less capable of self-support and self-defense. The father, at least in early human society, has no such handicap.

The particular relations that would develop between them would depend on the problems that life would present under different situations. The general economic function that each would perform and the rank that each would enjoy would be determined by the exigencies of the time and place. Life was not easy for the first men and women. It was a struggle in which no quarter was given and the issue was survival or death. And only gradually has this struggle been softened. How natural, therefore, it was that the male should assume the functions that involved combat and movement, and the woman the routine tasks, for only by coöperation could they make every faculty count. And how natural it was that the woman with her handicap of weakness and child-bearing and rearing should be willing to endure a secondary rank for the sake of the protection and assistance of the man, especially in a time when strength in combat determined superiority and inferiority.

And where economic development and war favored the patriarchal family, the relation of the sexes was an adjustment that gave to the man satisfaction for his desire and his vanity and to the woman a settled home and sure support and protection for herself and children. She lost much, but what she gained was satisfaction of the more immediate and pressing need. From this point on, the ever-widening scope of the man's activities and the condition of isolation and dependence for the woman represent an adjustment that was the best that could be made under the circumstances. To attribute the injustice and hardship of the arrangement primarily to a conscious purpose of subjection on the part of the man or to weak willingness of the woman to be dwarfed and cramped in personality, is to fail to understand life. We are not so rationally deliberative

as that. It fails also to recognize that the adjustment in the main was in response to some pressing need, and so, at least partially useful.

In general, the division of labor between the sexes and the peculiar status of each, with reference to the other, may be said then to grow out of the necessity for meeting particular social situations under the differing conditions that the reproductive process lays upon each. It is not necessary to posit a wide variation in the innate adaptability of the minds of men and women to particular types of work.

That there have been other factors, however, some of them less creditable to human nature, must be admitted. The vanity of the male that expresses itself in a thirst for distinction, and his love of dominance have led the man to set himself above anyone that he could. Most human beings will dominate to the extent that their associates will permit. Possibly the male has this quality to a greater degree than the female. At all events, the physical strength and greater freedom of movement of the male has given him advantage and his assumption of a superior position over the female has been to some extent an expression of this quality where a rationalized ethical code or custom has not restrained him.

In the next place ignorance and superstition have been important factors. The fact that the division of labor between the sexes in primitive society, while in its larger features based on differences of strength and mobility, is in its more minute features entirely irrational, demonstrates this. A requirement in one tribe that the dressing of skins should be performed by women while in others it must be done by men, or the custom in one tribe that spinning is exclusively a male occupation while in a neighboring tribe it is exclusively feminine, show that the origin of such division of labor must have been some trivial incident or an occurrance that assumed an importance entirely beyond its real significance. Moreover, the exclusion of women from many ceremonial and religious rites and privileges

seems to have been based upon a superstitious interpretation of her nature. The horror of menstruation is thought by a number of students of primitive life to account for much of this.[33]

Lowie has well shown that the explanation of woman's status exclusively by the type of economic life prevailing in the tribe is subject to some limitation.[34] There is no denial that the form of work performed by women has always been a most important factor in determining their rank. But when this principle is applied to every separate tribe it is found that many inconsistencies appear. The status is found to differ greatly among tribes having practically the same type of economic life and of women's work. The evidence seems rather conclusive that the idea of woman's status has been borrowed by one tribe from another, irrespective of economic life. Cultural contacts therefore must be taken into account if we would understand the peculiar relations of men and women with respect to rank in any particular group.

Finally, custom has had its part in perpetuating peculiar functions and rank beyond the period in which they were socially useful. The child, growing up in a society in which a given relation of the sexes prevailed, would inevitably become adjusted to the situation and cling to it in his adult life. The relation would also become crystallized in literature, mores, religion, law, and from the sheer weight of human conservatism would be perpetuated beyond the time of its usefulness.

The situation with respect to the distinction in the mind and character of the sexes is somewhat different. There is undoubtedly something of inherent difference in temperament and in attitude that is incidental to the different parts played in courtship and in reproduction. The male aggressiveness in seeking a mate is carried over into other aspects of life so that his approach to any situation is more likely to be direct, open, and forceful. At the same time the backwardness of the

[33] Lowie, *Primitive Society*, p. 203.
[34] *Op. cit.*, pp. 193-203.

female and her tendency to wait and attract rather than to make a direct attack to secure a mate is likewise seen in her methods of securing other ends. Of course, as noted above there is no sharp cleavage in the matter of temperament separating male and female into clearly distinct groups. Undoubtedly many women are more direct and aggressive than many men. But in a group of a hundred or more persons selected at random, there is little question that there will be found among the men a greater tendency toward directness and aggression and among the women indirectness and a waiting attitude. There are many other items of character apparently different in the original nature, as in the need for some one to rely upon, and possibly in the appreciation of aesthetic values.

When we get away, however, from the attitudes involved in courtship and reproduction, we are on more uncertain grounds, and the positing of original differences is largely a matter of speculation because in actual life it has up to this time at least been impossible to separate original from acquired traits. There is no question that very many of the traits once supposed to be original are acquired. Given a particular type of occupation and a particular status in the social group, and a type of mind will follow as a matter of psychological consequence. Isolation versus contact, subordination versus freedom, dependence versus responsibility, house-life versus community life, personal relations versus impersonal relations—these are the contrasts that explain much of the differences in women's and men's minds and characters. Conservatism or progressiveness, excessive modesty or fearless frankness, indirection or directness in securing ends, clinging dependence or self reliance, conventionality or free thinking, ornamentation or social utility as ideals—all these can almost be manufactured at will by society, by placing people in situations where their reactions will necessarily follow certain paths.[35]

[35] See Coolidge, *Why Women Are So.*

There are few things, if any, that require as great effort to change as the relative social position of the sexes. It would seem that each society had laid away in its holy of holies a conviction on the subject, violation of which must be punished by contempt, ostracism, or even legal measures. Few crimes in the category equal, in the abhorrence they arouse, a women's being masculine or a man's being effeminate, in appearance, activities, psychic qualities, or rank assumed.

Doubtless a part of the depth of feeling that is held in the matter arises from the fact that biologically each sex is constituted to stimulate and attract the other. Without such power of attraction for each other the race must have perished. Undoubtedly some degree of difference is a strong factor in this power that each has to attract the other. The secondary sex characteristics, such as features, contour of body, quality of voice, constitute the peculiar marks by which each sex recognizes the other and which are associated consciously or subconsciously with sex attraction. The loss of any of these, therefore, renders an individual less capable of playing his part in the game of sex attraction that constitutes such a large part of human existence. The psychic stimuli arising from sex contacts undoubtedly play a much larger part in human consciousness and in the subconscious than is ordinarily recognized. Each individual instinctively is searching for those marks in a member of the opposite sex that will induce this state of pleasurable stimulation. Even in relations where the dominant element is other than sexual, as that of father and daughter, mother and son, brother and sister, Platonic friendship, the presence of sexual difference heightens the pleasurableness of the contact. Few individuals enjoy "stag" parties or "hen" parties, except for discussion of topics or participation in activities that have been tabooed for the opposite sex. In short, a very large part of life is made up of situations in which sex contact induces a state of stimulation that is subconsciously, if not consciously, pleasurable.

Now, the instinctive search for this stimulation leads to a natural disapproval of anything that renders an individual less capable of arousing it, and every individual is evaluated by the members of the opposite sex for his abilities to produce it. Accordingly there comes to be recognized a set of qualities which each sex demands in the other, and these are conventionalized and lifted into a place of consummate importance in the social mind. Moreover, everything that belongs with a member of either sex comes through habituation to be associated with his sex. The costume, the manner of wearing the hair, the forms of mental expression, the activities and status,—all by association of ideas are identified with those natural sex qualities that lie at the basis of sex attraction. When, therefore, a member of either sex undertakes to lay aside any of these purely external marks, it creates a shock that expresses itself in the cry that he is "unnatural," "unwomanly," or "unmanly." This instinctive tendency undoubtedly lies at the basis of much of the deep scorn that those pioneers must endure who undertake to dissociate either sex from any of the traditional marks by which it has been known, a scorn much more keen than that attending a change in any other element of the mores.

The modern movement in the western world toward equalizing the positions of the sexes has, however, gone so far that it is the opponents who have been put on the defensive. The ethical and social need for a removal of many of the traditional differences has become so apparent that the opposition has been put in the minority. This fact logically raises the question as to the ultimate goal of the movement. What kind and degree of social differentiation is finally to exist between the sexes? And closely associated with this is the other question continually raised in the discussion; namely, what *ought* to be the relative social positions of the sexes? Both questions can be answered only by reference to social needs. As in the past so in the future, the adjustment must be sought on the basis

of what the common social life demands of the sexes. As we have noted above, nature has predetermined a certain differentiation at least of social function, and to some extent of character and temperament. But in the past this natural basis has been supplemented, or in many cases supplanted, by a false basis in ignorance, superstition, and brutality. It is these, as we have a right to expect, that will disappear. Some differences of function doubtless will persist. Just what those differences must be, will, in a day of enlightenment, be determined entirely by social needs. When superstition and tradition do not confine the activities within arbitrary limits, men and women will find their tasks in those fields where each person can contribute most to the social weal and find most opportunity for an expression of his abilities. But except for those women who forego reproduction, there must always be some division of labor between the sexes. Child-bearing and child-rearing, themselves social functions of the most vital significance, cannot cease to make some difference in the performance by women of other tasks. But that women should have no other social functions, or that they should be confined to some prescribed "sphere" is alike disproved by the changes that have taken place in the past and by the evident tendencies of the present.

In the matter of rank, sex in the past has always been the foundation of a sharp difference. Because physical force has been such a controlling factor in human affairs, the advantage has rested with the sex least handicapped by the burdens of reproduction and physical weakness. In proportion as force is supplanted by reason and moral responsibility, the sexes must approach an equality of rank. Any identifying of the functions will tend to equalize rank, but since function can never be completely identified and since the male must always be superior in strength, the rule of reason and moral force are the only means by which the sexes can attain an equal position with respect to rights and appreciation of worth.

Rank is always determined by the nature of the social control exercised. If the control is physical, those will be highest who are strongest. If the control is mental and moral, those will be highest who can show most of these abilities. The fields of mental and moral qualities are the only ones in which the sexes can be equal, and only in proportion as society comes to be controlled by mental and moral forces can we hope for the sexes to live on a basis of social equality. Whenever, and to the extent that, social organization rests on physical force, women must occupy an inferior social rank. In proportion as mental and moral forces control, the sexes will be equal in status and in the appreciation of worth accorded to each.

The mental content and character of the masculine and feminine personalities must continue to be greatly influenced by function and rank. In proportion as differences of function are minimized and rank equalized, the mental content and personality of the sexes will tend to become similar. But enough differences of function must persist to maintain an essential difference in this respect. Moreover, it is doubtless true that the differences in attitude and temperament accompanying the different parts played in courtship is an inherent difference that must always make for a distinction in the masculine and feminine personality. A different attitude toward children must also play a similar part in differentiating the mind and character of the two sexes. There are probably also other secondary psychic sex traits which are greatly modified in the degree of their expression by the external circumstances, and yet which do have some inherent basis, as for example the sense of dependence. Little fear need be felt that not enough cultural differentiation will persist to make the sexes mentally attractive to each other, just as the factor of physical attraction, being inherent, must always persist.

QUESTIONS

1. What division of labor generally prevails between the sexes in primitive society?

2. What is the situation to-day in industry with respect to a sexual division of labor?

3. What change in woman's status came with the patriarchal form of family?

4. What was the influence of the Christian Church on woman's status?

5. What was the significance of the rise of chivalry for the position of woman?

6. What have been the fundamental differences in the moral standards of the sexes? In the objects of their attention and interest?

7. What difference of opinion has prevailed concerning the secondary sex traits?

8. What are the conclusions of Miss Thompson concerning the mental differences of the sexes?

9. What is meant by "overlapping" in sex traits?

10. How do the different parts played by the sexes in courtship and reproduction affect their relative social positions?

11. How does the interest in sex attraction affect the social positions of the sexes?

12. How does the character of the life of a society influence the relative positions of the sexes?

EXERCISES

1. What limitations on women's freedom in occupations or discrimination between the sexes in compensation exist in your community?

2. What present customs in rearing children tend to differentiate the sexes in character, direction of attention, moral standards?

3. Should mothers of small children seek occupations outside the home when not driven by economic necessity and when competent care of the children can be provided?

4. Should the principle of complete equality between the sexes prevail in legislation for industrial workers, as for example in hours of work, time of work, conditions of work?

VIII

RACE AND SOCIAL DIFFERENCES

NEXT to age and sex, race stands as probably the most important basis of social differentiation. If we are comparing the peoples of two nations or nation-states constituted of differing ethnic stock, we are confronted with a marked difference in the culture manifested. Institutions, mores, laws, ideals, habits of daily life,—all show marked dissimilarities. If we have under consideration different ethnic elements within the same state, we may have one of three different situations. In one, the different races may constitute separate national groups as in the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, where a great variety of national groups with differing ethnic qualities maintained a somewhat separate existence within the same political machinery. They tend to congregate in particular geographical areas, but, even when somewhat indiscriminately mingled, the different ethnic elements maintain a more or less distinct culture. This situation generally carries with it a political supremacy of one or two of the groups. The ruling family will represent one particular racial group and all the important offices will be filled by members of the same and possibly one other group. But with this exception, there is more nearly an equality of rank between the different races in this situation than in the other two.

Another situation is that in which the different races occupy the same geographical area, but are on distinct levels of right or social class. Negroes and Whites in the United States illustrate this type. Such a situation is developed from the conquest or enslavement of one group by the other, and the lower class may occupy any rank ranging upwards from slavery through serfdom to a station of nominal equality, as in the United States.

A third situation is that in which amalgamation has taken place to such an extent that the majority of the population has some of all the different race elements in their blood, but here and there particular families show a marked preponderance of one stock or even may have maintained an almost complete freedom from the amalgamation process. Central and South America show many populations of this type. In such a situation there is likely to be also a distinction of social class between those showing different degrees of particular ethnic strains.

Thus, whether we consider races as constituting separate political groups or living as parts of the same state, we have the problem of accounting for certain broad social differences existing between them, in the one case difference of culture, in the other of both culture and rank. This has been the situation during the whole period over which we have any knowledge of human society. Naturally race has been regarded as one of the most fundamental of all bases of social differences, and those social differences associated with race have been the most persistent and most keenly felt of all distinctions between persons.

The older explanation was that the cultural differences that developed were but the natural outcroppings of inherent differences that lay within the biological fact of race, just as the older explanation of the social differences between the sexes was biological. Religion, government, moral standards, literary and artistic achievements, proneness to dominance or servility, in fact any and all social difference noted, could be explained easily by simply saying that it is "in the blood" or that it is "natural" for such a race to do so or to occupy such a position.

But the theories of evolution and functional psychology have revolutionized our conceptions of race as they have of sex, and we have been forced to a closer analysis of the concept "race." What is race and how did the differences between races originate? The two theories which have divided the field until recently are

the multiple origin and the unitary origin theories. Among the sociologists the chief champion of the multiple origin theory was the late Gumplowicz, who, in his *Rassenkampf*, vigorously defended the theory that the number of different races at the beginning of human life on the earth was great, each race being descended from a different animal stock. This would explain the wide diversity in races, although all races known to-day would be regarded as compounded of several of these originally pure races. In recent years, however, the great weight of anthropological opinion has swung to the unitary origin theory, so that there are probably no students of note to-day who do not start from this assumption. According to this theory the inherent differences in races are to be accounted for by the selective action of different physical environments. The human stock, originating in a comparatively limited geographical area from common ancestry, though not a single pair, was gradually dispersed. The differences that later appeared among different branches of the human family came from the adaptation that each was forced to make to the different circumstances of food, climate, natural resources, enemies, etc.

Another theory that has had some currency since the advent of the evolutionary concept is that the different races represent different stages of evolution from a common animal ancestor. According to this theory the several branches of the human species represent different stages of advancement beyond the animal stage in an ascending scale. Since this theory was put forward by whites, in the interest of white supremacy, it follows, of course, that the white race represents the climax of the evolutionary process, while the other races find their places along the scale according to their supposed approximation to the whites. But actual observation of the characteristics of different races lends little support to this assumption. Some races are found to be further removed from the animal

type in one respect, others in another. Boas, after reviewing these differences, says:

> In relation to the interpretation of all these observations, it must be strongly emphasized that the races which we are accustomed to call the "higher races" do not by any means stand in all respects at the end of the series, and farthest removed from the animal. The European and the Mongol have the largest brains; the European has a small face and a high nose—all features farther removed from the probable animal ancestor of man than the corresponding features of other races. On the other hand, the European shares lower characteristics with the Australian, both retaining in the strongest degree the hairiness of the animal ancestry, while the specifically human development of the red lip is developed most markedly in the negro. The proportions of the limbs of the negro are also more markedly distinct from the corresponding proportions in the higher apes than those of the European.
>
> When we interpret these data in the light of modern biological concepts, we may say that the specifically human features appear with varying intensity in various races, and that the divergence from the animal ancestor has developed in varying directions.[1]

It would seem, therefore, that each race must stand upon the merits and demerits of the actual characteristics that it possesses, without claiming any superior position in the way of a longer evolutionary history.

Assuming, then, a unitary origin of the human stock and the origin of different racial traits through selective adaptation to different physical environments, how may we define race? The precise definition of race is complicated by the difficulty of assigning to it a definite place in the scale of zoölogical classification. Is it a family, or order, or genus, or species, or variety?

Keane, quoting favorably Prichard and Pouchet, and Darwin, concludes that species is synonymous with "human variety," the whole human group constituting one species.[2] Quartrefages says:

> Race is an aggregate of individuals resembling one another, belonging to the same species, having received and transmitted by way of generation the characteristics of a primitive family.

Deniker, after pointing out wide differences in the use of the terms species, variety, etc., concludes:[3]

[1] *Mind of Primitive Man*, p. 21.
[2] *Ethnology*, p. 5.
[3] *Races of Man*, p. 7.

From what has just been said the question whether humanity forms a single species divided into varieties, or races, or whether it forms several species loses much of its importance.

This probably represents the most general attitude of modern scholars on the exact zoölogical content of the term. The more important question, however, concerns the anthropological content of the concept.

In more recent literature, of which Ripley's *Races of Europe* furnishes an example, the term race has come to be applied to a hypothetical type which represents a certain combination of traits, which traits are not only transmitted singly from father to son, but are transmissible in particular combinations. This combination, however, is probably never completely realized in any one particular person. But in a given geographical area all the traits which belong to the type will predominate. Thus a majority of the population may be blond, rather than brunette. A majority may be tall, rather than short. A majority may be long-headed, rather than broadheaded. And so on through the list of traits that make up the type. The type is a blond, tall, dolichocephalic, etc., individual, even if no person can be found who has all the traits of blondness, tallness, long-headedness, etc., etc. We simply understand that with respect to any one trait the majority of the members of that race will show it in a high degree. The association of a high degree of a number of the race traits in any one individual is an extremely difficult thing to find. Ripley says on this point:[4]

We are thus reduced to the extremity in which my friend Dr. Ammon, of Baden, found himself, when I wrote asking for photographs of a pure Alpine type from the Black Forest. He has measured thousands of heads, and yet he answered that he really had not been able to find a perfect specimen in all details. All his roundheaded men were either blond, or tall, or narrow-nosed, or something else that they ought not to be.

Confronted by this situation, the tyro is here tempted to turn back in despair. There is no justification for it. It is not essential to our position that we should actually be able to isolate any considerable number, nor even a single one, of our *perfect* racial types in the life. It matters not to us that never more than a small

[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 107-109, 110-111.

majority of any given population possesses even two physical characteristics in their proper association; that relatively few of these are able to add a third to the combination; and that almost no individuals show a perfect union of all traits under one head, so to speak, while contradictions and mixed types are everywhere present. Such a condition of affairs need not disturb us if we understand ourselves aright. We should indeed be perplexed were it otherwise.

Moreover, the tendency toward any one trait is constantly being opposed by the mingling of the blood of its exponent with the blood of one representing the opposite, or at least a different tendency. Thus concerning the mingling of the three races in Europe Ripley says:

It has appeared that only in the most simple conditions are the several traits constant and faithful to one another in their association in the same persons. Nor are we justified in asking for more. Our three racial types are not radically distinct seeds, which, once planted in the several parts of Europe, have there taken root; and, each preserving its peculiarities intact, have spread from those centres outward until they have suddenly run up against one another along a racial frontier. Such was the old-fashioned view of races, in the days before the theory of evolution had remodelled our ways of thinking—when human races were held to be distinct creations of a Divine Will. We conceive of it all quite differently. These types for us are all necessarily offshoots from the same trunk. The problem is far more complex to us for this reason. It is doubly dynamic. Upbuilding and demolition are taking place at the same time. By our constitution of racial types we seek to simplify the matter—for a moment to lose sight of all the destructive forces, and from obscure tendencies to derive ideal results. We picture an anthropological goal which might have been attained had the life conditions only been less complicated.

This idea of race as a hypothetical type, a tendency induced by certain environmental conditions, breaks down most of our ideas of the fixed and stationary character of race. It is probably not an exaggeration to say that it revolutionizes our whole conception of the relation of race differences to social differences.

Thus we could not expect all members of a race to possess all the characteristics of the type to a higher degree than members of another race, since the concept "race" implies merely a tendency among the members of a given group to approximate a certain type. But with

respect to any one characteristic many individuals in other races could be found to have it in a greater degree. For example, if tallness is a characteristic of a particular race, it simply implies that the average height of the race is greater than the average height of some other race, and that a majority of its members are tall. But there would be many individuals of the tall race shorter than many individuals of a short race. It would also be true that the differences between the extremes of one race with respect to any particular characteristic would generally be greater than between the averages of the two races. Thus the shortest individuals of a tall race would be farther removed from the tallest members, than the average height of the tall race is removed from the average of the short race. Conceiving then of race as a tendency in a given population toward certain traits which when combined form a hypothetical type, we are led to inquire what those traits are.

The somatic or purely physical are undoubtedly the most clearly marked and the best understood. Of these the following are the most important: the cephalic index or ratio between the length and breadth of the head, the facial angle, stature, pigmentation, hair texture, peculiarities of nose and lips. Each of these can be isolated and studied independently of all the others, and a number of them can be studied together when combined so as to form a type. Ripley regards the cephalic index as the most permanent and reliable of them all, and thus the most important as marking a real difference of race.

But are these somatic traits all? Certainly we are accustomed to associate with race much more profound differences. The mental and moral aspects of race have come in for much more attention than have the purely physical. And the consciousness of racial difference has generally at least supposed itself to rest upon mental and moral grounds. Even when the cause of such consciousness is purely the realization of some such striking physical difference as color, there is a tendency to attribute the repugnance to supposed mental or

moral differences. While there is little scientific support for much of this belief in the psychic peculiarities, most recent students of race agree in the conclusion that there are some such differences. Thus Ross says:

> The broad moral contrasts between German, Turk and Gipsy must be due to Race or to Environment, physical and social. Now, how much weight ought we to assign to the race-factor? For my own part, I doubt if ideas ever get into the blood or feelings and dispositions that depend on particular ideas. The Chinese is not born a conservative, the Turk a fatalist, the Hindoo a pessimist, the Semite a monotheist. Notions and beliefs do not become fixed race-characters, nor do the emotions and conduct connected with them become congenital. Yet, considering how differently the peoples have been winnowed and selected by their respective environments, occupations, and histories, I see no reason why there should not arise between them differences in motor and emotional response to stimulus.
>
> Even now in the same stock, nay, even in the same family, we find congenital differences in the strength of the sex-appetite, in the taste for liquor, in the craving for excitement, in migratoriness, in jealousy, in self-control, in capacity for regular labor, in the spirit of enterprise, in the power to postpone gratification—differences which defy eradication by example or instruction. If such diversities declare themselves within a people, why not between peoples? Will not a destructive environment select the sensual, a bountiful environment the temperate, a niggardly environment the laborious, a capricious environment the forelooking? Will not the restless survive under nomadism, the bold under militancy, the supple under slavery, the calculating in an era of commerce, the thrifty in an epoch of capitalism? Since intellectual gains are indefinitely communicable, men do not survive according to their predisposition to have or not to have a certain advantageous idea or belief. But modes of response to stimulus are not so generalized by imitation. Men change their thoughts but not their elementary reactions, and, since according to these reactions they survive or perish, it is possible for motor and emotional differences to arise between peoples, one in blood, but unlike in social history.[5]

Likewise Ripley, who strongly favors the environmental rather than the racial explanation of most cultural differences, finds that the cities of Europe attract a higher percentage of long heads than prevails in the rural districts from which the city population is recruited. And he finds no other explanation than that

[5] *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 355-356.

the long heads must have some quality such as superior vitality or aggressiveness that causes them to respond more acutely to the attractions of the city.[6]

There may be some question whether we should call Ross's "motor and emotional response" and Ripley's "vital superiority" physical or psychic characters. But it is not necessary that we should label them. It is patent that they are not merely somatic but, even if physical, have certain psychic accompaniments that cannot be dissociated. Weatherly says:

> On the borderland between somatic and psychic characters are numerous traits that give color to the group life. In the case of individuals there is a more or less definite fusion of these physical and mental characters which are described by type-terms, like sanguine, phlegmatic, austere, sensuous. Racial groups are also marked off into temperamental categories corresponding to those of the predominant mass of their constituent individuals.
>
> From temperamental differences to diversity of mental taste and capacity is a short step. Tastes in ornamentation, music, art, forms of courtesy are as clearly traceable in groups as in individuals.[7]

It is plain that the question as to just how far motor and emotional response or temperament shall be regarded as carrying definite accompaniments of mental process is a difficult one to answer. And nothing is more sure than the fact that our present facilities for psychic measurements do not afford us any basis of fact much better than speculation. Indeed we have at present no answer at all to such a question as what temperament is. In the face of such dearth any statements as to definiteness of racial differences in mental process is little short of unfounded dogmatism. But that there is some psychic difference seems to be the conclusion of most recent students of race.[8] However, we may well keep in mind the facts pointed out above while discussing the definition of race, the fact that few individuals are wholly typical of their race, and especially the fact that the variation between individuals of

[6] *Op. cit.*, chap. 20.
[7] *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 15, pp. 437-438.
[8] See Wissler, *Man and Culture*, pp. 289-295. Also, Kroeber, *Anthropology*, p. 84.

the same race is in most respects far greater than the difference between the average of the most contrasted races.

Assuming, then, that races are possessed of certain psychical tendencies peculiar to each, the important question for us is how far these tendencies are responsible for the particular culture, function, status, interest, which the different races manifest. That is, is the particular social position which we find a race occupying traceable to the inherent mental and moral qualities of the race? More specifically, is the rank that a race holds with reference to other races; are the social functions which it is assigned in the total work of the nation; are the language, religion, institutional organization, technique, mores—in short the culture of a race, determined by the inherent psychic qualities which are peculiar to that race?

Here again we must approach the subject from the viewpoint of functional psychology. If we are to account for the particular content of the mind of a race, its institutional life, its economic technique, its mores, we should have to say that all these have been built up out of the attempt of the race to meet practical situations. How has it made its living? What limitations has the physical environment put on the accumulation of wealth? What culture contacts has it had with other groups? What enemies has it had to meet? Has it been a sedentary or a migratory race? This is the sort of question that must be answered before we can account for the mind of any race.

The culture of a race cannot, therefore, be considered apart from its past experiences. And since the history of no two races has been the same, it is the purest sort of speculation to attempt to assert what culture one race would have achieved out of the experience of another.

The two factors, its original quality inherited from the past, and the practical issues of the present, are the hammer and anvil which together shape the mind of any race. That the differences in situations that races

have met, however, probably have been greater than the differences in the type of mental reactions to those situations is the position held by an increasing number of anthropologists.[9] Says Thomas:

> Without ignoring economic determinism or denying the importance of specific race characters, I have assumed that individual variation is of more importance than racial difference and that the main factors in social change are attention, interest, stimulation, imitation, occupational differentiation, mental attitude, and accessibility to opportunity and copies. In other words, I have emphasized the social rather than the biological and economic aspects of the problem.
>
> Present day anthropology does not pretend that any of the characteristic mental powers, such as memory, inhibition, abstraction, logical ability, are feeble or lacking in any race.[10]

Boas remarks:

> There are two possible explanations of the different manifestations of the mind of man. It may be that the minds of different races show differences of organization; that is to say, the laws of mental activity may not be the same for all minds. But it may also be that the organization of mind is practically identical among all races of man; that mental activity follows the same law everywhere, but that its manifestations depend upon the character of individual experience that is subjected to the action of these laws. . . . It would seem that, in different races, the organization of the mind is on the whole alike, and that the varieties of mind found in different races do not exceed, perhaps do not even reach, the amount of normal individual variation in each race.[10a]

And Ross, who believes in the reality of psychical race differences, says: "More and more the time-honored appeal to race is looked upon as the resource of ignorance or indolence. To the scholar the attributing of the mental and moral traits of a population to heredity is a confession of defeat, not to be thought of until he has wrung from every factor of life its last drop of explanation. 'Blood' is not a solvent of every problem in national psychology, and 'race' is no longer a juggler's hat from which to draw explanations for all manner of moral contrasts and peculiarities.

[9] See Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, p. 14. Also, Boas, *Mind of Primitive Man*, chap. i.

[10] *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 17, pp. 726-727.

[10a] *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. xiv, pp. 1-11. Quoted by Thomas.

Nowadays no one charges to inborn differences the characteristic contrasts between Englishmen and Russians, between Jews and Christians, between Javanese and Japanese. The marvelous transformation, to-day of Japan, to-morrow, perhaps, of China and Siam and the Phillipines, make one doubt if even the impassive Oriental is held fast in the net of race. Perhaps the soul-markings of Anglo-Saxons or Slavs or Orientals are of societal origin, due to the capitalization of centuries of experience in unlike situations, and to the injection and saturation of individual minds with these transmitted products by means of social circumpressure."[11]

Further evidence of the small part played by mental differences of race in determining culture is supplied in abundance by the European situation. It is now recognized that the European population is made up of three distinct elements, which are inextricably mixed in most of the nationalities. And yet in both France and Germany, for example, we find that all the different racial elements are equally representative of the culture of their nationality. National lines, that is, culture and political boundaries, do not follow at all the racial lines. And Odin found that the differences of racial influences in France did not furnish different degrees of advantage for the production of great men. Thus he says:

> If we compare this ethnographic division with the geographical distribution of French men of letters, we shall seek in vain to discover the least connection between race and fecundity in men of letters. Let any one take the map of the regions, that of the provinces, or that of the departments, and he will find everywhere that the distribution of men of letters differs entirely from that of the races. He will see that the Ligurian, Iberian, Gallic, Cimbrian, and Belgian areas prove indifferently a high, mean, or low fecundity. There is no single race in which we do not meet all grades of fecundity, while on the other hand a great many districts inhabited by different races show the same degree of fecundity.[12]

[11] *Op. cit.*, pp. 309-310.

[12] *Genese des Grands Hommes*, Vol. I, pp. 465-466, 470. Quoted by Ward, *Applied Sociology*, p. 157.

Some writers have found in the mere fact of superior social position of certain racial elements of Europe an evidence of their superiority in psychic qualities. Ammon and LePouge especially have taken great pains to show that superior social position follows distinct racial lines. And a disciple of theirs has, on the basis of this data, arranged the three races of Europe in a hierarchy. His standards of judgment are: the possession of wealth, the social status occupied, the tendency to occupy the best land and to migrate. He finds that, judged by these three standards, a definite ranking of the races can be made.[13] All that this shows, however, is merely that the present position of the races evinces a superior culture of some as compared with others. That this is due to inherent differences of race is not a necessary conclusion. In fact such an assumption is nothing short of begging the whole question.

Can we then find any clue to the cause of the superior culture and status maintained by the ruling race or class? It seems to be found in the discovery of modern social science that the political state owed its origin to the conquest of one group by another. The horde and the tribe were not divided into social classes. Age and sex differences were the fundamental bases of social differentiation at that state of social organization. The political state, taking its origin in the subjection of one group by another, brought about a higher and lower rank in the new organization. In practically all cases the conqueror and the conquered were of diverse ethnic character. They also were practically always possessed of a different culture. Here begins, then, that sharp demarkation of status and culture that we have always associated with differences of race. A differentiation of function also immediately took place. The conquered became the laborers and menials, the conquerors the priests, warriors, rulers.

[13]Closson, "Hierarchy of Races," *Journal of Sociology*, Vol. III, pp. 314-327.

The evidence for this theory of the origin of social classes in the older states is abundant. Gumplowicz was probably the first to bring clearly to the forefront the fact of a universal racial conflict.[14] More recently other students have discovered that the caste system of India, and elsewhere, has its origin in racial war. Ward says:

> Now the simple truth is that the social classes that we find today in the most advanced nations of the world are the outgrowth and natural successors of those primary subdivisions of society, or castes. They are modified castes and have not been greatly transformed during the historic period. The four so-called "estates" of European history, so clearly recognized in the eighteenth century, correspond well to the four great castes of India. The Brahminic caste, or priestly order, became the First Estate, the lords spiritual, the clergy; the Kshatriyaa, or warriors and ruling class, took the name of Second Estate, the lords temporal, the nobility; the Vaisyas, or merchants, brokers and business class, scarcely different from the Third Estate, the commons of England, the bourgeoisie of France; the Sudras, or laborers and artisans, are clearly represented by the Fourth Estate, the modern industrials, the proletariat.
>
> But the castes of India are not the only castes, and it is now known that they exist in all countries that have undergone the race struggle, and that they are in all essential respects the same in all, being found in great completeness even in Polynesia.
>
> The slaves of Greece and Rome, the plebians of later Rome, and the serfs and villians of feudal times, and the laboring and menial classes of all ages have belonged to a different race from that of the citizens, patricians, nobles, lords, and upper classes generally. They represent the conquered races of the world, and had occupied those social positions since long before there was any written history of the countries in which they lived. It is this fact that concealed their true origin for so long and obscured the great ethnic principle that underlies the social classes. The idea prevailed universally that they were *naturally* inferior, and that the existence of social classes was a natural condition and must always continue. But it is now beginning to be seen that the existence of lower classes was the result of early subjugation in the struggle of races which took place in the savage state of man.[15]

M. Raoul de la Grasserie says:

> The Pariahs of India are conquered peoples. The roturiers of

[14] *Rassenkampf.*

[15] For a collection of a part of the evidence to which reference is made, see Ward, "Social Classes and Sociological Theory," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIII, pp. 617-627.

France were the Gauls conquered by the Franks. There must be two peoples of different race and civilization in order that the superior blood remain pure from the inferior blood. . . . Classes at the height of their intensity are castes. These latter are not found today in every country, but probably have so existed at an earlier time, and classes may be regarded as attenuated castes. . . . The members of one caste do not, at least originally, belong to the same race as those of another. The Pariahs of Hindustan are conquered peoples; the serfs and villians of France belonged to the Celtic nation opposed to the Germanic of their lords. Of course this difference has often been effaced, but it was the fundamental distinction.[16]

S. E. Simons observes:

The Helots of Sparta were the original inhabitants of the Peloponnesus, while the warriors and kings were the Dorians who subdued them.[17]

Westermarck, in speaking of the origin of castes, says:

Castes are frequently, if not always, the consequences of foreign conquest and subjugation, the conquerors becoming the nobility, and the subjugated, the commonalty or slaves. Thus, before the Norman conquest, the English aristocracy was Saxon; after it, Norman. The descendants of the German conquerors of Gaul were for a thousand years the dominant race of France; and until the fifteenth century all the higher nobility were of Frankish or Burgundian origin. The Sanskrit word for caste is "varna," i. e., colour, which shows how the distinction of high and low caste arose in India. That country was inhabited by dark races before the fairer Aryans took possession of it; and the bitter contempt of the Aryans for foreign tribes, their domineering spirit, and their strong antipathies of race and religion, found vent in the pride of class and caste distinctions. Even to this day a careful observer can distinguish the descendants of conquerors and conquered. "No sojourner in India," says Dr. Stevenson, "can have paid any attention to the physiognomy of the higher and lower orders of natives without being struck with the remarkable difference that exists in the shape of the head, the build of the body, and the colour of the skin between the higher and lower castes into which the Hindu population is divided." This explanation of the origin of Indian castes is supported by the fact that it is in some of the latest Vedic hymns that we find the earliest references to those four classes—the Brahmans, the Kshatriyas, the Vaisyas, and the Sudras—to which all the later castes have been traced back. The Incas of Peru were known as a conquering race; and

[16] *Annales de l'institut international de sociologie*, Tome XI, 1907, pp. 153, 181, 182. Quoted by Ward.

[17] *Journal of Sociology*, Vol. VI, p. 796.

the ancient Mexicans represented the culture-heroes of the Toltecs as white. Among the Beni-Amer, the nobles are mostly light-coloured, while the commoners are blackish. The Polynesian nobility have a comparatively fair complexion, and seem to be the descendants of a conquering or superior race. "The chiefs and persons of hereditary rank and influence in the islands," says Ellis, "are, almost without exception, as much superior to the peasantry or common people in stateliness, dignified deportment, and physical strength, as they are in rank and circumstances; although they are not elected to their station on account of their personal endowments, but derive their rank and elevation from their ancestry. This is the case with most of the groups of the Pacific, but particularly so in Tahiti and the adjacent islands." Among the Shans, according to Dr. Anderson, "the majority of the higher classes seemed to be distinguished from the common people by more elongated oval faces and a decidedly Tartar type of countenance." In America, at the time of the earliest European immigration, a kind of caste distinction arose, white blood being synonymous with nobility; and, in LaPlata, Spaniards, Mestizoes, and Indians were separated from each other even in church.[18]

Brinkley finds the same situation to prevail in Japan:

Several writers have regarded them (the Japanese) as Malayan colonists. Griffin was content to think that they are modern Ainu, and recent scholars incline to the belief that they belonged to the Tartar-Mongolian stock of central Asia. Something of this diversity of view is due to the fact that the Japanese are not a pure race. They present several easily distinguishable types, notably the patrician and the plebeian. This is not a question of mere coarseness in contrast with refinement; of the degeneration due to toil and exposure as compared with the improvement produced by gentle living and mental culture. The representative of the Japanese plebs has a conspicuously dark skin, prominent cheek bones, a large mouth, a robust and heavily boned physique, a flat nose, full straight eyes, and a receding forehead. The aristocratic type is symmetrically and delicately built; his complexion varies from yellow to almost pure white; his eyes are narrow, set obliquely to the nose; the eyelids heavy; the eyebrows lofty; the mouth small; the face oval; the nose aquiline; the hand remarkably slender and supple.

Here are two radically distinct types. What is more, they have been distinguished by the Japanese themselves, ever since any method of recording such distinctions existed. For from the time when he first began to paint pictures, the Japanese artist recognized and represented only one type of male and female beauty; namely, that distinguished in a marked, often an ex-

[18] *History of Human Marriage*, 3rd ed, pp. 368-369.

aggerated, degree by the features enumerated above as belonging to the patrician class. There has been no evolution in this matter. The painter had as clear a conception of his type ten centuries ago as he has to-day. Nothing seems more natural than the supposition that this higher type represents the finally dominant race of immigrants; the lower, their less civilized opponents.[19]

Ripley finds that everywhere in Europe the present day peasantry represents a different racial stock from that of the upper class, a relic of the conquest of the one by the other in the earlier history of the European territory. Thus in speaking of some facts noted concerning differences in head form among the French popuation, he says:

In entire ignorance of them, in 1889 a gifted young professor in the university at Montpelier in southern France, having for some years been occupied in outlining various theories of social selection, stumbled upon a surprising natural phenomenon. On examination of a considerable series of skulls, dating from various periods in the last two hundred years, which had been preserved in crypts at Montpelier, he found that the upper classes as compared with the plebeian population, contained a much larger percentage of long-headed crania. These crania of the aristocracy, in other words, seemed to conform much more nearly to the head form of the Teutonic race than those of the common people. Additional interest was awakened in the following year by the researches of Dr. Ammon of Carlsruhe, who, working again in entire independence upon measurements of thousands of conscripts of the Grand Duchy of Baden, discovered radical differences here between the head form in city and country, and between the upper and lower classes in the larger towns.[20]

Again, concerning the population of the British Isles, he says:

In the same race the exposed farm laborer will differ from the well-fed and groomed country gentleman. Strongly marked racial differences between social classes exist all over the islands. The aristocracy everywhere tends toward the blond and tall type, as we should expect.

On the other hand, the Anthropometric Committee, measuring more among the upper classes in London, found them to exceed both in height and weight the peasantry in Hertfordshire nearby.[21]

[19] *Japan: Its History, Arts, and Literature*, pp. 36-37.
[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 545.
[21] *Op. cit.*, p. 554.

Of the Russian population he says:

Summarizing our results thus far, we find two physical types more or less clearly coexisting in the Russian people, and throughout all the Slavs, too, for that matter. One is tall, blondish, and long-headed; the other is brachycephalic, darker complexioned, and of medium height. The relative proportions of each vary greatly from one region to another. Among Lithuanians and Poles the former is more noticeable; in the Ukraine the other type becomes more frequent; the Great Russians stand between the two; while among the southern Slavs the blond, long-headed variety entirely disappears. Not only do the relative proportions of these component types vary from one region to another; distinct differences in the several social strata of the same locality appear. The tall dolicocephalic blonds are more characteristic of the upper classes as a rule, so far as the matter has been examined. Our results for Western Europe are entirely harmonious with this tendency.[22]

And in accounting for the association of color with class, Ripley says:

But there is yet another reason why we may expect these Teutons to be notable even in their own latitude by reason of their blondness. It is this: that the trait has for some reason become so distinctive of a dominant race all over Europe that it has been rendered susceptible to the influence of artificial selection. Thus a powerful agent is allied to climate to exaggerate what may once have been an insignificant trait. Were there space we might adduce abundant evidence to prove that the upper classes in France, Germany, Austria and the British Isles are distinctly lighter in hair and eyes than the peasantry. It is no coincidence that *caste* and *colour* are of common derivation in the Sanscrit language. The classical Latin writers abound in testimony to this effect. The Teutonic conquerors of prehistoric times, the *Reihengraber* for example, were of this type. Both tall stature and blondness together constitute insignia of noble descent. Since the time of the Eddas, the servile ones have always been described as short brunettes, according to von Holder. Borrow tells us in his Bible in Spain that "negro" is an opprobrious epithet even in that dark country. Gummere has collected some interesting materials from medieval literature on this point. The thrall or churl is invariably a dark type, the opposite of the flaxen-haired, blue-eyed jarl or earl. The rule has been effective in painting. Christ a blond, the two thieves as notably dark, was long the invariable rule in artistic composition. Let us suppose, then, that such an opinion concerning nobility became widespread; suppose that it were intensified by the splendid military and political expansion

[22] *Op. cit.*, pp. 351-352.

of the Teutons in historic times all over the continent; suppose it to have become the priceless heritage of people more or less isolated in a corner of Europe. Is there any doubt that, entirely apart from any natural choice exerted by the physical environment, an artificial selective process would have been engendered, which in time would become mighty in its results? Is it not permissible to ascribe in some measure both the patent blondness of the Teutonic race and its unique stature as well to this cause? This is our hypothesis at all events.[23]

From such evidence as the above it would appear that we may safely accept it as established that the subjection of one group by another was the beginning of the fundamental class differentiation in civilized societies and that the conquered group was generally of different ethnic stock. That there are other foundations of class distinctions in present day societies will appear later in our discussion. But the great distinctions which played such a large part in barbarian culture and in the earlier civilized societies undoubtedly were due to this cause, and the main lines of class division in those modern nations which trace their history back consecutively to the earlier period are also the outgrowth of the racial distinction.

This fact of one group's ability to conquer another has been taken by some to indicate a superior worth on the part of the conquerors, and thus to be a natural outgrowth of race differences. But absolute standards of social worth are hard to establish. As a matter of fact all elements of racial worth, as of individual worth, are relative to particular situations. Superiority in some one direction may give a group an advantage in meeting a particular situation, as that of conquest or opening up a new territory. Those same qualities, however, may be a disadvantage under a more peaceful and settled regime. There are no qualities that would make a race superior under all situations.

Undoubtedly the type of culture developed is one important criterion, and it is true that in some cases the cultural superiority of the conquerors is very manifest. Their institutional life, technique, art, language,—all

[23] *Op. cit.*, pp. 469-470.

show a higher degree of development than that of the conquered. This was particularly true in the case of the enslavement of blacks by the Americans, and by the Europeans in South Africa, and in the case of the conquest of Central America and parts of South America by Europeans. It was doubtless true of much of the conquest by the Romans of neighboring peoples, though not by any means of all Roman conquest. It probably was true in the case of the conquest of India by the northern races. On the other hand, we have many cases of a culturally inferior people establishing a superiority of status over a people more highly civilized. This was doubtless the case in many of the earlier conquests of which we have no historical records. It is well known that an agricultural or pastoral people, who by their more settled industry had acquired some wealth, were frequently the prey of marauding bands who were culturally inferior though superior in military strength. So prevalent was this practice that no people could attain a high degree of culture who were not located in some cradle where they were protected by the natural environment from these onslaughts of barbarians.[24] Among historical records of the conquest of culturally superior peoples by their inferiors, prominent cases are those of China overrun by the Tartars, and Rome overrun by the northern tribes.

As a matter of fact cultural superiority or inferiority is not a determining factor in the matter of conquest unless the cultural superiority is a kind to give superior military strength. Superiority in military strength is the only factor involved, and it may be accompanied by superiority or inferiority in other elements that enter into the total worthfulness of a people.

Advantage, however, in economic privilege and in access to the materials of culture undoubtedly do give their possessors in time a cultural superiority. This is doubtless the explanation of the wide difference in the abilities shown by the upper and lower classes, where

[24]Shaler, *Nature and Man in America*, chap. 5.

the distinction is of long standing. Ward has clearly shown that the superior advantages of the upper classes undoubtedly do give them a very great superiority in intelligence, capability, resourcefulness, and in most of the items that are taken account of in estimating comparative worth and efficiency. Thus he says:

> A certain kind of inferiority of the lower classes to the upper is admitted. There is physical inferiority and there is inferiority in intelligence. This last is not the same as intellectual inferiority. Their physical inferiority is due entirely to the conditions of existence. As a subject race, as slaves, as overworked laborers or artisans, as an indigent and underfed class, their physical development has been arrested and their bodies stunted. These conditions long continued have told upon them through heredity and have brought about whatever physical inferiority they manifest. Their unequal intelligence has nothing to do with their capacity for intelligence. Intelligence consists in that capacity together with the supply of information for it to expend itself upon. We see, therefore, that both kinds of inferiority of the lower classes are extraneous and artificial, not inherent and natural.
>
> I need not here go again over the ground already several times traveled, to show that, as a matter of fact, every time that the lower classes have been brought under conditions where they could manifest their natural and inherent quality with the upper classes they have done so in such a manner as to leave no doubt with regard to that equality.[25]

In comparing the mental powers of the so-called lower races with the higher, we frequently fall into the same error as in comparing the relative abilities of the upper and lower classes in civilized society. We mistake an acquired ability for an inherent faculty. Thus many examples are given of the low powers manifested by members of the lower races in drawing logical conclusions, of their inability in abstract thinking, of slowness in imitation of copies. But these abilities, or the lack of them, themselves are now recognized by psychologists to be a part of the intellectual "atmosphere" imbibed by the individual from his social environment. Thus Boas says:

> The difference in the mode of thought of primitive man and that of civilized man seems to consist largely in the difference of character of the traditional material with which the new percep-

[25] *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIII, pp. 623, 624.

tion associates itself. The instruction given to the child of primitive man is not based on centuries of experimentation, but consists of the crude experience of generations. When a new experience enters the mind of primitive man, the same process which we observe among civilized man brings about an entirely different series of associations, and therefore results in a different type of explanation. A sudden explosion will associate itself in his mind, perhaps, with tales which he has heard in regard to the mythical history of the world, and consequently will be accompanied by superstitious fear. When we recognize that neither among civilized men nor among primitive men the average individual carries to completion the attempt at causal explanation of phenomena, but carries it only so far as to amalgamate it with other previously known facts, we recognize that the result of the whole process depends entirely upon the character of the traditional material.[26]

And after reviewing the evidence concerning the relation between the racial stock and superiority of culture among civilized races, Boas concludes:

First of all, we tried to understand the reasons for our belief in the existence of gifted races and of others less favorably endowed, and found that it was based essentially on the assumption that higher achievement is necessarily associated with higher mental faculty, and that therefore the features of those races that in our judgment have accomplished most are characteristics of mental superiority. We subjected these assumptions to a critical study, and discovered little evidence to support them. So many other causes were found to influence the progress of civilization, accelerating or retarding it, and similar processes were active in so many different races, that on the whole, hereditary traits, more particularly hereditary higher gifts, were at best a possible, but not necessary element determining the degree of advancement of a race.

* * *

. . . The mental traits common to all mankind are those which appear by contrasting man with animals; and we pointed out briefly that articulate language, the use of implements, and the power of reasoning belong to all members of the human species as opposed to the higher animals.[27]

Thus both anthropologist and sociologist seem to reach the same conclusion, that notwithstanding certain important differences of race, chiefly of a motor and emotional sort, we cannot look to the status or culture exhibited by any two races at a given time as

[26] *Mind of Primitive Man*, pp. 203-204.
[27] *Op. cit.*, pp. 244-247.

growing out of a definite superiority of one to the other, but that these social differences owe their origin more to the exigencies of historical development than to inherent differences. Moreover historical evidence is abundant to show that whenever two races come into contact, the one that has for the time the military advantage will subject the other to an inferior social position.

When races meet, the difference in physical appearance and the difference in culture induce a strong consciousness of unlikeness. The consciousness of kind which draws the members of one racial and cultural group together has its counterpart in this consciousness of difference when the physical appearance and culture are widely separated. This consciousness carries with it a natural antipathy or repugnance, which members of all groups inevitably feel toward those of another whose appearance and culture are different. The antipathy generally will be proportionate to the degree of difference. If the physical characteristics are strikingly diverse, such as color, odor, facial form, hair, this will be the central element in the feeling of antipathy. If, however, the difference is chiefly one of culture, the antagonism will be directed against this. Where both culture and physical marks are diverse to a high degree, the attitude may be confused, and the antipathy be expressed against one factor when the other really is the primary cause. Thus in the contact of whites and blacks in America it would be difficult to analyze the precise degree to which differences of physical characteristics and those of culture lie at the bottom of the attitude of the whites.

This repugnance will keep the members of two diverse groups separate until one has need of the other or of something that the other has. There is abundant evidence that diverse groups, as well as individuals, avoid each other until it is to the interest of one or both to cultivate a relation. Whenever, therefore, we find two or more racial groups in continuous contact or together constituting a political organization we may

be sure that it is because it is to the interest of one or both, and that the need is stronger than the feeling of repugnance. This permanence of relation is, as noted above, nearly always accomplished through the conquest of one group by the other. The conquered group had territory or goods or labor that the conquerors wanted.

Now, the very difference of culture and physical appearance is a factor leading to this situation and to its continuation. A consciousness of difference arising from the diversity in appearance and culture make it more natural for a group to aggress upon another than when these do not exist. The ethical consciousness tends to limit its scope of application to those only who are considered of one's kind. To oppress or mistreat in any way those who are not of one's kind is much easier than to oppress members of one's own group. So long, therefore, as the culture and the physical characteristics are strikingly different the oppression of the conquered by the conquerors will not greatly disturb the ethical sensitiveness of the rulers. This explains why, long after the ethical consciousness has become highly sensitive to any kind of mistreatment of those within one's own group, there still remains the height of injustice and even cruelty of one race or class toward another. It also explains why the diversity of interest that accompanies racial lines seem to be so much more fundamental than difference of interest arising out of other causes. The growth of feeling of unity and brotherhood, which is a phase of all advance in civilizing elements, dulls the edge of intra-group conflict. But the conflict between races is the last to feel this.

Difference of racial function and of rank is easily explained in the light of the above. The conquerors assign to the conquered the menial and laborious functions and themselves engage in intellectual, artistic, governmental, religious, sporting, and military pursuits. The ranks of the two groups follow in course from both the character of the functions performed and from the relation of ruler and ruled. The functions which are

more agreeable and offer scope for the expression of personality will naturally be regarded as more honorable than those which are irksome or routine in character. And the position of rulership naturally is more honorable than that of obedience and submission. Therefore, anything that the ruling class does will, by association, become more honorable. Herein lies the foundation of the difference in function and rank that follows all racial and class lines.

It is true, however, that the continuation of functional and ranking differences reacts upon culture and creates a real difference in abilities, so that members of the lower class become really inferior in knowledge, in skill, in abilities of various kinds, and are thus less adapted to the performance of the functions generally associated with the upper class. The superior rank of the upper class carries with it greater opportunity for mental development and even greater for physical health and well being. This inevitably tends to perpetuate the superior position of the class by denying to the members of the lower class the means of becoming capable of exercising the functions of the upper class.

Undoubtedly this is largely responsible for the idea that grows up eventually in all societies having a class differentiation, that the lower class or race is by nature inferior to the upper. The acquired superiority is counted an inherent superiority. And when the ethical consciousness disturbs the peace of mind of the upper class, resort is had to the natural or supernatural sanction of the *status quo*. We thus find that there is no sort of injustice between classes or races that has ever occurred for which a sanction has not been found by some upper class philosopher who discovered that the difference rests back on something in the very moral or natural order of the universe or arises from divine decree. We need not always, or even necessarily at all, ascribe the philosopher's position to hypocrisy. He is generally blinded by the very patent fact of a real intellectual, moral, technical superiority on the part of the upper class; and fails to understand its origin.

Thus we find that the different castes of India are said to have proceeded from the different parts of the body of Brahma, and that the inferiority of the lower castes rests on a difference determined by divine mandate and thus existing in the very nature of things. The Laws of Manu declare:

But in order to protect this universe He, the most resplendent one, assigned separate (duties and) occupations to those who sprang from his mouth, arms, thighs, and feet. To Brahmanas he assigned teaching and studying (the Veda), sacrificing for their own benefit and for others, giving and accepting (of alms). To Kshatriya he commanded to protect the people, to bestow gifts, to offer sacrifices, to study (the Veda), and to abstain from attaching himself to sensual pleasures; the Vaisya to tend cattle, to bestow gifts, to offer sacrifices, to study (the Veda), to trade, to lend money, and to cultivate land. One occupation only the Lord prescribed to the Sudra, to serve meekly even these (other) three castes. Man is stated to be purer above the navel (than below); hence the Self-existent (Svayambhu) has declared the purest (part) of him (to be) his mouth. As the Brahmana sprang from Brahman's mouth, as he was the first-born, and as he possesses the Veda, he is by right the lord of this whole creation. For the self-existent (Svayambhu), having performed austerities, produced him first from his own mouth, in order that the offerings might be conveyed to the gods and manes, and that this universe might be preserved. What created being can surpass him, through whose mouth the gods continually consume the sacrificial viands and the manes the offerings to the dead? Of created beings the most excellent are said to be those which are animated; of the animated, those which subsist by intelligence; of the intelligent, mankind; and of men, the Brahmanas.

Aristotle finds some persons slaves by nature, and others rulers by nature.

For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary but expedient; from the hour of their birth some are marked out for subjection, others for rule. . . . In all things which form a composite whole and which are made up of parts whether continuous or discrete a distinction between the ruling and the subject element comes to light. Such a duality exists in living creatures but not in them only; it originates in the constitution of the universe. . . . Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves and it

is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master.[28]

Similar statements were common in the defense of slavery in America. Biblical passages were used generally to show that slavery was a divinely decreed institution. God in cursing Canaan had forever made him the servant of his brethren. "Let every man abide in the calling wherein he was called." "Servants be obedient to them that are your masters." The following passage from a speech of the period in Congress is typical of many:

> In all social systems there must be a class to do the mean duties, to perform the drudgery of life, that is, a class requiring but a low order of intelligence and but a little skill. Its requisites are vigor, docility, fidelity. Such a class you must have or you would not have that other class which leads progress, refinement and civilization. It constitutes the very mud-sills of society and of political government; and you might as well attempt to build a house in the air as to build either the one or the other except on the mud-sills. It (the slave class) is everywhere; it is eternal. All the powers of the earth cannot abolish it.

The same speaker asserts that even in the North the same social situation prevails, the only difference being in the form of the servitude that the working class endures.

A far more effective reply to this argument than even the psychological and anthropological is the actual rise of races from a situation of cultural inferiority or from a status of "mud-sills" when the opportunity is presented. Japan has come forward in recent years from a position formerly classed as that of a twilight-race to one not only as a world power of the first rank, but as a nation having a culture that is making valuable contributions to world thought and practice. The Philippino under American educational methods shows himself capable of taking a place in the world of western culture.

The negro in America, in the face of prejudice and a tradition that regards him as incompetent and hopeless under self-direction, has made greater progress since

[28] *Politics*, Book I, 5. Translation by Jowett.

emancipation than any other race ever made in a similar period. In 1920 negro farmers in the South owned land and buildings valued at over $522,000,000, an increase of 91 per cent in ten years. There were in 1924 over 70,000 business enterprises owned and operated by negroes, with an annual volume of business of over one and one-half billion dollars. Negro banks, 73 in number did a yearly business of about $100,000,000. Negroes each year contribute approximately $3,000,000 toward their own schools.[29] Negro teachers, physicians, artists, technical experts are taking their places beside professional white persons in increasing numbers. And all this in only a brief half-century of limited opportunity.

The feeling of race superiority is, however, so deep-seated an emotion that its foundations are no sooner undermined in one field than it appears in another, claiming justification on some fresh assembling of data or some new interpretation of old material. An interesting case in point is the appearance within recent years of the claim of Nordic superiority. Philosophical appeals to the moral order of the universe, and references to Biblical passages have become somewhat antiquated as arguments, but there may be used for the same purpose the newer instruments of anthropological interpretation, Mendelian heredity, and psychological tests. Anthropologists have only in recent years identified that ethnic strain which predominates over northern Europe and which has become known as the Nordic race. Though its existence rests on more sure scientific foundations, it has been in many ways the heir of the racial prejudices which surrounded the myth of an Aryan race. This supposed stock had been held up as responsible for about all that had ever been accomplished of any worth in Europe or Asia. When it became apparent that no such race ever existed, the glorification of its supposed qualities was transferred to the blond, blue-eyed, tall, long-headed Nordic.

[29] *Negro Year Book*, 1925-26.

These evident and typical physical characteristics were matched, by the race-enthusiasts, with a set of mental qualities which were, indeed, characteristic of the conduct of most of the north European stocks, but which had no such certain biological origin as did the physical traits. These supposed Nordic mental qualities have been variously described, but most champions of the race would credit the stock with the following distinct, peculiar traits:[30] a high degree of restless energy which has given the stock its capacity for exploration, conquest, subjugation of new territory, successful colonization, individualistic social organization; strong curiosity which has led to scientific research and discovery; an emotional reserve and weak expression of gregariousness, which accounts for its austerity and preference for domestic life over community association, for its brooding introspective temperament, reflected in its art as well as in its proneness to suicide. These traits are then supposed to exist as unit traits or groups of unit traits which are inherited in various numbers, according to the Mendelian law, in all the stock that has been permeated with the Nordic blood. These inherent qualities are held to have been responsible for the peculiar culture, social organization, and world dominance that have characterized the northern European elements for the past several centuries.

The most exaggerated statement of the point of view of this group of writers is found in H. S. Chamberlain's *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, originally written in German and eagerly accepted by many Germans of two decades ago as proof positive of the legitimacy of their claims to world dominance. Chamberlain used the term Teutonic instead of the later term Nordic, but regarded the German strain as the most typical of the qualities of the whole stock. Chamberlain says: "If we look around we see that the importance of each nation as a living power today is de-

[30]For a moderate summing up of these traits see McDougall, *Is America Safe for Democracy?*

pendent upon the proportion of genuinely Teutonic blood in its population. Only Teutons sit on the thrones of Europe. What preceded in the history of the world we may regard as Prolegomena; true history, the history which still controls the rhythm of our hearts and circulates in our veins, inspiring us to new hope, and new creations, begins at the moment when the Teuton with his masterful hand lays his grip upon the legacy of antiquity."[31]

While the other writers of this group have not made such excessive claims for the superiority of the Nordic, they have taken the same general point of view that the inherent qualities of this stock is accountable for the peculiar history and preëminance of north European culture, and that any diminution in the relative proportion of this element in the population must be reckoned as so much loss for the civilization of the world.

It is in consideration of the shift in ethnic elements in the North American population that we find the largest amount of recent glorification of the Nordic elements.[32] The fact that the North American colonies were settled by Nordic stock and that this element has until recently predominated in the population is taken to explain the best features in American life. The shift in our immigrant sources from north Europe and the decline in the birth rate of the older American stock has seemed to promise a change in the ethnic composition of the nation. Since it is held that the Nordic stock has been responsible for the peculiar quality of American life to date, the future looks black

[31] *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, Vol. I, p. 257.

[32] For a somewhat restrained and careful statement of the point of view of the Nordic champions see Ross, *The Old World in the New*, and McDougall, *Is America Safe for Democracy?* For a less scientific but widely popular statement see Madison Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*. Josey, in his *Race and National Solidarity*, has shifted ground somewhat and opposed the whole group of white races to the colored races, as has also Lothrop Stoddard in his *Rising Tide of Color*. Their point of view is, however, essentially the same as that of the Nordic enthusiasts though they more frankly assume an ethical justification for exploitation of the colored races by the whites.

and foreboding to the champions of Nordic superiority, unless the present sources of immigration or the relative birth rates or both can be changed.

In all this there is a very evident over-emphasis on the significance of the supposed original mental difference between Nordics and other ethnic strains. There is no sufficient basis in psychological or biological data for regarding the Nordic as having so nearly a monopoly on courage, initiative, scientific curiosity, capacity for control and for democratic institutions as his champions assume. These qualities are observable among all populations, and their manifestation in European culture (which of course includes American) to the degree that is recognized has undoubtedly been influenced to a considerable degree by the peculiar environment and the circumstances under which this culture has been developed. The assertion that the Nordic differs so widely from other stocks in its native capacity neglects at once evidences of the same qualities among other peoples and evidences of favoring environmental circumstances in northern Europe and America.

That there possibly is some difference in what we call temperament or motor response may be granted. But the assumption of such sweeping mental difference is wholly gratuitous and arises from a wrong interpretation of the factors underlying the development of the culture of any racial group, as has been shown above.

But the Nordic champions have not been content with basing their claims of superiority on mere cultural and military achievements. The most recent writers have seized upon the results of psychological tests to fortify their position. While some tests of school children have been made for comparative purposes, the chief reliance of the race enthusiasts is the record of the American army tests.

These tests[33] resulted in a higher score for the native white population than for the foreign born, and

[33]See Yoakum and Yerkes, "Army Tests," *Memoirs of the National Academy of Science*, Vol. XV; Brigham, *A Study of American Intelligence*.

a higher score for the foreign born than for the negroes. Taking the results at their face value, there is undoubtedly a strong showing of a gradation of intellectual capacity with the native white stock at the top, the foreign born in the center, and the negroes at the bottom. There is also a variation in the ratings of different national groups of the foreign born. Those who place unquestioned faith in the face value of the tests can and do find here a satisfying argument for Nordic superiority.

A critical examination of the tests and the scores do not, however, necessarily lead to such a conclusion. Since the whole matter of psychological tests are discussed in some detail in a later chapter,[34] I will not enter into a minute criticism of them here, but several outstanding considerations should be noted in their bearing upon the question of the relative intellectual capacity of races.

The fundamental criticism of the tests, and the one which strikes at the validity of many of their results, is that they are not purely tests of native or inherent intellectual capacity but of abilities acquired through the combined action of inborn capacity and environmental influences. It is obvious in any examination of the scores that the ratings of the men show a very high correlation with school opportunities. This is true whether we compare different groups of native whites with one another, native whites with foreign born or with negroes, or northern negroes with southern negroes. Almost everywhere it is very apparent that those with the most schooling got higher scores in the tests.

This fact is recognized by the psychologists who have analyzed the results, and no claim is made that the correlation does not exist, except in a few cases which the psychologists regard as significant.

A fact which the psychologists do not clearly recognize is that there are many other environmental factors

[34]Chap. ix.

besides schooling that also are evidently influential in giving some an advantage in the tests over those who have not been subjected to the same influences. Social status, political status, type of family life, community contacts, economic opportunities, and many other influences are effective in stimulating the individual and providing mental patterns out of which his mind is developed. Thus one writer[35] notes that northern negroes have a higher score than southern negroes of *equal schooling* and that therefore there must be a difference in native ability. In doing so he neglects the vastly different environments of the two groups besides schooling. Moreover, in comparing the schooling of different groups no distinction is made between the quality of the education, the regularity of attendance, the number of months per year attended.

Because of this failure properly to evaluate the importance of the various environmental factors in influencing the scores made in the tests, the Nordic enthusiasts have put an interpretation on the findings that more critically minded students find it difficult to accept. It is the interpretation of the scores and the assumptions on which they rest that are in question, not the value of the tests themselves for legitimate purposes.

An excellent illustration of the importance of interpretation is found in the conclusions drawn from the relative scores of native whites and foreign born. It is found that the differences in scores decline in proportion to the length of residence in the United States.[36] The greatest difference is found between the native whites and the most recent arrivals. This difference declines as the length of residence in the United States increases, until those who have been here twenty years or more show practically the same score as do the native whites. Most students would recognize in this a very striking piece of evidence that the difference which the tests are showing between

[35]Brigham, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-192.
[36]Brigham, *op. cit.*, p. 98 ff.

native whites and foreign born is really one of adjustment to American life in which the time element is of more importance than inherent capacity. But the race enthusiasts do not so interpret it. Assuming that the tests *must* measure inherent capacity, by a tortuous dialectic they arrive at the conclusion that we have here proof of a gradual decline in the quality of American immigration for the twenty years preceding the time the tests were made.

But although this shows to the satisfaction of the Nordic champions that our recent immigration is inferior to the earlier, it does not prove their whole case to their satisfaction. It might be that the decline comes from the shift of our source of immigration to a lower stratum of the European population rather than from a shift to Alpine, Mediterranean, and Russian stocks. In fact this is accepted as a part of the explanation.[37] It is necessary, in order to make out a clear case for the Nordics, to assume an ability to estimate correctly the proportion of Nordic blood in the various European countries. On the basis of such an assumption[38] a correlation is worked out to show that the supposed decline in the quality of our immigration corresponds with the decline in the amount of Nordic blood among the immigrants. But the assumption of the ability to estimate with any degree of accuracy the amount of Nordic blood in the various national groups of Europe is one which is exceedingly precarious on anthropological grounds.

In addition to the effect of their general assumptions upon the conclusions of some of the race enthusiasts another factor should be taken into account in comparing the general scores of the whites and negroes. It is pointed out in the description of the tests[39] that the method of testing many of the negroes put them at a disadvantage. In many camps the negroes were given the Beta test, the one devised for illiterates and for

[37]Brigham, *op. cit.*, p. 178.
[38]Brigham, *op. cit.*, Table 33.
[39]*Memoirs of the National Adademy of Science*, Vol. XV, pp. 705-708.

those who could not understand English. This is admitted by many of the examiners to be less satisfactory for the negroes than for the illiterate whites and to put them at a disadvantage. Moreover, so many of them made low scores in this that there was not time to recall them for the individual examinations, as was generally done with the whites who made the low scores, and thus give them a chance to redeem themselves. The relative scores made by negroes as a group and whites as a group must therefore be greatly influenced by this fact.

The following facts, then, are shown by the findings of the psychological tests, and not questioned by even the strongest Nordic champions: (1) that in general there is a very close correlation between scores made in the tests and schooling, this manifesting itself between different groups of native whites as well as between native whites and foreign born and negroes,[40] (2) that Northern negroes make higher scores than do Southern negroes, and that there is less difference in the scores of negroes and of whites living in the same communities than between the scores of negroes and whites taken as a whole for the entire country,[41] (3) that the method used in examining a large part of the negroes put them at such a disadvantage as to affect the total scores of negroes as a whole, (4) that the differences between the scores of native whites and of foreign born grow less and less with increasing residence in the United States, disappearing entirely where the foreign born have resided here twenty years or more.

In the face of these facts it would seem that there is some question concerning following the interpretation of the scores made by the champions of Nordic superiority, to the conclusion that the psychological tests give satisfactory evidence for a belief in striking differences in inborn intellectual capacity between the various races. Many persons would insist that the facts point

[40]Mr. Walter Lippman in the *Century Magazine* for May, 1923, points out many interesting verifications of this when the scores and schooling facilities of different sections of the United States are compared.

[41]Brigham, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

rather clearly to the conclusion that environmental factors were much more important in determining the relative scores of the various races in the psychological tests than were their inborn capacities.

QUESTIONS

1. What are the three possible situations within a state where different ethnic elements constitute the population?
2. What is to be said of the theory that the different races represent different stages of the evolutionary process?
3. Explain the statement that a race is an ideal or hypothetical type. How does it affect the notion of exclusive differences between all members of different races?
4. What is the tendency among modern students in explaining the peculiarities of the culture of any particular race?
5. What conclusion is to be drawn, from the evidence presented, concerning the origin of social classes? How widespread has been the process?
6. Does conquest indicate superiority on the part of the conqueror? Explain.
7. Why do races stay together?
8. Are there evidences other than psychological and anthropological to show that races need not permanently occupy different levels of culture?
9. What is the position of the Nordic enthusiasts?
10. What different interpretations may be put upon the findings of the psychological tests of the United States Army.

EXERCISES

1. Have you any evidence on the point that some white persons evince traits usually associated with some other race, and *vice versa?*
2. What traits of the American negro might be traced, at least in part, to the institution of slavery and to the limited opportunities that he has lived under since slavery?
3. Are the conditions surrounding race relations in the United States favorable for drawing accurate conclusions concerning the relative innate worth of the different ethnic elements of the population?

IX

INDIVIDUAL VARIATION AND SOCIAL DIFFERENCES

IN ADDITION to age, sex, race, there is another biological factor which plays a large part in determining the place of the individual in society. This is individual variation. Every individual is the product of at least two interacting forces, the inherited or original, and the environmental. The original or biological quality is generally referred to as capacity. It is that combination of qualities which, when played upon by the materials of the environment, responds in ways peculiar to that individual.

Individuals of all types of organic life have this quality of reacting to environment in a peculiar way. Man is not unique in this respect. Every specimen of plant or of animal life is endowed with it. Each individual brings into the world a potentiality which not only leads to the display of those characteristics which are peculiar to his particular species, but each has that which also distinguishes him from all others even of his own species. Except in the case of identical twins no two individuals of any species are found exactly like in their response.

In recent years much light has been thrown upon the process by which new specimens of living organisms are produced. In the higher forms of life, it has been discovered that the union of two cells carries with it the combination of the various original traits of the parents in such a peculiar way as practically to preclude the possibility of any two offspring of the same parents, except identical twins, getting the same combination of traits. Thus every individual stands out before the world as a very peculiar and particular specimen, in spite of the fact of general likeness which increases with the closeness of relationship.

These original potentialities are, however, not discernable in isolation. No capacity ever unfolds into an actual trait unless played upon or fed by an environmental factor. The only way to discover an original capacity or tendency is to subject its possessor to the appropriate environmental influence and see what results from the interaction. If a particular individual shows no response whatever to a stimulus which has brought out a response from other members of his species, it is inferred that he is lacking in that capacity. If he shows a keener or duller reaction than the generality of members of his species, it is inferred that he possesses the capacity in a greater or lesser degree, respectively. It should be clearly understood that all our knowledge of inborn capacity rests upon this process of inference or deduction. No one ever saw or measured an original capacity independent of its appropriate environmental stimulus.

This fact makes the study of original qualities difficult because the environmental factor is also variable in the degree of its ability to stimulate or feed the capacity. The waves of air that strike the auditory nerves are of different intensity. The food that different bodies get has varying degrees of nourishment. The other individuals with whom one is associated all present him with different degrees of stimulation.

In studying the original traits of plants and animals, it is possible so to control the environment that different individuals can be subjected to practically identical stimuli. Under these conditions the variation in the original capacity can be somewhat accurately inferred. In the case of human beings, however, this has not been possible. And we never are able to say that any two human beings have had an identical environment. This has made all study of original capacity in human beings open to the possibility of imputing to variation in capacity what was in reality variation in environment. Reference to this possibility of error will be made below in reviewing some of the studies made in recent years.

This difficulty has not, however, prevented some remarkable studies being made in original human capacity. It is to Francis Galton that the credit belongs for initiating them. His *Inquiries into Human Faculty* was published as a volume in 1883 and set going a tremendous impulse in this direction. Something over twenty years later Binet's scale for measuring the native intelligence of children gave the movement a more definitely psychological foundation. Since the appearance of Binet's work, psychologists have been devoting more and more attention to the subject which today is probably the most widely discussed aspect of psychological investigation. While there are wide fields to be explored by the physiologist and neurologist and medical researcher, it is the psychologist who has done most and who occupies the center of the stage to-day in the discussion of original human capacity. The use of intelligence tests in helping to determine the ability for military duty of over a million and a half men in the American Army during the World War gave the movement practical standing in the world of affairs.

When we come to enumerate the different respects in which individuals differ from one another, we are confronted with a bewildering array. The modern biological theory of unit traits regards the individual as a combination of thousands of separate traits each variable within rather wide limits. There is some difference of opinion as to whether every physical and mental characteristic of an individual may be analyzed into these minute unit traits. But at least a considerable number of characteristics, both physical and mental, have already been so analyzed. Since persons vary considerably with respect to the degree in which each trait is possessed, it is evident that there are an almost unlimited number of combinations possible in the make up of individuals. Thus it has been computed that considering only five traits with a variation of five different degrees in each, we could have over

three thousand varieties of men.[1] Since we know that there are a very large number of unit traits and that the variation in each is very considerable, it is not remarkable that we never, except possibly in the case of identical twins, find two persons exactly alike.

Most of these differences are minor in character and do not have great significance in influencing the function, mind, or rank of individuals. And yet sometimes an apparently trivial peculiarity may have considerable significance. Galton found for example that color blindness probably has had considerable selective influence in the growth of the Quaker sect. He found the percentage of color blindness among Quakers to be nearly twice as great as among the general population. The inference is that the original Quakers were doubtless very largely color-blind and the adoption of their drab gray costume, not at all painful to them, would result in keeping many normally visioned individuals out of the sect because of their aesthetic repugnance to the garb.[2] There are doubtless many such apparently minor peculiarities which have had very considerable significance in fixing one's particular place in society.

Certain differences, however, stand out as much more significant than others and, in considering the bearing of original differences upon social position, we may select these more significant differences for consideration. Certain ones are so peculiarly significant in this respect that they may be regarded as fundamental. There are three characteristics of any individual on which his social position particularly rests; namely, energy, intellectual capacity, character. These are probably not unit traits. Each seems to be a combination of a considerable number of traits. But in our present stage of analysis each of these characteristics of persons stands out as a definite quality whose significance for social position is very great. It is to differences in these three respects that we shall give attention, recognizing that many other minor differences do

[1] Thorndike, *Individuality*, p. 19.
[2] *Inquiries into Human Faculty*, pp. 32-33.

play their own peculiar part in effecting the social position of individuals.

Of these three fundamental characteristics, there is only one which yet has been at all successfully measured, —namely, intellectual capacity. We are in a much better position, therefore, to interpret its significance for social life than we are in the case of any others.

Intellectual capacity is that innate quality which makes it possible for a person to become intelligent when placed in an environment that furnishes the proper materials. Many psychologists use the term "intelligence" to connote this innate capacity, but, in order to insure against confusion of the capacity with the acquired trait, the phrase intellectual capacity will be used throughout this discussion.

There is some difference of opinion among psychologists whether general intellectual capacity should be regarded as a single unitary trait, or whether it is a complex of a number of capacities for the acquiring of different kinds of intelligence. That is, if one has a high degree of capacity for acquiring intelligence in mechanical matters, does that indicate that he has an equal capacity for becoming intelligent in scientific subjects, in business organization, or in philosophy? Or, is there a separate capacity for becoming intelligent about a wide number of things? In this latter case one might have become very intelligent in some one line or lines and never be able to show much advancement in some other lines, even though subjected to the most favorable environment. However, those who hold to the theory of multiple capacities regard it as probable that a high degree of capacity for intelligence in one respect carries with it a high degree in others. This aspect of the subject need not, therefore, concern us at this point since, in the case of both these theories, general intellectual capacity is treated either as a single trait or a single group of traits. And in measuring the original capacity, the tests are aimed at showing capacity for general acquisition of knowledge.

A more fundamental question is, just what is meant by ability to acquire knowledge? To be intelligent involves a considerable number of things, such as memory, ability to compare and distinguish likenesses and differences, to classify, to associate ideas, to reason, to meet new situations successfully, etc. Pintner points out that the concept of general intelligence has been a gradual growth since Binet devised his first tests to measure it. And although there is not yet general agreement as to definitions, there has come greater clarity as to the function of the ability which the psychologists are attempting to measure.[3]

Thus Stern defines it as "a general capacity of an individual consciously to adjust his thinking to new requirements," or as "general mental adaptability to new problems and conditions of life."[4] Thorndike says; "We may then define intellect in general as the power of good responses from the point of view of truth or fact."[5] As another writer states it, "General intelligence is commonly understood to mean an innate ability or group of abilities that lie at the basis of the acquired intelligence of an individual."[6] Consistent with this tendency to define intellectual capacity in terms of functions, Colvin points out that all mental testing is of things that have been learned. And the only way we have of measuring intellectual capacity is, therefore, to measure the things that have been learned. For this reason he defines general intellectual capacity (or general intelligence) as "a group of innate capacities by virtue of which the individual is capable of learning in a greater or less degree in terms of the amount of these innate capacities with which he is endowed."[7] Intellectual capacity then is nothing more nor less than capacity to learn, if we conceive learning in its complete aspects of acquiring knowledge and comprehending it,

[3] *Intelligence Testing*, chap. iv.
[4] *The Psychological Methods of Testing Intelligence*, translated by G. M. Whipple, p. 3.
[5] "Symposium on Intelligence and its Measurement," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, Vol. XII, nos. 3 and 4, pp. 123-147.
[6] Gregory, *Fundamentals of Educational Measurement*, p. 65.
[7] *Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, 1922, pp. 16-17.

and developing correct mental adaptations to truth or fact. It therefore involves particularly an active rather than a passive attitude, a reaction to materials or stimuli presented by the environment.

In the effort to measure this ability to learn, resort is had to the concept of a standardized form of development for each year or stage of growth of the normal individual from infancy to the maturing of the intellectual faculties. Binet in his studies of hundreds of French children reached the conclusion that for each year up to about twelve years of age there was a somewhat definite standard of accomplishment that could be expected of the average child. These standards became norms for the particular ages and any child could therefore be classified as to his development irrespective of his chronological age, his mental age being fixed by his degree of accomplishment according to the tests. It is not assumed that every normal child must just reach the standard for his age, no more and no less. In fact deviation from the average is the common rather than the exceptional circumstance. But the average gives a standard by which each individual may be measured, the degree of deviation being the determining factor in normality or abnormality. This concept of mental age has played a most important part in all mental testing and in fact lies at the very foundation of the classification of individuals into normal and subnormal and supernormal.

Just what is the average age at which the mental powers reach their full development is a point of some controversy. Since the Binet tests were not highly successful in testing normal individuals above about twelve years of age, it was at first somewhat generally accepted that the normal person reached his mental maturity at about that age, and, therefore, that any person who measured a mental age of twelve years was normal. Later studies have, however, led to a revision on this point. Terman places the average age for reaching mental maturity at about sixteen years, Pintner at fourteen years. There is at present no gen-

eral unanimity on this point, although the lower age is more generally accepted since the use of the army tests.

An important addition to the concept of the mental age is that of the Intelligence Quotient, first suggested by Stern and worked out by Terman.[8] While the mental age gives a basis for comparing the degree of development of mature individuals, it does not provide an accurate basis for comparison of children who are yet chronologically below maturity. A child of six years, chronologically, may have a mental age of five, while one of ten chronologically might have a mental age of seven. The younger child has greater intelligence for his age, and is therefore more nearly normal than the older one.

The Intelligence Quotient is obtained by dividing the mental age of the individual by his chronological age. Thus if an individual of six years of age has a mental age of six also, his normality is 100 per cent. If, however, his chronological age is ten and his mental age six, his intelligence quotient is 3-5 or sixty per cent. In estimating the intelligence quotient for adults, the years above sixteen or maturity are not counted. Terman believes that this ratio that a child would show anytime before reaching maturity would remain somewhat constant through life. Hence his intelligence quotient or I. Q. would be practically the same regardless of his age. The I. Q. has become a term of rather general acceptance, applicable to persons of all chronological ages to indicate their degree of intellectual capacity. Its value over a mere statement of the mental age is, however, confined to comparing those under maturity.

Previous to 1917 the chief use of the tests was to distinguish sub-normal children from normal. The tests as originally devised by Binet and later developed by Goddard were primarily to facilitate this process. They were applied to one child at a time and the task was somewhat laborious and called for considerable technique. Considerable value was derived, however,

[8] *Intelligence of School Children*, pp. 7-11.

from the assistance rendered by the tests in determining the normality or feeblemindedness of individual subjects. A child whose mental age was two or more years below his chronological age, or an adult whose mental age did not reach 12 years, was generally regarded as subnormal. School children who were not doing satisfactory work or delinquents, generally juvenile, who were brought before the courts, were examined in considerable numbers. It became increasingly evident from the results of these examinations that to know the mental age of an individual is very essential to any successful planning for his future, particularly if that involves any reformatory treatment or special educational provision. It was also found that considerable numbers of cases whose progress or conduct was difficult to explain on any other ground became readily intelligible when it was established that they were below normal in intellectual capacity.

During these early years of the use of the tests, the discussion waged around the distinction between normal and sub-normal, the line being somewhat arbitrarily drawn at the mental age of 12 years. There also soon developed a twilight zone of borderlinity. The number of the population who were of sub-normal intelligence was variously estimated, depending on the rigidity of adherence to the dividing line of twelve years of mentality, on the particular test used, and also on the tendency of the examiner to give or withhold the benefit of the doubt in borderline cases. Two per cent of the population was a fairly conservative estimate of the amount of subnormality. Among delinquents in reformatories and prisons the percentage ran as high as fifty or more and as low as fifteen, depending on the examiner.

In 1917 the application of the test in the American army opened an entirely new chapter in the development of mental measurement. In order to make it practical for the army, it was necessary to abandon the laborious individual examination, as a general method of procedure, and to resort to the testing of large

numbers of men simultaneously. New tests were devised for this purpose by a group of psychologists and also immediately put into use for testing school children in groups and later university students. The group test had been used for sometime previous to 1917 by psychologists, but not for the purpose of getting a general measurement of the individual's intellectual capacity. The psychologists who devised the army tests made use of what had been worked out in these group tests and formulated on this basis the instrument which has become the generally accepted method for measuring large numbers of individuals. From the results obtained in the army and in testing large numbers of school children, data have been provided which carry the interpretation of mental differences far beyond their earlier possibilities. We have been given data on such large numbers of the population as to make wider generalization possible, and to carry the discussion far beyond the problem of distinguishing between the normal and the subnormal. On the basis of these findings the whole population is divided into levels or strata on the basis of their intellectual capacity. This manifestly opens the way for most far-reaching social interpretation.

Terman, previous to 1917, had measured by the individual method nine hundred and five school children, whom he selected in such a way as to make them as representative of American school children as possible. His results, as shown in the table below, distribute the whole number into groups on levels of intellectual ability, which in proportion as his methods were accurate are indicative of the differences among American school children between five and fourteen years of age.



Distribution of I. Q's. of 905 unselected children 5-14 years of age.[9]

The tests in the army were given to a much larger number, approximately 1,700,000, and to adults. The grades are not given in terms of the I. Q. as were Terman's and the division lines are drawn at different points. And yet a comparison of the two will show no great discrepancy in the grouping. The significant fact in both is the establishment of levels of intellectual capacity for numbers of individuals which may be regarded as representative of the whole population.

The groupings from the army tests indicated by letters and showing the percentage of each group, and the significance for military purposes, is as follows:[10]

"A"=Very superior intelligence. This grade is ordinarily earned by only four or five per cent of a draft quota. The "A" group is composed of men of marked intellectuality. "A" men are of high officer type when they are also endowed with leadership and other necessary qualities.

"B"=Superior intelligence. "B" intelligence is superior, but less exceptional than that represented by "A". The rating "B" is obtained by eight to ten soldiers out of a hundred. The group contains many men of the commissioned officer type and a large amount of non-commissioned officer material.

[9]Terman, *Measurement of Intelligence*, p. 66.
[10]Yoakum and Yerkes, *Army Mental Tests*, pp. 22-23.

"C+"=High average intelligence. This group includes fifteen to eighteen per cent of all soldiers and contains a large amount of non-commissioned officer material with occasionally a man whose leadership and power to command fit him for commissioned rank.

"C"=Average intelligence. It includes about twenty-five per cent of soldiers. Excellent private type with a certain amount of fair non-commissioned officer material.

"C–"=Low average intelligence. This group includes about twenty per cent. Although below average intelligence, "C–" men are usually good privates and satisfactory in work of a routine nature.

"D"=Inferior intelligence. It includes about fifteen per cent of soldiers. "D" men are likely to be fair soldiers, but they are usually slow in learning and rarely go above the rank of private. They are short on initiative and so require more than the usual amount of supervision. Many of them are illiterate or foreign.

"D–" and "E"=Very inferior intelligence. This group is divided into two classes (1) "D–" men, who are very inferior in intelligence but are considered fit for regular service; and (2) "E" men, those whose mental inferiority justifies their recommendation for development battalion, special service organization, rejection, or discharge. The majority of "D–" and "E" men are below ten years in "mental age."

The immense contrast between "A" and "D–" intelligence is shown by the fact that men of "A" intelligence have the ability to make a superior record in college or university, while "D–" men are of such inferior mentality that they are rarely able to go beyond the third or fourth grade of the elementary school, however long they attend. In fact, many "D–" and "E" men are of the moron grade of feeblemindedness. "B" intelligence is capable of making an average record in college, "C+" intelligence cannot do so well, while mentality of the "C" grade is rarely capable of finishing a high school course.

From these and other available data the facts seem established that very wide differences of intellectual capacity do exist in the general population, and that it is possible to distinguish more or less definite levels or strata of the population on this basis. Since the

publication of the results of the army tests, however, there has been considerable discussion as to their validity. It has been urged that the army was not representative of the whole population since many of the better grades of intellect were excused from the draft. It has been urged that, since the tests were designed particularly to select men for military purposes, it does not grade persons on the basis of their intelligence for civil life. It is urged also that the assumption, that all those tested by the Alpha or literate test and all those tested by the Beta or illiterate test were on an equality with respect to the requirements of the tests, is an incorrect assumption. Many persons do not believe that the large proportion found of "C" grade and below is consistent with what we know from general observation. For example, according to the army findings, approximately seventy per cent of the population are incapable of completing satisfactorily a high school course, a conclusion which school experience seems to belie.

It is entirely possible that some revision of these findings as applicable to the whole population will ultimately be made. It is probable that the psychologists have rated too highly the degree to which the tests get at a common experience of those tested, especially when they are drawn from as widely different environments as were the members of the American army. It is generally accepted that comparative findings are valid only when, among other conditions, the persons tested have had an equal opportunity to become acquainted with the material of the tests employed and also have the same interest in becoming acquainted with them. This arises from the fact noted above that innate capacity itself is never directly measured. It is always an acquired ability that is measured and the innate capacity is inferred from this. It is evident therefore that a comparison cannot be made between those who have had unequal opportunities to acquire that which the tests actually do measure.[11]

[11]See, for example, Colvin, *Yearbook of Society for Study of Education*, 1922, pp. 20-21.

The psychologists have constantly aimed at escaping this difficulty by devising tests that would measure ability that all their subjects had had equal opportunity to acquire. There can be no question that they have gone very far toward accomplishing this in the tests. In order to check up on their success they have put the same tests to persons of widely different circumstances in life and found more or less satisfactory results.

There is, however, a legitimate question whether sufficient experimentation of this sort has been done. It is admitted that the brightest white child brought up by a group of African Pigmies would not test above the grade of a moron when brought for the first time into civilized society.[12] If this be true, concerning which there seems to be no question, there may be serious doubt as to the propriety of assuming enough common experience between all the various grades and classes of young men who were thrown together in the American army to justify their being measured by the same tests.

It should not be lost sight of that the environment does something more than merely feed the material of experience into the mind. It has a directly stimulating effect in many cases. We have much evidence to show that most minds need a stimulation in order to react up to the fullest of their capacities. It is undoubtedly true that many of the young men tested in the army had never been in an environment that had provided a situation that would bring out all their intellectual capacity. And we know that innate capacities lie dormant in the human mechanism until the appropriate stimulation is brought to bear.

There are in fact many considerations that would indicate that the role of the environment is exceedingly complex in its relation to the reacting force of innate human capacities. And the assumption of equality of experience with respect to the materials of the tests, in

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

the cases of individuals whose lives have been extremely different, is one which is open to serious question, unless fortified by more complete experimental investigation than has appeared to date. For this reason it is likely that there will be a revision of conclusions with respect to the proportion of the population in the lower grades of intellectual capacity.

This, however, is not the essential point for us here. The fundamental fact seems to be well established that there are widely differing grades of intellectual capacity and that there is a gradual transition from the lowest to the highest. The question of the proportions of the population at any particular level will probably be a troublesome one for some time. But once the fact is recognized, that the different levels do exist for the entire population, we may expect a gradual improvement in the actual drawing of the lines in social life.

Because intellectual capacity has been under discussion for some time and because we now understand it much more clearly than we do any of the other fundamental characteristics of human beings, it is probable that its importance for social position has been somewhat overrated relative to the other kinds of individual differences. It is admitted, however, that it is only one of the significant factors that determine the place an individual occupies in the social order.

A second group of traits which together with intellectual capacity makes up the original endowment of personality is generally referred to as character. While there is little agreement in the terminology used to describe these traits, the existence of a significant group of traits other than intellectual capacity is generally accepted.[13] Of the nature of this group of traits, Webb says: "It markedly dominates all the correlations yielded by the estimates of moral qualities, the deeper social virtues, perseverance and persistence;

[13]For a good summary of the literature on character traits see Brown, Wm. M., *Character Traits as Factors in Intelligence Test Performance.* I am much indebted to this summary for references to studies made.

also, on the negative side, qualities related to instability of the emotions and the lighter side of sociality.

"Its nature is best conceived in the light of our present evidence to be in some close relation to 'persistence of motives'; i.e., to depend upon the consistency of action resulting from deliberate volition, i.e., from will.[14]

Fernald takes a similar view: "For the purposes of mentality study, intelligence may be conceived as the thinking, inventing, selecting, combining, planning, deciding function of mentality and character as the complementary function. Character, then, is the emotivating, feeling, sentimental, instinctive, sustaining, energizing, executing, or vetoing function of mentality, and as such it is integral. Intelligence being the directing factor is responsible for its own product-decision; and character being the energizing force is responsible for its own product-action. Habit is a factor in both these functions, but a controlled factor, i.e., it may be influenced by the will. Volition and inhibition, though under direction of intelligence, owe their force to character. Sentiment, emotion, and conscience are related to character rather than to intelligence and both the latter are inseparable parts of one whole mentality. If intelligence be regarded as the judicial department of the mind, then character is truly the executive."[15]

The functioning of these traits is bound up with the emotional life. The emotions are now generally regarded as those states of excitement which accompany certain visceral and bodily changes connected with the instinctive processes.[16] The emotions, such as anger, hate, love, fear, wonder, disgust, elation, etc., constitute the affective aspect of the operations of the instincts. Their strength has much to do with the motor inclinations of the individual.

[14] "Character and Intelligence," *British Journal of Psychology, Monograph Supplement*, 1915, Vol. I, no. 3, p. 76.

[15] "Character as an Integral Mentality Function," *Mental Hygiene*, 1918, Vol. 2, pp. 448-462. Also "Character vs. Intelligence in Personality Studies," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 1920, Vol. 15, pp. 1-11.

[16] See McDougall, *Social Psychology*, pp. 46-47.

The temperament may be regarded as the somewhat permanent or constant bias of emotional state and expression. Traditionally, persons have been classified in four temperamental types, the sanguine, the melancholic, the choleric, the phlegmatic. Later psychologists have, however, been inclined to regard the kinds of temperaments as much more numerous than four, and this traditional classification is no longer regarded as an adequate one. The entire nervous system, and through it the whole mentality, is profoundly influenced by a number of conditions that are as yet little understood. McDougall notes two sets of these influences, those arising from the functioning of the bodily organs; and certain general functional peculiarities of the nervous tissues. The ductless glands are known to have a most profound effect upon the emotional life, and the injection from without of adrenal solution will produce many of the phenomena of anger. In fact most of the bodily organs have some effect, greater or less, in determining the emotional life, and their state of health or development, or peculiarities of functioning produce their effects on the general nervous system and on the emotions particularly. The understanding of this aspect of the mental life waits upon the development of physiology and neurology. We do know that persons differ very strikingly in respect to this phase of life, but we are yet in no position to classify the population with respect to the differences involved. The differences arising from variation in the general constitution of the nervous tissues are still more vague because this side of life has been even less understood.

Another aspect of character is disposition. It is possible that this may be simply a phase of temperament which expresses itself in the propulsive strength of a particular group of instincts or tendencies. It is immaterial for our purposes here whether we regard it as such a phase or as a wholly separate aspect of character. It is a trait which is highly significant for conduct since it indicates the strength of the urge

within the individual toward certain activities and his sensitiveness to certain important kinds of stimuli. The strength of the impulses which underlie the moral life, for example, is exceedingly important. Loyalty, bravery, courage, honesty, sense of responsibility, self-respect, altruism,—such qualities as these are the ones which are probably most important of all for social life. As with all human qualities we of course see in these much that is acquired from training and moral discipline. But we know that there is a vast difference in the responsiveness of individuals to this training. And this disposition to respond readily to the moral requirements of one's group is an innate quality which marks certain individuals whose value to society is correspondingly greater than that of those who are weak in this respect. On the other hand there are many individuals who are possessed of very strong impulses toward activities which are harmful to society. A violent temper, an unusually strong sex impulse, a high degree of timidity, an abnormal acquisitiveness, or any other strong tendency toward anti-social conduct constitutes an innate quality which may predetermine an undesirable social position.

Some beginnings have been made in the study and measurement of character traits but exceedingly little in comparison with the work on intelligence. Thus far most of the tests devised have been concerned with particular aspects of character. Thus we have a number of tests of the degree of mental balance;[17] another more specific test for emotional instability;[18] and several devices for measuring emotional expression.[19] Aggressiveness has been measured by tests of

[17]Wells, F. L., "The Systematic Observation of the Personality in its Relation to the Hygiene of the Mind," *Psychological Review*, 1914, Vol. 21, pp. 295-332. Also *Mental Adjustments*, New York, 1917.

[18]Franz, *Handbook of Mental Examination Methods*, pp. 170-176.

[19]Langfield, H. B., "The Judgement of Emotions from Facial Expressions," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 1918, Vol. 13, pp. 172-184. Also Feleky, A. M., "The Expression of Emotions," *Psychological Review*, 1914, Vol. 21, pp. 33-41. Also Pressey, S. L. and L. W., "Cross-Out Tests, with suggestions as to a group scale of the Emotions," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1919, Vol. 3, pp. 38-150.

eye control in personal interview;[20] and various tests for ascertaining the degree of suggestibility have been devised by different students.[21]

Several students have made use of handwriting to test certain aspects of character. Probably the most significant of these is the measurement of the "Will Profile" by Professor Downey, who regards this as a permanent quality of the individual which is seen in such motor tendencies as readiness to act, vigor, mental suppleness, accuracy of motor reaction. By means of a series of tests, chiefly handwriting, she measured the following traits: speed of movement; freedom from load or degree of inertia; flexibility; speed of decision; motor impulsion; assurance; resistance; motor inhibition; care for detail; coördination of impulses; perseverance; revision.[22]

The correlation between the graphs recorded from the testing, and the judgment concerning the same individuals by persons who knew them somewhat intimately, was high enough to give considerable confidence in the validity of the tests.

Undoubtedly the study of character traits is more difficult than that of intellectual capacity. And until it reaches some similar degree of efficiency we probably will continue to have an over-emphasis of the significance of the intellectual factor as we have had in recent years.

The third factor, which together with intellectual capacity and character is highly significant for the social position of the individual, is energy. This is a physical quality which the physiologists have not yet analyzed or explained. It is closely connected with heart action, with respiration, with resistance to fatigue, and with a certain quality of the nerve fibre. But its real nature is not understood and as yet we have no

[20]Moore, H. T. and Gilliland, A. R., "The Measurement of Aggressiveness," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1921, Vol. 5, pp. 97-118.

[21]Brown, Warner, "Individual and Sex Differences in Suggestibility," *University of California Publications in Psychology*, 1916, Vol. 2, no. 6. Also Whipple, G. M., *Manual of Mental and Physical Tests*, Vol. II, chap. 10.

[22]*Journal of Experimental Psychology*, Vol. 3, pp. 281-301.

standards of measurement. Galton defined it as the capacity for labor, which is probably as far as we can go at present. It is a quality that pertains not merely to the muscular system and bony structure, but particularly to the nervous system. In modern life the greatest demands are for nervous energy rather than for muscular. The capacity for prolonged, arduous application to tasks which tax the nervous system is one on which very much depends and one in which individuals manifestly differ originally to a very considerable degree.

Since it has not yet been subjected to measurement we have no data indicating the way in which a population would divide or classify with respect to it. All we have to rely upon is the observation made on certain individuals in whom a high degree of correlation is found between preëminence and energy.

Galton found in the case of men of science that no fact was more evident than that the leaders of scientific thought were men of unusual energy and that the same quality was to be found in their parents and grandparents.[23]

Binder in collecting information on preëminent men of different historical periods found that they were nearly all men of rugged health and longevity.

Socrates served as a hoplite, or among the shock troops, as we would say to-day, and was put to death at the age of 70. Measured both by length and breadth of life, most geniuses of modern times were men of good vitality.

Sir Isaac Newton died in his 85th year and was, except during the last few years of his life, not only a very busy man, but a healthy man.

Darwin was born with a good constitution which he unfortunately ruined, perhaps during the five year's journey on the *Beagle;* it stood him, however, in good stead as soon as he gave it a chance; and he not only accomplished a remarkable amount of work of the highest order, but he lived to the age of 73.

Herbert Spencer is another man born with a good constitution which he ruined by overwork. Only a boy with a first-class vitality could at the age of 13 walk 48 miles in one day, 47 the second and 20 the third with very little food during the three days.

[23] *Human Faculty*, pp. 17-18.

He lived to the age of 83 and accomplished a remarkable amount of work in both quantity and quality.

The other member of this trio, Alfred Russell Wallace, passed the age of 90 and kept vigorous in both mind and body till near his death.

Among modern philosophers, Kant and Hegel are perhaps unexcelled; they enjoyed good health, and Kant died at the age of 80, while Hegel died of cholera at 61, a disease which almost invariably proved fatal in those days.

Among modern poets Shakespeare and Goethe easily take the lead. The great bard of Avon was only 52 when he died; this is a good age considering his many activities as an actor, dramatist, manager and above all boon companion in "Merrie England." He was able, notwithstanding the small compensation which actors and writers commanded in those days, to buy two houses in London and another in Stratford.

Of Goethe we know that he was an exceedingly busy man and that he enjoyed good health during his 83 years of life. He retained his vitality till death and his mental vigor until a year before he finished his greatest work, the second part of Faust.

Among the famous Italians four stand out foremost—Dante, Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo and Galileo. Dante was only 56 when he died; this was, however, a good age when we consider the many vicissitudes and the arduous labors of his life, which only a man of good health could have endured.

Leonardo da Vinci was a person of splendid physique, outstripping younger men in feats of strength, and zealous in his multitudinous activities; he lived to be nearly 67.

Michelangelo worked with furious intensity up to his seventieth year, and then had energy enough left to plan and complete great architectural works like St. Peter's in Rome. He was a poet, painter, sculptor, architect, excelling in at least three lines. He retained full possession of his faculties until his death at 90.

Galileo was active along many lines in science, enjoyed good health and made a name for himself by working almost to his death at 78.[24]

Differences of energy have undoubtedly always been an important factor in determining social position, but in modern life it must be increasingly so. The pace of life has been so accelerated that the demands put upon the nervous system have been very greatly increased. There is scarcely any phase of life where this is not true. In scientific investigation, in business organization, in industry, the pace of modern life is so much

[24] *Publications of American Sociological Society*, 1921, pp. 170-172.

faster than that of even a generation ago, that a high premium is placed on the ability to work a little harder or endure a few longer hours. He who can do so is assured of a very considerable advantage over his competitors.

Intellectual capacity, character and temperamental bias, energy and vitality, these are the significant factors, the quality or quantity of which sets such limits to the development of the individual that we cannot explain his social position without reference to them. There may be some question as to the relative importance of these fundamental innate qualities. As indicated above, some psychologists who have been measuring intellectual capacity are inclined to rate that factor above all the others. Thus Goddard states that "the chief determiner of human conduct is a unitary mental process which we call intelligence."[25] Lichtenberger in reviewing the social significance of mental levels also is inclined to regard the intellectual factor as the most fundamental one.[26]

It is, however, manifestly unscientific and illogical to attempt to compare in importance two or more of several factors all of which are of absolute importance. The intellectual factor, the motor-emotional factor, the character, all interact in a most complex fashion in the life of an individual. The only way in which one of them can be said to be of the greatest importance is in reference to particular situations which the individual must meet, when the other factors are regarded for the time as constant within certain limits. Thus in school, if it is assumed that a child is normal in his motor-emotional life and in his response to discipline, the intellectual factor is the most important one for his progress in education. On the other hand, there are many situations in business or industry or politics where the motor-emotional factor is the most important for success, if it is assumed that the intellectual capacity

[25] *Human Efficiency and Levels of Intelligence*, p. 1.
[26] *Publications of American Sociological Society*, 1920, pp. 102-115.

is at least average or normal.[27] But in both these cases the assumptions of normality or of average degree in the other factors is essential.

We may now raise the question, just what part do these differences of individual variation play in determining the social position of persons? Can we discern their influence in the actual social differentiation of the population? The most obvious place to look for their operation is in the determination of the line of demarkation between those to be treated as normal and those to be treated as abnormal. It is evident that a physical or mental condition is the basis of the distinction. And yet, as in the case of the influence of age, sex, and race factors, the biological fact is not by itself an absolute determinant. The social group may and does draw the line between the normal and the abnormal at a different place, depending on the general social situation.

As noted above, in the early days of intelligence testing, the important problem was the distinction between those below and those above a somewhat arbitrarily drawn line. With the testing of large numbers it became apparent that the gradations in intelligence of the entire population ascended by a regular scale from the lowest to the highest, the largest number, of course, falling near the median. In the face of such facts the arbitrariness of drawing a line at some particular mental age which would separate the normal from the abnormal is more evident. For practical purposes it may at times be necessary to make such a distinction. For example, in school work, there is undoubtedly a degree of intellectual capacity in the pupil below which it is impracticable to attempt literary education. And if this is all the kind of training that is available in that community, the pupil must be excluded. Similarly there are many industrial positions requiring a certain speed of muscular manipulation.

[27]Since the above was written some tests on successful business men seem to show that the intellectual factor is less important than the others in making for their success.

A particular individual may be so deficient in that respect as to be unfit for a particular occupation.

It is evident, however, that no two situations will be exactly alike even when only one factor, as intellectual capacity, is considered. One's capacity must always be rated relatively to the requirements of the social situation. It is undoubtedly true that the complexity of modern life, particularly in urban communities and also in many rural communities, is so much greater to-day than a generation or more ago that a higher degree of intellectual capacity is required to meet the minimum social necessities. Similarly a greater amount of nervous energy is required. Certain temperamental qualities that would permit of fairly successful life in a remote, simple environment would make it impossible for many individuals to live in a highly complex modern community. Many persons who in primitive life were leaders or dictators today would be confined in the penitentiary. The "normal," therefore, is always the normal for some particular social situation, and since situations are constantly changing, even within the same locality, there can be no accurately defined absolute distinction between those who are normal and those who are not.

This fact has become increasingly evident in dealing with the feebleminded and insane. It is now recognized that the necessity for institutional segregation in any particular case should not be determined by mere mental measurement. The entire social situation which this particular person must meet, the environment into which he must fit, are to be considered together with his mental condition. The determination whether he is to remain at entire liberty or to have supervision while living in regular social relations or to be confined within an institution, depends quite as much on the environment which is possible outside the institution as it does upon his mental condition. This implies that we must soon begin to give the same careful study to the effects of different kinds of environment as we have given to mental condition.

This relativity of normality or abnormality to particular social situations appears in the definition of the British Royal Commission on the Feebleminded in 1904. A feebleminded person is defined as "one who is capable of earning a living under favorable circumstances, but is incapable, from mental defect existing at birth, or from an early age, (a) of competing on equal terms with his normal fellows: or (b) of maintaining himself and his affairs with ordinary prudence." A recent psychological writer points out that by means of intelligence testing we are now able to escape from this variable standard of feeblemindedness and define the condition in terms of an absolute norm, namely, a mental age below a given level, as twelve years, or eleven, or ten.[28] While it is true that such an absolute standard gives greater scientific precision, it is doubtful whether such a definition has much value in the practical classification of the population, since the assumption of a fixed social situation that the person must adjust himself to is a false one.

Further light is thrown on the lack of absoluteness in the distinction between the normal and the abnormal by a recent study in mental abnormality.[29] It is shown that among those classified as normal there is to be found a very great amount of physical and mental defect, delinquent conduct, emotional instability. Obviously the degree and number of such limitations necessary to change one's classification vary greatly from one community to another.

The concept of relativity as applied to the abnormal renders obsolete the earlier efforts to determine the number of insane or psychopathic or feebleminded in the population. In its place we are getting estimates of the numbers in need of particular types of treatment. Institutional treatment, community supervision, special classes in the public schools, and other forms of special provision are adapted to persons with different needs. To know that there are one or two or three per

[28] Pintner, *Intelligence Testing*, chap. viii.
[29] Pressey, S. L. and L. C., *Mental Abnormality and Deficiency*, chap. vi.

cent of the population insane or feebleminded according to some arbitrarily set form does not mean much from the standpoint of social policy. But to know that a given number are in need of community supervision and another proportion incapable of general industrial employment outside of the simple kinds of work, gives us a working basis for dealing with the various grades of lower intelligence. But even on this basis of estimate our divisions will constantly change, as we modify our type of treatment. For example, increasing the efficiency of community supervision will greatly reduce the number for which institutions must be provided, and improvement in personnel management in industry will increase the number of those of low grade intelligence that may be successfully utilized in regular work.

In the field of dependency we do not have as yet much evidence concerning the part played by individual variation. Some mental testing has been done on several groups, particularly institutional cases, children, and almshouse inmates. From various studies it is evident that a considerable proportion of almshouse inmates are feebleminded. But since the conditions of entrance and the classes of persons kept in almshouses vary so widely from one part of the country to another we have no basis for ascertaining a correct correlation between almshouse residence and mental condition. Similarly in children's institutions a considerable number of the inmates have been found of a low grade mentality.[30] But here also the conditions under which children are received in these homes make it impossible to get any general estimate of the proportion of dependent children who have a given mental level, although it seems established that the proportion of low intelligence is considerably greater than among the general school population. Dependents who are outside institutions have been studied even less than those within. Terman notes two tests made on unemployed, homeless men. In one group 5.5 per cent

[30] Pintner, *op. cit.*, chap. xiv.

test 10 years and 12 per cent below 11 years. In the other group 5.2 per cent are below 10 years and 8.4 per cent below 12 years.[31] Pintner and Toops tested 94 cases of unemployed in one city and 40 in another and found the following percentages:[32]

	City A	City B
Feebleminded	28.7	7.5
Borderline	29.8	25.0
Backward	28.7	32.5
Normal	8.5	20.0
Bright	4.3	15.0

All these studies show a much larger proportion of low grade intelligence than was found among semi-skilled employed men. But as Pintner points out they merely give a general "indication that low grade intelligence is likely to be very common among the unemployed."

With the exception of the above data concerning institution cases and the unemployed we have little or no information concerning the mental level of the vast numbers who receive material assistance in some form. It is generally believed, however, that chronic pauperism in particular is highly correlated with low mentality. Studies of certain degenerate families such as the Jukes, the Kallikaks, the Ishmaelites, etc., have shown this to be true. It is also believed by those who are in close contact with the shifting, incompetent, inefficient individuals and families that they belong in most cases to the low grade mentality group. It seems probable, however, that when we are able to measure energy, temperament, and disposition more accurately we will find that a deficiency in one or more of these respects also characterizes those dependents thought to be merely feebleminded.

Some light has been thrown on this recently in the mental measurements of delinquents. Recent tests seem to show that the prison population does not con-

[31] *Intelligence of School Children*, pp. 282-283.
[32] Pintner, *op. cit.*, pp. 371-372.

tain a higher proportion of low grade intelligence than appeared in the army tests. This was true of the population of the Disciplinary Barracks during the war and appears also from studies of the inmates of state prisons.[33] The earlier belief that low mentality was the sole cause of a very large part of crime now gives way to the belief that it is only when low mentality is combined with some peculiarity of emotion or temperament or disposition that such defects show a high correlation with delinquency.[34] These facts give considerable force to the contention that traits other than intellectual capacity must be taken into consideration in accounting for the social position of persons. For example, Goring found that the English convict had a generally defective physique.[35]

In the case of prostitution a very high correlation of low mentality with sex offense is found, though here also we have no means of knowing of the presence of other deficiencies.[36] Female convicts in all types of penal institutions show a lower grade of intelligence than the male.[37] This may be due to the fact that the courts send only the worst type of women to prison.

The conclusion that seems inevitable from a survey of studies made thus far with respect to dependency and delinquency is that a very large proportion of these two groups are in their present social position because of the peculiarities of their innate qualities, although definite proportions are as yet difficult to establish. A very general belief in this explanation of dependency and delinquency already exists. There is a strong possibility, however, that this explanation may be pushed farther than the evidence will justify. A new theory is generally made to explain too much when it first gets general acceptance. There are undoubtedly many other factors that are operating to cause depend-

[33] *Army Mental Tests*, p. 195. Also Adler, *National Conference of Social Work*, 1919, pp. 647-648. Also Pintner, *op. cit.*, chap. xiii.

[34] It seems probable that feeblemindedness by itself is far more effective as a cause of dependence than it is of crime.

[35] Goring, C., *The English Convict.*

[36] *Army Mental Tests*, p. 196.

[37] Pintner, *op. cit.*, pp. 295-296.

ency and delinquency, environmental factors that permit of more definite social control than do innate qualities. And many naturally normal persons will be found in this group because of these other factors.

We may raise a similar question concerning the individuals at the other extremity of society, the persons of eminence and distinction. Do they occupy the social positions that they do because of their innate qualities? It is futile to put the question in the form of the relative importance of innate qualities and environmental factors. As shown above, these always work in a complementary manner, not as alternatives. But we may put it this way: are the persons who come to the top in social life endowed with a higher degree of those significant qualities of energy, intellectual capacity, adaptable dispositions, and favorable temperament than are those who do not; that is, to gain distinction is it necessary to have an unusual native endowment? On *a priori* grounds we would of course expect that unusual ability would be necessary, that no amount of favorable environmental influences could produce distinguished individuals unless they were possessed of unusually high native capacities. It might be urged, however, that given an average or mediocre native endowment, the vicissitudes of fortune might be responsible for raising these individuals to the positions of prominence that they come to occupy. It is desirable therefore that we look for some data that will throw light on the innate qualities of persons of distinction.

Galton was the first writer to thow much light on the problem. In his *Hereditary Genius* he undertook to discover the extent to which genius was an hereditary matter. By an objective method he made a selection of nearly one thousand eminent men of English history, four hundred and fifteen of whom were illustrious. From a study of their family histories the evidence seems to show that genius is hereditary. According to his findings, the chances, statistically, of a father of an illustrious man to be eminent "is 1 to 6; of each brother, 1 to 7; of each son, 1 to 4; of each grandfather 1 to

25; of each uncle 1 to 40; of each nephew, 1 to 40; of each grandson, 1 to 29."[38]

Havelock Ellis in his *A Study of British Genius* found similar facts. Of the 81 eminent persons who died while the Supplement of the *Dictionary of National Biography* was in progress, in which they were included, 33 are noted as having father or mother, or both, reckoned as persons of unusual ability, or about 40 per cent.[39]

A study of Frederick Adams Woods of *Heredity in Royalty* confirms the findings of Galton and Ellis. He collected information concerning six hundred and seventy-one members of the royal houses of Europe, and divided them into grades of eminence from (1) to (10) according to the opinions expressed concerning their relative merits, intellectual and moral. His ratings were objective, based upon all estimates available concerning the merits of the particular personages. In following the hereditary connections, he found that the individuals in the two topmost ranks (9) and (10) were grouped in a few families of close blood relation. He concludes: "If such a great chart were constructed (on which the interrelations of the various individuals were indicated) we should see the geniuses of (9) and (10) grades not scattered at random over its entire surface, but isolated little groups of (9) and (10) characters (the individuals within each group contiguous to each other) would be found here and there. One such group would be seen centering around Frederick the Great, another around Queen Isabella of Spain, another in the neighborhood of William the Silent, and still a fourth with Gustavus Adolphus as a center. These would constitute the largest groups of closely related (9) and (10) characters. There would also be a few other groups of two or three geniuses each."[40]

[38] *Hereditary Genius*, revised edition, p. 324.
[39] *A Study of British Genius*, pp. 99-100.
[40] *Heredity in Royalty*, p. 265.

In the Stanford *Genetic Studies of Genius* we find a further confirmation of the conclusions of the earlier studies. This is a study of the mental and physical traits of a thousand gifted children, selected from the public schools of several California cities.[41] It was found that a high proportion of the gifted children came from parents whose occupations are generally rated as calling for the higher grades of intellectual ability. Thus a classification of the occupations of the fathers gave 31.4 per cent for the professional group; 50 per cent for the semi-professional and business; 11.8 per cent for skilled labor; and a total of 6.8 per cent for semi-skilled and unskilled labor.[42] (The agricultural group obviously does not appear because the study was made among city children).

This study shows what the earlier studies did not; namely, that in American society there is at least some correlation between intellectual ability and higher social status. The hereditary character of special ability is confirmed by the showing of the large number of gifted relatives of these gifted children. Nearly a quarter of those in the Hall of Fame are represented among the relatives. Four grandfathers and 35 other relatives are known to appear in *Who's Who*. Among 58 other eminent relatives are six signers of the Declaration of Independence, two presidents and two vice-presidents of the United States, four generals, six writers, two inventors, four statesmen, three artists, and two supreme court judges.

Parents and grandparents have held posts of responsibility in very great number, including 20 cases of major national office, 26 of major state office, 67 of major religious or fraternal office, 4 college presidencies, 23 professorships in colleges, 74 positions as superintendent or manager of large factory or corporation, and 18 bank presidencies.[43]

[41] Terman *et al*, *Genetic Studies of Genius*.
[42] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 82.
[43] *Op. cit.*, pp. 110-111.

On the basis of such evidence as the above, we may regard it as established that being eminent or distinguished is an hereditary matter to a very great degree. From this we may conclude that social distinction is not the result of fortuitious social factors exclusively, but that there must be some inherent qualities in the germ plasm which are passed on from one generation to another. This does not deny the equal importance of the environmental factors, but it does show that social distinction, at least in a very great proportion of the cases, must have the requisite innate qualities as one of the foundations. Of course there must be many persons who have reached places of distinction by purely fortuitious circumstances. That a person does occupy a position of high rank in society is not proof that he must necessarily have a correspondingly high grade of innate capacity. The evidence presented shows only that in a very large proportion of cases, even in non-democratically organized societies, individual capacity of a high degree is associated with distinction.

With respect to the variety of individual traits that made for this distinction in the cases studied, there is little available data. As indicated earlier in the chapter, Galton found energy to be a leading characteristic of most of his highly eminent men. The Stanford study showed that the gifted children came from families of more than average vigor.[44] And both Ellis and Woods considered moral traits as well as intellectual. It is evident that we cannot single out any one trait, as intellectual capacity, and hold it chiefly responsible for distinction.

In so far as the psychological tests measure innate intellectual capacity, they do show that high scores are associated with at least some kind of distinction. Thus the army gradings show that the great majority of the regular army officers made scores which placed them in one or the other of the two highest grades. And

[44] *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 52.

the men who were chosen, independently of the tests, as the best fitted for military service, when tested later, secured generally higher grades than others of closely similar schooling.[45] This should not be interpreted, however, as proving that those rated high for military purposes would be rated so high in civil life. For the tests having been devised primarily to select those best fitted for military purposes might not be equally capable of selecting those who would come to distinction in civil life.

A beginning has been made in establishing a correlation between intellectual capacity and occupation. Terman records the intelligence quotient of various groups of workmen who have been tested. The results point to the conclusion that different occupations do generally draw persons of a certain range of intellectual capacity.[46] The most comprehensive data, however, came from the army mental tests. The army occupations of 18,423 men were classified into unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled, business and clerical, professional, and intelligence ratings taken for the various groups.[47] Proctor has arranged the findings in the following table, which gives the median score attained in the tests for the various groups and the range of scores of the middle 50 per cent in each group.[48]

1.	Unskilled labor	Median	35	Middle 50%	21-63
2.	Semi-skilled labor	"	42	"	23-70
3.	Skilled labor	"	61	"	26-95
4.	Business and clerical	"	96	"	58-145
5.	Professional	"	140	"	98-184

Yerkes points out that these data cannot be applied to civilian groups since the assignment to particular occupations in the army results in a different occupational selection than occurs in civil life. And yet since the army selection did follow previous civil occu-

[45] *Memoirs National Academy of Science*, Vol. XV.
[46] *Intelligence of School Children*, pp. 271-279.
[47] *Army Mental Tests*, pp. 196-200.
[48] *Journal of Educational Research*, Vol. 2, p. 537.

pations to a considerable degree the findings throw much light on the different intelligence ratings of the different occupations. In all cases, however, of intellectual rating of occupational groups, it was evident that other factors, as temperament and disposition, played quite as large a part as did intelligence in determining fitness for a particular position. Altogether the evidence seems conclusive that innate qualities play an extremely large part in the differentiation of a population into specific occupations and in determining the degree of success that an individual could hope to attain in an occupation. Our greatest lack in this respect at present is our inability to define and measure the factors of character and energy to the extent that we can intellectual capacity.

Another significant piece of evidence drawn from the army findings is that, while the intelligence ratings of the occupational groups differ considerably, there is much overlapping. That is, many individuals showed a much higher rating than the median for their occupation. Thorndike commenting on this says: "Taking the measurements as they stand, the 75 percentile unskilled laborer is up to the level of the median general mechanic, tool room expert, or automobile mechanic and up to the level of the 25 percentile mechanical engineer. The 75 percentile railroad clerk is at the level of the average accountant or civil engineer. The 75 percentile receiving or shipping clerk is at the level of the 25 percentile physician. This variability would be reduced by longer and repeated tests, but, unless the test as given has a very large probable error, it would still be enormous. It would still imply that there were in the occupations supposed to demand a high minimum standard of intelligence, a very large number of dull men; and in the occupations supposed to give little opportunity for the use of the intellect, a very large number of gifted men and consequently a large unused surplus of intellect."[49] The inevitable con-

[49] Thorndike, "Scientific Personnel Work in the Army," *Science*, Vol. XLIX, no. 1255, pp. 53-61.

clusion must be that under our present social system innate capacity very frequently does not find its appropriate social status.

The bearing of intellectual capacity, character, and energy upon the culture of individuals offers an alluring field for investigation, although practically nothing has yet been done directly on this. The study of intelligence levels does of course show why some people are more highly educated than some others in particular directions. Differences in opportunity will, of course, account for much, but innate capacity must be reckoned with as a much more important factor than has been believed if the findings of the army tests and recent school tests are anywhere near correct. For example, the statement that approximately seventy per cent of the population is incapable of completing a high school course, if true, shows that no amount of opportunity would be of any help in giving these persons a high degree of literary education. However far from the correct proportion this may be, it undoubtedly is true that very large numbers lack this capacity. And as we go down the grades in school we find considerable numbers dropping out each year or at least reaching the limit of their education, regardless of any environmental factors. The establishment, therefore, of mental levels makes it very clear that we must always reckon in any population with a very large difference in the education of different sections of the population. This is not denying the desirability of providing, much more fully than we have, types of education that will increase the usefulness of all grades of intellectual capacity. But differences in the degree or type of education that people attain we must always expect, regardless of any general leveling of the educational opportunities.

When we get away from education we are on more uncertain ground with respect to relating innate qualities to cultural accomplishments. How far are one's particular religious leanings, his political bias, his preferences in recreation, his particular taste in art

and other aesthetic directions due to his original nature? Probably the emotional, the temperamental, and dispositional factors are most important in determining such things as these. And until we devise some means of measuring those factors we must remain in the dark as to the particular way they enter into the determination of these cultural elements.

General observation, however, has already made a great deal of this apparent to us, even if not in strictly scientific form. For example, it is obvious that peculiarity of emotion and temperament accounts largely for preferences in forms of recreation and in aesthetic appreciation, in spite of the manifestly large part played by example, and training, and prestige. Temperament and disposition also are manifestly large factors in aligning one with the conservative or progressive wing in politics or theology.

The emotional and temperamental factors in religious alignment would offer a most interesting study. In the growth of such movements as Methodism a generation ago and Christian Science in recent years, what elements of the population were drawn to them? What innate factors make a person good ground for the development of Calvinism or Dowieism, or spiritualism? What type of person followed the Unitarian break with New England Congregationalism? What original qualities distinguish the modernist in the Catholic Church, or the high churchman from the low in the Church of England? Many broad classifications of people have been made in describing such religious movements, but we know very little yet concerning the actual qualities that affect one's religious leaning. That there are such original factors in human nature, however, does not seem open to much question, although it must be admitted that in regard to cultural elements like these, environmental influence is in most instances the chief determinant.

One of the results of a close survey of the innate factors of human nature may be to get an impression of complete determinism. It is difficult to pay close

attention to the way in which original qualities set the limits to human activity without neglecting to recognize that they are but one factor in the process. It should not be lost sight of that an inborn capacity represents only a potentiality in conduct. It never functions without an appropriate stimulus. The role of environment is to supply the stimulus and the patterns which determine the forms which the expression of the impulse will take. There is almost unlimited variation in the character of the stimulus and the pattern which the environment may provide. Assuming, therefore, that the original capacity is known, we do not know what kind of expression it will result in until we know the character of the environmental influence under which the unfolding takes place. The term "predetermine" has been used in the above discussion with reference to the function of the original capacity. It should be clearly understood that it is always used with the recognition of the equally essential function of the environmental factors.

QUESTIONS

1. Why is it difficult to measure original human capacity? Why is it more difficult than in the case of plants or animals?

2. How does the theory of unit traits affect our notion of human variability?

3. What is intellectual capacity?

4. Explain the concepts of "mental age" and "intelligence quotient" and indicate their use in describing the intellectual capacity of persons.

5. How have the group tests improved the process of measuring intellectual capacity.

6. What limitations surround the interpretation of the findings of the army tests?

7. What is meant by "character" as an element in original quality? What does it include, and what part does it play in behavior?

8. What is meant by energy and what is its significance as an element of original nature?

9. Why is it difficult to distinguish between the normal and the abnormal? How does the concept of relativity affect our classification of those individuals needing special care?

10. May we push too far the explanation of dependency and delinquency in terms of defective original endowment? Why?

11. What does the evidence show concerning a correlation between innate capacity and eminence?

12. What are some cultural variations that may be influenced by variety in original traits?

EXERCISES

1. Read Goddard, *Human Efficiency and Levels of Intelligence*, and criticise it from the standpoint of its emphasis on the factor of intellectual capacity.

2. Criticise the points of view presented in the following articles: Bagley, "Educational Determinism," *School and Society*, Vol. 15 pp. 373-84; Vol. 16, pp. 141-44. Whipple, Vol. 15, pp. 599-602.

3. Criticise the points of view of the following articles: Lippman, *New Republic*, Vol. 32, articles beginning on pp. 297, 213, 246, 275, 328. Terman, Vol. 33, article beginning on p. 116. Lippman, Vol. 33, beginning on p. 145.

PART III

THE SOCIAL FACTORS

X

THE CREATION OF PRIVILEGED CLASSES

THE biological factors of age, sex, race, and individual variation have not been the sole bases of the social differences that have arisen in all societies. There have been present certain political, economic, religious, and intellectual factors, as well as other factors that have brought about differences which bore no relation to the age, sex, race, or individual variation of the persons concerned. That is, social organization has developed marked social distinctions when there has been nothing in the nature of the individual which would indicate why he should occupy the position assigned to him.

In some of these situations a biological difference has existed, as when men have been assigned a rank superior to that of women, but the biological distinction bore no necessary relation to the social distinction that prevailed. In others, no pretense of biological difference has been present. What has been true in all these artifically created social distinctions, is that out of social organization itself have come needs that had to be met. In the meeting of these needs the difference of social position appeared as a social adaptation, either necessary or expedient.

In all stages of social evolution the primary purpose has been existence. Justice, logical arrangements, happiness are all subordinated to the necessity for such adjustments of life as will secure for the individual the means of living and protection from the elements and from enemies. Social organization has been one means to this end. Aristotle's dictum that man is by nature a social animal cannot well be interpreted to show that adequate social organization comes easy to man. His individualistic impulses lead him quite as much away

from organization as his social qualities lead him towards it. Gregarious he undoubtedly is, but what he would like is companionship and fellowship without the inconvenience of limitation on his freedom by organization.

Social organization may be said to develop as the conditions of existence and the necessities for supplying wants have driven man to develop it and subject himself to it. This is not to deny that through it he has attained a larger measure of self-expression than would otherwise be possible. But it has always been at some price. And this price has seldom been paid equally by all members of the organization. In fact wherever a part of the population has been able to shift the burdens of organization to another part and to usurp its advantages for itself, it has done so.

Out of this has arisen the fact that all social organization has been attended by much injustice and unequal distribution of hardships and advantages. There have been two main reasons why those who have borne the heaviest part of the load have continued to bear it; they have been threatened with death or severe punishment if they should rebel; or they have realized that the advantages they secured from their relation to the group were greater than the disadvantages. This latter need not be the result of any consciously rationalized process of thought. A somewhat blind impulse has lead them to endure the hardships they had rather than to flee to those they knew not of, which in many cases would have meant extinction or a denial of the elementary wants of life.

The phase of social organization which assigns superior advantages or opportunities or fewer hardships to one part of the population than to the other, without regard to the relative merits of the different sections, is called "privilege." It has emerged in various ways and under different circumstances in practically all periods of human history. It may be said to be a practically universal aspect of social

organization, although much more characteristic of certain types of societies than of others.

In general it may be said that the simpler forms of social organization have been freer from it than the more complex. The more primitive groups have approached the democratic type of life to a greater extent than did those that lay intermediate between the primitive and modern. Numerous examples are cited, however, in which a highly privileged order of society has prevailed alongside a culture very primitive in many of its aspects.[1] The superior rights of the males and of the aged in many primitive societies undoubtedly constitutes a system of privilege. And in addition to these the earlier types of culture show some cases of sharp cleavages of rank based apparently on the same assertion of force or of economic advantage that create privilege in the more advanced types of culture.

These factors responsible for the development of artificial gradations appear much more frequently, however, in later society. The circumstances that were particularly favorable for the appearance of privilege were the conquest of one group by another and the setting up of an organization that would maintain the *status quo*. This was the situation under which the state as we know it in historical times generally had its beginning.

It is true that some slight differences in fortune and consequently in class did appear, when a group came to live by flocks. This is due to a natural economic development which will be discussed in the next chapter. But no great and permanent divisions of class appeared so long as a peaceful mode of life was maintained. It was only under the influence of military activities that sharp and lasting cleavages in rank appeared. Nomadic groups, moving their flocks here and there for pasture, were probably the first to develop these warlike proclivities. Among the early Germans the same tendency appeared in the activities of the

[1]See, for example, Lowie, *Primitive Society*, chap. 12, and Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, pp. 54-55.

war-bands, those groups of adventurous individuals who preferred fighting to the duller pastoral pursuits.

But whether the whole pastoral group became a military organization for purposes of offense and defense, or a small part gathered about some magnetic, daring leader and formed a war-band, the result was the same; namely, the development of a type of social organization in which the leader had supreme authority and his lieutenants graded downward in hierarchical order, while at the bottom were the rank and file of the warriors. Here was a differentiation in rank made necessary by the exigencies of military activity, since a fighting group always finds obedience to a supreme authority necessary for military success. In these nomadic warring groups there appeared, therefore, three gradations,—first, the nobility or the chief and his lieutenants, second, the warriors, finally, some slaves who were captured in skirmishes and were owned by individuals and used for tending the flocks. Some individuals, made poor by some fortuitous circumstances, might also hire themselves out to the larger cattle-owners and thus occupy virtually the same status as the slaves. This division was still further accentuated by the results of fighting. Booty would be captured in the form of cattle and slaves, and since those higher in rank would take the lion's share, their wealth would increase faster than the others. Thus economic distinctions of rank increased along with and as a result of the superior military ranking.

A more profound sort of differentiation, however, was yet to take place. This occurred when this warring group exercised conquest over some entire weaker group. The number conquered were entirely too great for them all to be apportioned as individually owned slaves. The greater part, therefore, not so apportioned for personal service would become a servile group to be exploited by the conquerors. The latter would settle down in the territory of the conquered, or in an adjacent territory and live from the proceeds of the labor of the vanquished.

It has been pointed out in an earlier chapter that this conquest implies no superiority other than that of military strength. In the earlier history of the race the conquered would in fact frequently be the more industrious and given to the arts of peace, which would make them at once the objects of greed and incapable of protecting themselves against the raids of those given to military exploits. On the other hand, the conquered sometimes were actually less advanced in culture than the conquerors. But in either case force was the sole factor in making of the one group masters and of the other slaves or serfs.

The system of military organization that had been worked out earlier, for carrying out the purposes of the warring nomads, was now utilized in constructing the system whereby the power and advantage of the conquerors could be maintained with the least cost. Hence a political organization was set up which embodied the features of the nomad military system, the conquered population constituting the lowest rung in the ladder. Thus came into existence the state, a social institution devised for the accomplishment of a definite purpose,—namely, the forceful exploitation of one group by another. The whole early development of the state can be understood only in this light.

Oppenheimer has clearly stated the matter as follows:

> The State, completely in its genesis, essentially and almost completely during the first stages of its existence, is a social institution, forced by a victorious group of men on a defeated group, with the sole purpose of regulating the dominion of the victorious group over the vanquished, and securing itself against revolt from within and attacks from abroad. Teleologically this dominion had no other purpose than the economic exploitation of the vanquished by the victors.
>
> No primitive state known to history originated in any other manner.[2]

Few states, however, remain with a single cleavage between two classes. Numerous forces conspire to develop various other ranks between the highest and the

[2] *The State*, p. 15.

lowest. Frequently through new conquests dominion would be established over other groups. Each such procedure would generally raise the lowest class in the conquering state to a higher level, intermediary between the rulers and the newly conquered.[3] Through economic development, to be discussed later, still other classes would appear,—as in India the conquerors became differentiated into strata, as priests, warriors, farmers.

The logical consequence of this evolution of the state has been to make it a combination of complex interest groups. Through economic and political competition and conflict the controlling power will shift from one group to another, or at least, the dominant group in order to maintain its supremacy will have to purchase the support of some of the under groups against the others by the grant of special privileges or rights.

As an organization, however, the state is recognized by most of the constituent groups as a necessity for the welfare of all. And except in very unusual circumstances, all groups will unite to defend the state against outside enemies. But within, the state presents a constant struggle of conflicting interests. The particular strength that any one group can bring to bear, either through direct attack or by combination with other groups, will determine the amount of advantage that it will be able to maintain for itself.

Thus the status or rank distinctions will be highly complex and will change from time to time as one group succeeds in forcing a change in the *status quo* to its advantage. The government, that is, the machinery of the state, becomes an instrument to be wielded by any group that can control it in its own interest. This instrument of government, created originally for the purpose of exploitation, and later maintained by the consent and allegiance of all the constituent groups for a common welfare, becomes, therefore, a device that creates and maintains dis-

[3] See Ratzenhoffer, *Sociologische Erkentniss*, p. 157.

tinctions of right and privilege between the members of the state. In their attitude toward foreign policies practically all groups within the state recognize that their continuance as a state is highly desirable, and, therefore, an allegiance to the state is maintained which gives it a certain aspect of unity. But in the consideration of domestic policies, the machinery of the state, its government, is seen to be not only a necessary device for preserving order but a tool which is wielded in the specific interest of the group which can keep it in its hands. Laski clearly states this when he says: "Historically we always find that any system of government is dominated by those who at the time wield economic power; and what they mean by 'good' is for the most part the preservation of their own interests."[4] It is not part of our discussion here to trace out the process by which the idea of a common good may gradually come to dominate policies of government. We are interested only in showing that government, whatever else it has been, has always been an instrument which has created and maintained social inequalities.

The ways in which those in control of the state may use their power for their own advantage are legion. This is true regardless of the form of government. It may be an absolute monarchy or an empire, or it may be a machine-controlled modern city government under the name of democracy. The instrument may be a small favor granted by a king to secure the services of a retainer or it may be a piece of legislation or a grant of a public service franchise that puts millions into the pockets of the "ring." It would be impossible to enumerate all the devices by which government has been and is used by those who control it. Several illustrations of the more flagrant forms of bestowing or securing privilege will show the nature of the process.

One form of privilege which has been historically prominent is monopoly. This came into practice only after a somewhat highly organized development of

[4] *Foundations of Sovereignty*, p. 238.

trade and industry had occurred. Literally the term implies sale by one person, but it has come to designate a power residing in one person or particular group of persons of exclusive sale or purchase. Its practice on any large scale first came into being through the issuance by monarchs of special permits to particular favorites to carry on exclusive trade in specified commodities, or to pursue exclusively specified occupations. The Letters Patent which conveyed the right came to have a recognized place in medieval business, and their issuance was the subject of considerable controversy between monarchs and parliaments. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the system reached its highest development. A considerable number of the more necessary commodities were thus controlled and exorbitant prices exacted from the consumers. The special favors granted by the English crown to the Hudson Bay Company and to the East India Company are conspicuous historical examples in more recent times. This form of monopoly has practically disappeared from modern business.

A form of monopoly in trade and labor which became prominent in the 12th to the 14th centuries in Europe, and lasted even until the early part of the 18th century, was the gild. The merchant gilds and the craft gilds undertook to solidify their members in each locality so as to create a monopoly in their particular fields. The merchant gilds were the first to appear, but the craft gilds lived longer. Each, while in existence, controlled effectively the merchandising or the craftsmanship in the community where organized, and thereby reaped a monopoly advantage. Through a system of apprenticeship the craft gilds also limited their membership, and thus secured a further advantage to those already in the privileged circle.

The modern labor organization, while in the main not organized for monopolistic purposes, has assumed in some cases a similar form. Thus where membership limited in number or apprenticeship is extended only to a few, a trade union may become a monopolistic body.

The most conspicuous example of the operation of the monopolistic principle in present day western society is the combination of control in large industries, such as the steel, the sugar, the oil, the tobacco industries, and public service corporations. While these industrial combinations have not come into existence by the express purpose of the government, they have made use of governmental machinery as a means of securing and of protecting their privileges. They have, of course, arisen out of the peculiarities of the economic organization of the period, but they could not have existed without the protection of the government. As devices for maintaining privilege they are undoubtedly the most successful monopolies that have ever existed. The efforts of legislative bodies to devise means of governmental regulation for the protection of the public have been thus far but meagrely successful, and the monopolies have been important factors in centralizing wealth in the hands of the few.

Another form of privilege closely akin in origin to monopoly is the grant of public lands to particular individuals. Ross has collected an excellent list of examples of this form of bestowing favors on the few.[5]

Early Egyptian kings bestowed on distinguished military officers portions of the crown domains. The absorption of the Roman *ager publicus* by senators and other insiders made them enormously rich and started the senatorial aristocracy on its career of six centuries. William the Conqueror distributed his newly won kingdom into about sixty thousand parcels of nearly equal value from each of which was due a "knight's service on horseback." As the Castilians drove back the Moors in Spain the land thus won was divided into huge fiefs and given to magnates on condition of their rendering military service.

In Japan in the seventh century a people essentially patriarchal in constitution was divided into governing and supporting classes. The former consisted of a civil nobility of rank and office, the higher ranks and offices being accompanied with definite grants of rice land to be held during the tenure of office and exempted from the payment of tributes and forced labor.

In 1586, under Queen Elizabeth, the plan for peopling the province of Munster in Ireland proposed to divide it into seignories of from 4,000 to 12,000 acres, to be offered to the younger

[5] *Principles of Sociology*, p. 328.

sons of gentlemen, who would "have the manrode of so many families and the disposing of so many good holdings," being "a thing fit for gentlemen of good behaviour and credit and not for any man of inferior calling."

In the New World, as Ross shows, the practice was carried out on the largest scale. Throughout all Spanish America the lands of the natives were apportioned among a few of the conquerors or their friends; those in higher rank securing the largest shares. Modern Mexico up to the recent revolution still showed the existence of these large grants, one of them embracing eight million acres. Argentina granted to single individuals as high as a hundred square leagues of land.

In the English and Dutch Colonies in North America the same practice was followed. In Virginia, New Netherlands, Georgia, Maryland, and other colonies, the foundations were laid for the wealth of many families whose aristocratic position was thus assured for many generations.

The disposition of the public lands in the western part of the United States has been the subject of legislation from the time of their acquisition to the present. Undoubtedly a serious effort was made in the Homestead law and other acts to distribute the land in small lots to those who intended cultivating it and making their homes on it. But fraud and greed, backed by the most skillful legal and political influence, succeeded in securing large tracts for corporations and individuals who thereby have acquired a permanent advantage for themselves and their children for generations.

Taxation is not in itself a form of privilege, but it is an instrument that may be easily used to secure advantage for some at the expense of others. Properly speaking, taxation probably did not exist earlier than the Greek period. Since that time it has been a phase of the organized life of practically all civilized societies. Just what constitutes justice in taxation is a disputed point among economists, since the basis of the levy may be the amount of goods possessed, the amount of benefits received from the state in the form of protection,

the amount of income, or the sacrifice involved in the payment. Manifestly equality of burden on one of these bases would not be equality on another. There can be, therefore, no unanimity of opinion in the case of any particular system as to its equity.

Practically all states, however, have developed their taxation systems not on the basis of any theory of taxation but on a purely empirical and utilitarian basis. The result has been that few systems of taxation have existed which have not contained a large element of privilege. Historical examples of the entire exemption of certain groups from taxes and the heavy burdening of others are familiar to all. In other cases under the guise of taxation certain industries have been fostered while others have been hindered or put entirely out of existence. Customs or tariffs on imports or exports are striking examples of this. Again, even where an attempt has been made to distribute the burden equally, on some rational basis, it has been shifted by a part of the population onto others through some econom device, under the protection of governmental machinery. It cannot be denied, however, that since the democratic movement has put governmental powers more fully into the hands of the people, taxation has lent itself much less to privilege than formerly. The so-called "protective tariff" is probably the most conspicuous modern example of privilege secured through taxation. Through the guise of protecting the home laborer from the standards of the "pauper labor" abroad, or of building up "infant industries" for the benefit of the whole country, enormous fortunes have been collected from the people in exorbitant prices that have gone to enrich a few individuals.

But privileged classes do not come into existence only from the manipulation of political power. They arise frequently also from the development of industrial organization. As a matter of fact, it is impossible completely to disentangle the web of social forces that are involved in bringing any historical event or situ-

ation to pass. Political, economic, religious and many other forces are all involved when we attempt to explain why any particular institution or condition has come to prevail in society.

In some situations the political factor is more prominent, in others the economic, in others the religious, or some other. But it is never possible to say that any one of them alone has been the solely responsible factor. Thus we may think of slavery and serfdom as political institutions, arising out of the exercise of political power. But they are also types of industrial organization which may be described as such purely in terms of economic development, that is, as adaptations of social organization to meet particular economic needs. Similarly the caste system of India might be described wholly in terms of the development of certain religious theories in adaptation to social conditions. But the political and racial and economic factors were also present. A description of the development of any social situation, therefore, in terms of one factor only, is permissible so long as it is not assumed that it is the only one involved. Describing it as a political evolution or as an economic evolution or a religious evolution entirely is merely a device for bringing into clearer view one of the factors, possibly the most potent for this particular situation.

The creation of privileged classes as described above in terms of the exercise of political power is a clear case in point. We might retrace the whole process in economic terms and discover that the result in any particular period was the outcome of the adaptation of social organization to meet the material needs of society. But here, as elsewhere, at particular times one factor is more potent than others. The facts seem to indicate that from the time of the appearance of the form of social organization that we call the state, down to the medieval period in Europe, the political factor was the all powerful one in determining one's occupation and rank. This was effected through conquest

and the subsequent military control exercised by the dominant group.

With the coming of established social order through this political development that culminated in the modern state, purely economic forces began to assume a more important role. Economic factors undoubtedly played a large part in forcing the transition from a regime of slavery to one of serfdom, although the position of the serf was still chiefly determined by the political factor in the form of military control. It is difficult to determine which factor, the political or the economic, played the larger part in the passing of serfdom over into free wage labor. Both were undoubtedly present in large measure.

But by this time the social solidarity of whole sections of population under state organization had become so thoroughly established that military control gradually gave way to mutual self-interest and state loyalty as the instrument for maintaining the existence of the political organization. Economic and cultural factors became more powerful than the political in holding peoples together, and economic forces, therefore, secured a larger field for determining social differences. While all states have used military power for maintaining the political organization to a greater or less extent, this factor has undoubtedly grown continually less important than the economic and cultural as the cementing force of social organization.

The social classes which had gained their supremacy through military power did, of course, succeed in maintaining the *status quo* for a time. The respective positions of the classes which had been determined by military power became the settled status under the new political organization whose control all accepted. And even to-day social gradations and occupations in Europe and Japan follow to a very considerable extent the lines marked out by the old military regime. Peasant and aristocrat trace their lineage back respectively to vassal or lord in many cases.

But the exigencies of economic development have

done much to break up the old alignments and make new ones. True, as shown above, those in control of the state machinery have sought to use it to control the economic development, and have frequently succeeded. But the economic forces could not be kept under perfect control by the political machinery. And the operation of the economic factors has resulted in destroying old forms of privilege and creating new ones. It has done this under the protection of the state, but it has not been controlled by the state to a degree sufficient for a perpetuation of the particular alignment of occupations and classes that prevailed at the beginning of the modern period. Moreover, those attaining power through economic sources, have frequently wrested the control of the state from the old regime and now control it in their own interests. It is through this process that the state may become the tool of economic control, and politics the handmaiden of business. The instances cited above of such use of the state are practically all of this sort.

It is for these reasons that, in explaining the origin of privileged classes, we must shift the stress from the political to the economic factors when we pass from the ancient to the modern period, recognizing all the while that both of these and still others are operating all the time.

Any consideration of the origin of privilege in the modern period leads us directly to the possession of capital as the cornerstone of economic power. The characteristic features of the modern economic system are: commerce and trade which recognize no local boundaries, but which distribute the products of every part of the world to every other part; a transportation system commensurate with the demands of such a commerce; machine production and the factory system; a labor system based upon free contract; concentration of trade and industry into large units of production and exchange. Such a system demands a very large amount of wealth not immediately available for consumption, but involved in the construction and maintenance of ma-

chinery and plants, in providing raw materials and other goods in process of manufacture, in holding stocks of finished goods not yet in the hands of the ultimate consumer. The development of the system has waited for the accumulation of capital. Wherever capital has not been available, the development of the system has been postponed. Even in places where labor and natural resources have been particularly abundant this is the case.

It is true, of course, that all three factors are equally essential, but it is capital that has given the possessor a unique position of power over the possessor of labor. He secures ownership and control of natural resources and of the instruments of production. The mere possessor of labor, unable except in a few situations to fix a scarcity price for his labor, is at a heavy disadvantage in comparison with the one who owns and controls the other instruments and who, therefore, dictates policies of management and the division of the product.

The modern economic system has, therefore, brought into existence a class whose power rests not upon military control or upon the inheritance of the position that was derived from it, but upon the possession of capital. Gretton has shown that the rise of this so-called middle class was incident upon the appearance of money which could be accumulated for capital.[6] Until wealth could be stored in easily movable money and manipulated to create credit, the essential distinction in rank or status was that which came down from the military regime. But when this new instrument became sufficiently available there developed a new class whose social status has been fixed by the possession of capital.

The first use of capital, as we know it, was in trade, and the first group to be pushed upward to power by it was the merchants. From the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries in Europe we see the rise of this new class of wealthy and powerful individuals. The

[6] *The English Middle Class.*

manufacturers, who from the seventeenth century on have shared with the traders the control of capital, sprang from the trading class. The capital of the merchants became available for the marvellous expansion of industry that took place on the introduction of machinery and steam power.[7]

It is frequently urged that this emergence of the class of those who control modern economic processes through the ownership of capital is not a case of privilege but of a natural evolution, whereby those whose abilities are adapted to the creation of capital and to the occupation of management and control naturally find their places in this position of power. In order to substantiate such a view it would have to be shown that the creation of capital was the work of such individuals and that they entered their vocations through a process of competitive adaptation. As a matter of fact all historical evidence points in exactly the opposite direction.

It is a matter of historical knowledge that the sudden appearance of loose money which could be made available for capital and credit in the fourteenth century was due to a situation over which the traders themselves had no control. The expulsion of the Jews and the dispersion of the Knights Templars liberated a vast quantity of money not previously available.[8] The traders, hitherto an insignificant group, occupying no position of prominence in the social order, were the only group into whose hands the new flood of currency could fall. They, in a short time, emerged as a class of plutocrats, not only revelling in luxury, but what is more important, assuming a place of strategic power in the political and economic organization of the period.

A still further source of wealth, acquired in a fortuitous way, was from the opening of new territory, from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries. Many vast fortunes were made by those whose adventurous spirits

[7]See Bücher, *Industrial Evolution*, pp. 330-332.
[8]Gretton, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.

led them into new quarters of the globe. Those who were fortunate enough to be a month or year ahead of their neighbors preëmpted rich resources and frequently, thereby, became the founders of wealthy families. The territory opened in the western continent and later in Africa contained the vastest sources of wealth that the world had known down to that period. It is true that much of it had to be developed in later generations, but there was undoubtedly a great amount that was suddenly realized, and the prior possession of much of the remainder led to fixing large fortunes in the hands of the fortunate descendants.

Again, in the fluid condition of economic institutions in any new and rich territory, as America or Australia or South Africa, in the nineteenth century, there were abundant opportunities for many individuals through fraud or sharp dealing to secure possession of large fortunes. Much of the financial power possessed to-day in these countries could be traced back from the present owners to some ancestor who acquired the foundation of the family fortune in ways not now pleasant to mention.[9]

In fact, wherever we see the emergence of a section of the population into a position of financial power, we find that some fortuitous circumstance, or some economic or political process, has guided a stream of wealth toward the position in which this group chanced to be located. No historical evidence can be found to show that the capital, the ownership of which furnishes the open sesame to modern economic power, was collected primarily through the productive activity or the thrifty habits of the possessors. There are, of course, many individual exceptions but this is true of the class as a whole.

When we come to examine the adaptability of the members of the modern privileged class to the occupation of management and control, we find also lack of conclusive evidence that occupation or social function has necessarily followed natural abilities. Bücher

[9]For some good examples of this see Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, chap. 27.

shows that as the medieval system began to break up and modern trades and occupations appeared, the possession of property or the lack of it was a determining factor in fixing occupations. That is, occupation followed economic status, rather than the reverse.

> The noble, the peasant class, the class of villeins, and serfs are at first mere classes based on property; it is only after a considerable time that they developed into a species of classes based on occupation. When in the Middle Ages along with the rise of the craftsman class the definite formation of trades set in, it proceeds again from distribution of property. The demesne servants, the landless villeins who have learned an industrial art, began to turn their industrial skill to independent account. The industrial process followed must adapt itself to their poverty; it is pure wage-work, in which the workman receives the raw material from the customer. . . .
>
> As one observes, each step taken by mediaeval division of labour in industry was conditioned by the possession of wealth. It is the same with trade. The trading class of the Middle Ages is derived from the class of urban landowners, who had become, through the introduction of rents on houses, and the practice of rent-purchases, possessors of movable capital. It is from this class of stock-holders and tradesmen that the present manufacturing class has sprung since the seventeenth century.[10]

It is generally recognized that the possession of property by the parents or the lack of it has been the chief factor in determining the selection of occupations by members of the later generations since the advent of the modern period. It is not merely the handing down of business control or opportunities in the family. This need not occur. But the training which the possession of wealth can give has fitted members of upper class families for a continuation of the father's occupation in the same field.

It is frequently not the identical occupation of the father that the son will follow, but one in the same vocational class.[11] Similarly in the case of the wage earning class, the son will be found in an occupation that belongs to the same class as that of the father.

The educational system has helped to perpetuate this situation by excluding in one form or another the

[10] *Industrial Evolution*, pp. 330-331.

[11] Bücher, *op. cit.*, p. 334. Also *Bevolkerung d.Kantons Basel-Stadt*, p. 70.

sons of wage-earners from higher education. In recent years, particularly in America, this has been overcome, and yet any study of the rolls of high schools and colleges to-day will reveal the preponderance of the children of the property-holding class in attendance at these institutions. It is still true that the social class of the parent, based largely on property-holding, determines the occupation of the child to a very considerable degree.

It is not to be assumed that the view maintained in this chapter, namely, that social rank and occupation have rested upon privilege of some sort, does not take account of many individual exceptions and of differences of degree to which the principle holds true in different historical periods. Individuals have always, as individuals, shown themselves stronger than the prevailing system, and have broken through it. We have many historical examples, and must be convinced that many more cases have always existed, in which individual persons have triumphed over the system that they found about them, and have taken the position to which their natural abilities entitled them. But it is the system that we have been describing, and these exceptions have been negligible in comparison with the millions who have conformed to it.

Moreover in some periods and nations the system of privilege has operated with much more rigor than in others. From the Roman period down to the present a democratic regime has been slowly emerging. In some aspects of life it has, since the eighteenth century, removed a considerable portion of the system of privilege. In fact the very essence of the democratic movement has been to free the social system from artificial advantages for the few. This is to be treated in a later chapter. What I wish to make clear here is that social differentiation of rank in the main has rested upon privilege. Democracy has been slow in arriving. Its victories to date, while important, are in no sense complete. The battle is by no means won. Social classes today in the western world still reflect to a remarkable

degree the power of privilege. The natural biological differences of men do not fully or freely determine their social status.

QUESTIONS

1. What is "privilege?"
2. How does a militaristic form of organization make for privilege? How was it accentuated by successful fighting?
3. What was the function of the state in its early form? Why did the state organization persist?
4. How did monopoly promote privilege?
5. What was the effect on social differentiation of the policy of public land grants?
6. How may the system of taxation promote privilege?
7. How have the emergence of modern economic factors shifted the possession of privilege?
8. How does the possession of capital give power to the possessor?
9. What evidence do we have that the possession of capital is not *primie facie* proof of the superior ability of the possessor?
10. Does occupation persist in a family? Why?

EXERCISES

1. Do any forms of privilege exist in your community?
2. How may modern government be kept free from manipulation in the interest of a privileged group?
3. Are there elements in our organization of industry that foster privilege?
4. Is the principle of the inheritance tax a good one?

XI

ACCOMMODATION AND THE ACQUISITION OF TRAITS

DIFFERENCES of rank or status are not the only social differences that are brought about by social organization independently of biological differences. Modern physiology and social psychology have demonstrated that the body and the mind of man are modifiable to a remarkable degree by the conditions and circumstances surrounding the period of development.

This remarkable power of adjustment which man possesses is one of the qualities that has made him superior to the other animals. All organisms possess it to some degree. Plants as well as lower forms of animal life are found to have the capacity to adapt themselves to widely differing conditions of soil and climate. But most of the important modifications which they undergo in this process of adjustment are brought by biological variation and selection. By this means the adjustment comes about through a change in the structure or function or both, and is then hereditary. The following generations then begin with the modification already accomplished.

As we come upward in the scale of nervous complexity we find the organism increasingly capable of reaching an adjustment to changes in the environment without resorting to the process of selection. Within the lifetime of the individual he may acquire forms of reaction which differ widely from those of his ancestors, and his children may acquire still different types of reaction from his. These differing forms of reactions or of bodily type coming about without any change in the hereditary process we call acquired traits. Some of these are the direct physical or mental effects of the conditions of life under which the individual lives. Others are particular forms of reaction which the indi-

vidual assumes in order to secure results most satisfactory to himself under the circumstances. As the circumstances change, new adjustments must be made or the individual will suffer. The term "Accommodation" has been used to designate this latter type of acquired traits.[1]

Man represents the climax in this increasing capacity of adjustment without a resort to the selective process. While to some extent he too shows modification through selective changes which have become hereditary, we have within recent years become aware of the very great capacity of all human beings to acquire adjustments within a single lifetime, which were once thought to be conditioned exclusively by predetermining inherited tendencies. This chameleon quality of the human species has been most useful in making it possible for man to endure many widely differing types of environment and for one group to persist and secure a measurable degree of successful living under circumstances that to another group, adjusted to a different set of circumstances, appears hopeless.

It is to this explanation that we look to-day for the great variety in culture, in habit, in the more minute specialization of function and to some extent in physical type, which we find between different peoples and also between different sections of the same population. Differences which were once regarded as biological in origin are now traced to this process of accommodation.

The most simple and obvious form of acquired trait is the physical condition that grows directly out of certain modes of life or of work.

The proper development of the body and the maintenance of its vitality and vigor demand a type of physical expression, of food, rest, and hygienic regimen that has been impossible for large sections of the population. The natural result is a physical condition that

[1]For a discussion of the term see Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 663-665.

marks these groups as apparently of unfit stock or type, when the actual explanation is the occupation or unfavorable condition of life that has been imposed upon them.

One outstanding example is the physical difference between the sexes in the middle and upper classes of modern society. The social functions of men and women are frequently held to be necessarily very distinct because of their greatly different degrees of strength and health. It is true that the male is naturally larger, has greater capacity for muscular development and has considerable natural superiority of movement. But the excessive difference between the physical conditions of modern men and women, especially in the middle and upper classes is not natural, as is seen by comparison with savage races and with the peasant class in modern society. Women's inability to engage in many activities of modern society in the way that men do is manifestly due in large measure to a physical weakness acquired by the peculiar method of life imposed upon them in highly civilized communities or strata of society.

Under the new status now being assigned women, they must inevitably acquire a finer physical development, both of muscle and of vitality. The new point of view must of course work backward to childhood and permit the girl equality of opportunity with her brother in this respect. Greater freedom of movement, opportunities for outdoor recreations, more wholesome dress, —all of which must follow the changing status,—will inevitably make for a physical development and a state of health that will make it possible for women to undertake successfully many more occupations than now seem practicable.

Another case of acquired physical trait is the lowered vitality of both children and adults through insufficient nourishment or unfavorable conditions of living or working. Rowntree found that the boys of the poorer sections of York, England, at 13 years of age averaged 3½ inches less in stature than those of the better

sections, and 11 pounds less in weight; that the number of those children graded "very good" in physical condition were ten times greater in the better sections than in the economically poorer parts of the city.[2] Korosi found that while merchants averaged 824 days of sickness in adult life, day laborers averaged 1,493 days.[3] Child labor, bad housing, insufficient nourishment, over-work, lack of medical attention in sickness induce a state of lowered vitality in a considerable part of the population of all modern industrial countries. It is shown in higher rates of mortality and morbidity and inability to maintain a standard of working efficiency. This makes the vicious circle from which many are unable to escape from one generation to another.

Another simple case of acquired trait is the development of specialized occupations within the larger group or class of occupations that are determined through political, economic, or some other form of privilege. As noted in the previous chapter, the broad distinctions of occupation except these arising from age and sex have grown chiefly out of military conquest and control of one group by another, or out of an economic status that depends upon the possession of capital. But within these broad classifications a more minute specialization has occurred which does not involve the question of rank, since within each class the occupations stand at about the same level of reward and esteem, but which does involve the nature of the occupation and the habitual reactions of the mind.

This specialization first developed under slavery where the master was able to dispose of the labor of his slaves to the best advantage. The division of labor is always somewhat dependent on the supply of labor. The larger the supply the more easily does labor adapt itself to subdivision of tasks. The abundant supply of

[2] *Poverty*, pp. 210-216.

[3] *Mittheilungen uber Individuale Mortalitats-Beobachtungen*. Cited by Warner, *American Charities*, 2nd ed., p. 132.

slaves provided by conquest, all under the will of the master, made minute subdivision an easy matter.

Of course, the stage of culture and refinement of wants had also a great deal to do with the degree of specialization. So long as barbaric culture and wants prevailed, the variety of tasks to be performed would be small. But as the upper class came to develop that refinement of taste and wants that is characteristic of the higher types of culture, a much greater variety of work would be demanded. A Roman gentleman and his family, for example, would need a very great variety of types of services.

One hundred and forty-six different designations for the functions of slave-laborers in aristocratic Roman households were enumerated by a writer of the seventeenth century.[4] This was in the period of household economy when each household was of a necessity self-sufficing. This army of slaves under a single ownership, in addition to supporting themselves, performed for their master and his family all the services that are now secured through an elaborate system of varied industries and world commerce.

The whole body of slaves in the house of a wealthy Roman was divided into two main groups, the "familia rustica" and the "familia urbana." The "familia rustica" engages in the work of production. On every large country estate there are a manager and an assistant manager with a staff of overseers and taskmasters who in turn have under them a considerable company of field-laborers and vine-dressers, shepherds and tenders of cattle, kitchen and house servants, women spinners, male and female weavers, fullers, tailors, carpenters, joiners, smiths, workers in metal and in the occupations connected with agriculture. On the larger estates each group of laborers is again divided into bands of ten each (decuriae) in charge of a leader or driver (decurio, monitor).

The "familia urbana" is divided into the administrative staff, and the staff for the service of master and mistress within and without the house. First comes the superintendent of the revenue with his treasurer, bookkeepers, supervisors of rent, buyers, etc. If the proprietor takes over public leases or engages in the shipping trade, he keeps for that purpose a special staff of slave officials and labourers. Attached to the internal service of the house are house-administrator, porters, attendants in rooms and halls,

[4]See Bücher, *Industrial Evolution*, pp. 98-99.

guardians of the furniture, the plate, and the robes; the commissariat is in charge of the steward, the cellar master, and the superintendent of supplies; the kitchen swarms with a great company of cooks, stokers, bakers of bread, cakes, and pastry; special table-setters, carvers, tasters, and butlers serve at the table while a company of beautiful boys, dancing-girls, dwarfs and jesters amuse the guests. To the personal service of the proprietor are assigned a master of ceremonies for introducing visitors, various valets, bath attendants, anointers, rubbers, surgeons, physicians for almost every part of the body, barbers, readers, private secretaries, etc. For service in the household a savant or philosopher is kept, also architects, painters, sculptors, and musicians; in the library are copyists, parchment-polishers, and bookbinders, who under the direction of the librarian make books in the private manufactory of the house. Even slave letter-writers and stenographers must not be wanting in a wealthy house. When the master appears in public he is preceded by a large body of slaves (anteambulones), while others follow him (pedisequi); the "nomenclator" tells him the name of those whom he meets and who are to be greeted, special "distributores" and "tesserarii" scatter bribes among the people and instruct them how to vote. These are the "camelots" of ancient Rome; and, what gives them special value, they are the property of the distinguished aspirant employing them. This system for exerting political influence is supplemented by the institution of plays, chariot races, fights with wild beasts, and gladiatorial games, for which troops of slaves are specially trained. If the lord goes to a province as governor or sojourns on one of his country estates, slave couriers and letter-carriers maintain daily communication with the capital. And how shall we begin to tell of the slave retinue of the mistress, on which Böttiger has written a whole book ("Sabina") and of the endlessly specialized services for the care and education of the children.[5]

Under slavery the task that was assigned to a particular individual undoubtedly took some slight account of personal adaptability. But for the most part the assignment of tasks must have been a merely random one that arose out of the convenience or whim of the owner or the overseer. The number of laborers available was the principal consideration, since it was this that determined the extent to which the subdivision of labor could be carried.

Under the manorial system of feudalism the situation was not different, so far as specialization of labor

[5]Bücher, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-101

was concerned. Each estate, under the control of a lord, was a self-sufficing economic unit. The different types of workmen rendered to the lord services of the sort that they were skilled in, or goods of the type that they produced. Among the villeins themselves a system of barter sufficed for securing the satisfaction of the different needs. The clergy was the only kind of independent professional calling. Lawyers, teachers, physicians, entertainers, artists, literary workers were all subjects of some over-lord and pursued their callings under his control. Any person showing ability in such a direction must wait for the favor of his lord before devoting himself to it.

The essential features of specialization under both slavery and serfdom were that it was controlled by the will of the master or lord, but within that limit developed by a natural process of adaptation to the needs of the community. The larger the unit, the greater the specialization that was possible within it, since in the very small households practically all the laborers would be required to produce the bare necessities of life.

On the break-up of feudalism and slavery the trades and callings that prevailed within the self-sufficing units were simply carried over into the realm of free wage labor. There was no change in the degree of specialization. In the southern states of the United States the freeing of the slaves simply meant that the slaves who had become skilled under the control of their masters became artisans who were paid wages.

It is under the modern regime that we find the degree of specialization attaining its highest point. Thus in the period from 1882 to 1895 there was an increase by 4119 in the trade designations used in the German census of occupations, and the very large part of this increase was confined to the mechanical and manufacturing groups. This brought the total distinct trade designations up to 10,298 in the German census for 1895.[6] In the United States census for 1910 we find approximately 17,000 occupation designations, although this includes a considerable number of cases

[6]See Bücher, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

where occupations practically the same were counted separately in different industrial groups. This does not, however, take account of the different kinds of one occupation, as of teachers, physicians, or merchants, which distinction would doubtless offset the duplication noted. But especially is it to be noted that only so-called "gainful" occupations are listed. There are many persons not gainfully employed who are specialized in the performance of some task constituting a part of the total work of the group. For example, not even the housekeeping activities of the married woman is included in the list of gainful occupations, to say nothing of the special social functions of child bearing and rearing, and those of promoting the cultural activities of her community. This list of 17,000 gainful occupations is, therefore, an understatement of the actual degree of occupational specialization that exists.

To account for the great development of specialization we must look to the operation of factors not present before the modern period. There have been three of these influences. The first is the development of machinery. It is true that the introduction of the machine is partially the result of a subdivision of labor, as well as the cause, since machines are contrived to perform tasks that have been reduced to single processes. But the machine reacts upon labor and causes its further subdivision. The enormous degree of industrial specialization that has taken place since the latter part of the eighteenth century must be considered in connection with the development of machinery during the same period.

A second cause of the modern increase of specialization is the increase of wealth. In proportion as a surplus is produced beyond bare necessities, a larger degree of refinement of the product will take place and also new wants will demand satisfaction. So great has been the increase of wealth in the modern period that a very great amount can and is expended in carrying products through ever more numerous stages of refine-

ment. This naturally increases the variety of tasks to be performed. With an assurance of a satisfaction of the more elementary wants, many new ones appear, and the increase of wealth makes this satisfaction possible. This, too, calls for an increase in the variety of occupations necessary to meet these demands.

A final cause that operates to increase specialization is the increase in scientific knowledge and artistic technique. This operates chiefly in the field of mental work, the professions particularly. The amount of knowledge and technique that must be acquired has become so enormous that no person to-day can cover more than a very limited field. The result is the very great development of professional specialism. The increasing wealth, noted above, helps to bring this about also, by making it possible for the consumers of professional products to demand an ever increasing degree of skill and perfection of workmanship.

Both the increase of wealth and the increase of scientific and technical knowledge, like machinery, are both effect and cause. They not only bring about specialization, but the latter greatly increases both wealth and scientific knowledge.

The process by which the individual finds his particular specialty within a general class of occupations is not open to very careful analysis, as, for example, why one chooses one profession rather than another or one skilled trade instead of another. Undoubtedly, personal adaptation enters somewhat into the process. But ordinary observation leads anyone to the conclusion that chance is a much more potent factor. The income paid, the conditions of work, and the openings available are the items that determine the choice of most persons. Since knowledge of these items is generally only locally available, most persons make their choice on the basis of the most favorable specialty available at the particular time within their immediate vicinity. Moreover, there is much shifting from one specialty to another, particularly as we go downward from the more skilled occupations. We must conclude, there-

fore, that the determination of the precise task that most individuals perform within the larger class of occupations lies chiefly within local, temporary, and fortuitous circumstances.

Variation of culture between groups occupying different geographical localities has long been a matter of discussion. The explanation offered has varied with the prevailing type of psychology. The earliest was the racial explanation.

But as early as the middle of the eighteenth century a new and brilliant explanation was presented by Montesquieu in the *Spirit of Laws*. A hundred years later Buckle followed with his *History of Civilization in England*. In both these studies and in several others the influence of the physical environment on the human mind was set forth as the cause of differences in religion, custom, law, habits of thought, and other aspects of culture.

Important as were these contributions to a more rational understanding of the problem, later students have found a serious defect in the reasoning set forth in these studies. Both Montesquieu and Buckle regarded the physical environment as having a direct influence on the mind. Thus Buckle regards the "aspects of nature," the mountains, storms, plains, as accountable for the peculiar differences of religious development between Asia and Europe. In other parts of his study,—namely, his discussion of climatic effects on the wages and the production of wealth,—Buckle hit upon a type of explanation that has been followed by later students and developed by them into the modern conception of the influence of physical environment on culture,—namely, the indirect.

Numerous modern studies, of which Demolin's *Social Geography*, Sumner's *Folkways*, and Semple's *Geographic Influences in American History* are notable, have followed this clue in accounting for variation in the mental processes of peoples living under different environments. According to this view the physical envi-

ronment fixes the conditions of life, and the mental processes of the group are worked out as an accommodation to these conditions.

What we need to know about the locality inhabited by a particular group are such things as these: how is food to be obtained; what difficulties must be met in securing food and shelter; what enemies must be met; what are the climatic conditions; what contacts are possible with other groups; how abundantly does nature reward effort, that is, are wants supplied easily or with difficulty; can families live near one another or must they be isolated? When we know such things we can predict something of their mode of industry, their type of recreation, their modes of dress, their type of sociable intercourse, what they worship, their moral conceptions, etc.

It is true that too much can be claimed for this type of explanation. As Ross points out, local differences are much better accounted for by it than differences between large national areas, because each large group has a variety of types of environment within it.[7] Moreover, the physical factor is not the only one to which the mind of a group must adapt itself.

But there is no doubt that it is a valuable ally in accounting for such differences of mental life as have occurred, for example, between different sections of the United States. The adaptability of the South to slave labor through the production of cotton and tobacco, and of the North to free wage labor and the development of manufacturing, has been undoubtedly the source of much of the differences in family life, moral ideals, political conceptions, that have distinguished the sections from one another.

For example, the traditional hospitality of the old South cannot be understood without a knowledge of the isolation of plantation life combined with the abundance of domestic service. Guests were greatly desired to break the loneliness, and it was easy to take care of them. Similarly its emphasis on "family" as a basis of

[7] *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 311-312.

social recognition, its exaggeration of personal "honor," its exaltation of chivalry,—all were closely connected with the conditions of life that ultimately trace back to physical conditions.

The West, with its freedom of social intercourse, its premium upon initiative and "hustle," its freedom from the conventionalities that are necessary in a more crowded area, cannot be accounted for without the theory of accommodation of mental and emotional life to the conditions imposed by the broad prairies, cattle-raising, pioneer conditions. The greater place that home life and the fireside, with all their attendant moral and emotional corollaries, play in the lives of northern and temperate zone peoples as compared with those living near the tropics cannot be understood without reference to the difference in climatic conditions. The religions of India, based so largely as they are on a philosophy of despair, would undoubtedly have taken on another tone if developed under an environment that made the satisfaction of human wants less difficult.

That adjustment or accommodation to environment is not in itself a complete method of explaining cultural variation, however, is evident from a consideration of the materials of modern anthropology. Similarities in economic technique and social organization are shown to exist between groups occupying widely different environments, and wide differences appear between many groups occupying very similar types of locality.[8] The explanation is cultural contacts, or the diffusion of particular items of culture from the place of origin to an indefinite number of other groups.

The differences, noted above, in American local culture would be explained by a strict diffusionist on the grounds of different sources of origin of the ideas or practices characterizing the various localities. That is, an attempt would be made to trace the culture "pattern" of each locality back to a different place of

[8]See, for example, Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, chap. 14. Also Wissler, *Man and Culture*.

origin. Some anthropologists may go as far in attempting to make the principle of diffusion explain all similarities of culture as the extreme environmentalists do in accounting for everything on the basis of accommodation to locality. It is evident that we have here two principles that must be considered together.

Accommodation to locality creates differences between groups but leaves the culture of the members of one group similar. There are other forms of accommodation, however, which differentiate from one another the members of a single locality group. Among these probably the most significant are accommodation to occupation and accommodation to status.

Occupation controls the psychic process by directing the attention to a selected set of thought-materials. It is true that its influence begins to operate after the individual has passed his most plastic period. On the other hand, it has a longer period in which to operate than does the school or the family influence, and after adult life is reached it furnishes quantitatively the largest part of the impressions that reach the mind. After the earlier part of middle age, even sex ceases to be as strong a competitor for attention as formerly. It may be said therefore that after the adolescent period the occupation gradually comes to fill more and more of the attention and thus to supply the chief materials out of which the entire psychic life is formed. For the majority, especially of the manual workers, it is a very important factor even during a great part of adolescence.

The large part played by occupation in moulding the life is a fact of common observation and knowledge. The common sayings and philosophic observations current in the folklore of any people abound in reference to the bias induced by particular occupational influences. Every one expects the business man to be "hard headed"; the man of affairs, practical; the scholar, idealistic; the clergyman, pious; the administrator, conservative. The teacher, the housewife, the

engineer, the lawyer, the social worker, the journalist can generally be identified after a few minutes of conversation, even though he does not mention his work. Each occupation is recognized as having its particular vices and virtues, as well as its point of view and its technique,—all induced by the method of living and the direction of attention necessary to the calling. Farmers, for example, especially in the United States, are very generally recognized to be individualistic because their work is performed in isolation and has never called for much personal adaptation to fellow workmen. They are thrifty because their income does not reach them in the form of frequent cash payments, and hence a dollar assumes a larger importance in their mind when it does come. The factory worker on the other hand can more easily be organized into a coöpertive group, and he will also be less thrifty.

These commonplace observations undoubtedly are frequently exaggerated in popular estimation, but their wide-spread acceptance in the popular mind indicates a fundamental truth. We have had, however, some studies by social psychologists which have gone much deeper. They have analyzed the psychological and social foundations on which such a conviction rests, and thus have given scientific warrant for a fact already popularly accepted.[9]

One of the earlier of these studies is Veblen's analysis of the minds, respectively of the financial and employing group and of the wage earner.[10] The different psychic reactions and cultural expressions in the pecuniary and the industrial groups of modern society are shown to grow out of their different points of contact with the various aspects of industrial and business activities. The manual workers, particularly those associated with the skilled processes, are subjected to the discipline of the machine process. "Wherever the machine process extends, it sets the pace for the work-

[9]For a good exposition of a part of the literature of accommodation to occupation and status see Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 309-327.

[10]Veblen, *Theory of Business Enterprise*, p. 306 ff.

men, great and small. The pace is set not wholly by the particular process in the details of which the given workman is immediately engaged, but in some degree by the more comprehensive process at large into which the given detail process fits. . . . Mechanically speaking the machine is not his to do with it as his fancy may suggest. His place is to take thought of the machine and its work in terms given him by the process that is going forward. His thinking in the premises is reduced to standard units of gauge and grade. If he fails of the precise measure, by more or less, the exigencies of the process check the aberration and drive home the absolute need of conformity."[11]

From such a discipline there results a definite type of thought. It is an habitual reaction in terms of "regularity of sequence and mechanical precision." Cause and effect come to be held as the inexorable method of all forces, natural and social. Moreover, other types of thinking are completely excluded from his mental processes. The impersonal, mechanical material so fills his mental horizon that there is no place for a consideration of the personal, or the qualitative aspects of life. "Such expressions as 'good and ill,' 'merit and demerit,' 'law and order,' when applied to technological facts or to the outcome of material science, are evidently only metaphorical expressions borrowed from older usage and serviceable only as figures of speech."[12] The apparent deadening of the intelligence of the workman since the advent of the machine process is really merely a transfer of attention to these mechnical, impersonal processes exclusively. With respect to such activities he is undoubtedly more intelligent and efficient, although it may unfit him for participation in thought process outside the machine regime.

The pecuniary group is made up of those engaged in purchase, sale, investment, and managerial activities, especially those who exercise the function of control or

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 307-308.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 311.

manipulation. Their minds run in channels set by the ownership of property, and their thinking always starts and ends with this premise. All the facts are interpreted in terms of the conventions, of precedent, established law and custom. "Such training gives reach and subtlety in metaphysical argument and in what is known as the 'practical' management of affairs; it gives executive or administrative efficiency, so-called, as distinguished from mechancial work. 'Practical' efficiency means the ability to turn facts to account for the purposes of the accepted conventions, to give a large effect to the situation in terms of the pecuniary conventions in force."[13]

These essential differences in mental process lead to widely different attitudes and aptitudes between the two groups, with reference to many of the phases of social life. The workingman is frequently unthrifty, improvident and inept in the use of his income. This is not merely because of lack of experience but because the mobility made necessary by his occupation discourages saving for a home, and because the capitalistic method of production leaves no place for him to own a part of the means of production. The acquisition of property thus is entirely removed from the necessary or desirable ends of life. Moreover, the respect for property rights and obligations to contract cannot bulk so large in the minds of men who do not think in terms of accepted premise or established custom, as in the case of those whose very existence depends on a recognition of such principles. The attitude of the workman toward the family, the state, the church must also reflect a greater appreciation of matter-of-fact, impersonal utilities, than of traditional, sentimental, or patriotic loyalty, and he is therefore skeptical about their claims upon him in the light of any of these accepted sanctions. In short, the attitude frequently described as skeptical, matter-of-fact, materialistic, unmoral, unpatriotic, undevout is simply a necessary

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 319-320.

outworking of the psychic process induced by absorption in the machine method of production.

On the other hand the group that is associated with the pecuniary process approaches life from an entirely different angle. Such a person looks upon all financial transactions from the standpoint of the ultimate acquisitions of property. He is, therefore, practical, thrifty, provident. He evaluates property rights above human rights. His reactions toward social institutions always start from an assumption of the validity of the established order. He is therefore conservative toward family life, political and religious activities. He is patriotic, devout, and conventionally moral.

In accounting for this wide separation between the industrial and the pecuniary groups it cannot be assumed that there are no other forces working toward the same end, or that the complete realization of the logical outcome of the occupational tendency is not to a considerable degree offset by other forces working in an opposite direction. But it cannot be denied that an understanding of many of the psychic differences of these two groups in present day society rests upon an analysis of the occupational accommodations involved.

In a similar fashion we might analyze the conventionality in thought and conduct of the public school teacher, the reckless daring and fatalism of the worker in dangerous occupations, the idealism of the scholar, in short, the habitual mental and moral reactions of practically any group subjected to the routine of a particular occupation. The result of any such analysis must convince one that to know the mind and character and availability for any particular social position of any individual one must understand the occupational discipline to which he has become accommodated.

The influence of one's status on his mind and character are somewhat more subtle and indirect than that of occupation but none the less pronounced. One cannot understand the personality of any adult indi-

vidual without having information concerning the status that he has occupied. With respect to his economic status we may ask, is the individual dependent or self-supporting, or responsible for the support of others? With respect to control we ask, does he have a part in shaping the policy of the group or is he subject to the will of others without any consciousness of participation in the social will? Concerning the thought-life of the group, we inquire whether the individual reads the books and papers, engages in the conversation, and shares the emotions that are current or dominant in the group. In the field of sociable intercourse we wish to know whether he is free to mingle with others on the basis of mutual compatability. Is he received on a basis of equality, or is he shut out from certain circles, shunned or despised, or is he looked upon as a person of unusual worth. In short, if we would know all the influences that are shaping the life of the individual, we must know his status and the relations he bears to the forces that surround him. It is a fact of common observation that one may be in a group but not of it. We must know the media through which the impulses of the group are transmitted to the individual. These media may so deflect the impressions that a group makes upon its various members that the same impressions reach different individuals as totally different impressions. Some typical cases of status influence will illustrate the principle.

A status that has been known in all ages as having a peculiar effect upon the individual is that of the mendicant and pauper, and the recipient of personal gratuities. Wherever an individual has become dependent on the bounty of others for his support and has accepted the situation, there appears a well defined type of character—cringing, wheedling, deceptive, lacking in self-respect and pride, fearful of self-assertion, improvident. The extent to which these traits appear depends of course somewhat upon the degree of dependence. It may range all the way from the attitude of the sycophant who was under the necessity of rendering

flattery to the monarch or wealthy patron to that of the professional beggar of the street. The essence of the attitude is the same all along the line.

Rulers' courts have always been surrounded by those who maintained their positions by flattery, cajolery, and humoring the whims of the mighty. When the pursuit of literary, artistic, and scientific careers has been financially precarious, we have had many examples of the writer or artist maintaining a similar attitude toward his wealthy patron. In democracies the nearest approach is the traditional attitude of the politician who plays the chameleon role as the opinions of his constituency change.

The dispensing of alms in an undiscriminating and unbusiness-like manner has always had the effect of developing in the community a group whose characters have been undermined by the status of pauperism. The practice of the Christian Church in the early medieval period of wholesale distribution of alms to all who asked is known to all students of European History as one cause of the development of a vast body of mendicants. Modern philanthropy, with its systematic discrimination and business methods of administration, seeks to protect the recipient of assistance from developing the attitude of a beggar, and persistently strives to build up that of an independent, self-supporting person. So subtle, however, is the status of dependence in its influence toward undermining the character of the recipient that it is only the well-trained and tactful administrator of charity who is able to protect the recipient from it.

Generally where mendicants and paupers are found, there is to be found a corresponding group of givers of alms, whose attitude of condescending pity has become a permanent part of their relation with the poor. Wherever mendicancy or alms-giving of any sort is a recognized institution in the community, the differentiation of receivers and givers is clearly marked in mental type.

Closely akin to the relationship of giver and re-

cipient of bounty or alms is that of ruler and ruled or master and slave or menial. This relation does something more than open to the one a rich opportunity for refinement of culture and deny it to the other. The relationship of itself develops characteristic attitudes and states of mind in both ruler and ruled. Slavery, serfdom, and despotism are known to all students of history as instruments which breed haughtiness, pride, arrogance, condescension, intolerance on the part of the ruling class, and meekness, servility, submissiveness on the part of the ruled. These respective attitudes cultivated in everyday intercourse become the constant state of mind on the part of both.

Even in many modern nations in which democratic institutions have supplanted the earlier institutions of despotism, a differentiation of attitude is still clearly marked between the classes. The peasantry in European nations still retains the attitude of servility, docility, submission, which is foreign to those who have been reared in an atmosphere of freedom. The attitude has become fixed in the tradition that surrounds the individual from birth to death.

This attitude of the lower classes is of course highly prized by the upper classes, and any loss of it is reckoned as evidence of a breaking up of the very foundations of society. In the United States the passing of the generation of negroes who were trained in slavery is regarded by many whites as an irreparable loss. It is true that the sudden acquisition of a new status without a corresponding change in cultural influences gave many negroes a somewhat childish impudence. But the real grievance of the old-time Southerner is the loss of the old attitude of servility.

Undoubtedly one point of friction in the present labor movement in the western world is the manifestation of a spirit of equality and freedom on the part of the laboring class and the resentment toward this attitude by the employing class. The last hundred years of democratic political institutions has produced a generation who are freemen in spirit. This results in

demands for recognition and treatment that many of the employing class have not yet learned to associate with the position of laborers, just as many persons still prefer to pay for services by tips and gratuities that reflect the old relation of lord and servitor with the corresponding attitudes on the part of both parties to the transaction.

The formation of the masculine and the feminine personalities is another excellent example of the power of status to mould mind and character. We have already discussed the different types of mind and character manifested by the two sexes,[14] and indicated that to some degree at least these differences must be found in external influences rather than in inherent sex traits. The essential differences in status and group relationship of the two sexes may be stated as follows: the woman is economically dependent upon the man; the woman occupies a position of inferiority in right and privilege; the woman is subjected to a greater degree of isolation from all types of social contacts. These three fundamental differences of status lie at the foundation of many of the well-known mental and moral differences of the sexes.

The effects of mental isolation are to limit the sources of information, retard the development of efficiency in judgment and reasoning abilities and to confine the attention to the more trivial interests of life. That women are, with notable individual exceptions, inferior in general information, in ability to think clearly, and in their vital intellectual and social activities, is a fact of general recognition. But a similar type of inferiority is also found in those males who have been shunted off the main line of male pursuits and sidetracked in some protected cove.

As Mrs. Stetson and Mrs. Coolidge have so well shown, the status of economic dependency and inferiority of rights in woman has placed her under the necessity of exaggerating the element of sex, and

[14]Chap. vii.

developing those qualities which are traditionally feminine, while the independence of the man and his dominance over woman have accentuated the qualities of vanity, aggressiveness, courage, self-reliance.[15]

Not only are the different mental and moral qualities of class and of sex developed from the differences in status and from the relation sustained to the activities of the society, but any individual, thrown by privilege or accident into a relation different from that of the remainder of the community, will develop peculiar marks of mind and character. In numerous societies where intermarriage between different racial elements is frowned upon, the offspring of such unions occupy an unfortunate position. The term half-breed has come to carry a distinct opprobium. By reputation he is deceitful, treacherous, cowardly, unstable, without purpose or self-respect. He has been thought to be the heir of the bad qualities of both races represented in his ancestry and the good qualities of neither. Miss Schreiner has clearly pointed out that his anomalous position in the community is a better explanation.[16] He feels himself the superior of the lower race and will not be accepted by the upper. He is left in a no-man's land in the midst of the community. There are no established standards to which he is amenable. Each race has its social standards and ideals, and when once in his hut even the Kaffir sits, surrounded by his wives, children, and friends, "a man among men." But the consciousness of the half-caste will not permit him to identify his personality with either set of racial standards and his hand is lifted against all men. Moreover morality is developed out of a sense of oneness with the social whole. The "we" and the "our" are fundamental concepts in the mind of the person who would become sensitive to the needs and the rights of others. Without this consciousness of social solidarity there can be no real morality. And it is this consciousness that is lacking in the thought and emotions of the half-

[15]Stetson, *Women and Economics*, and Coolidge, *Why Women are So.*
[16]"Stray Thoughts on South Africa," *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. 66, pp. 1-35.

caste. It is significant that in those societies where intermarriage between the races is not interdicted the half-breed carries no such reputation as in the situation which Miss Schreiner explains.

Within recent years the treatment of racial psychology has tended decidedly toward explaining practically all psychic traits of race as examples of accommodation. Instead of tracing peculiar behavior traits of racial groups back to some particular racial inheritance, we now look for the adjustment that the group was compelled to make and which led to habits that became historical traditions. Even temperamental and dispositional traits are found by some students to have their origin here rather than in inherent biological tendencies. Thus Professor Thomas says: "I am assuming that habit formation is mainly responsible for the behavior traits of individual races and nationalities, that these traits change much as fashions in dress and almost as freely, only within decades and centuries instead of seasonally, and that dispositional traits, while they certainly do exist, are not distributed in blocks to national and racial groups, but rather to individuals in various proportions so that there is an assortment of temperaments in all groups; seeming uniformities like the phlegm of the Englishman and the explosiveness of the Italian, being mainly due to habit formation and the tendency of all dispositions to conform themselves to the prevailing fashion. . . . I conceive that with a different historical conditioning the Poles would have become as composed as the American Indian. It is idle to speak confidently of the biologically determined behavior tendencies in races and nationalities as a working base when we see daily that the social distance and the disparity of attitudes between American parents and children, or shall we say grandparents and grandchildren, is, generally speaking, greater than the same differences between nationalities, say the Swedes and the English, or even the Americans and the Japanese."[17]

[17] "The Problem of Personality in the Urban Environment," *Publications of American Sociological Society*, 1925, pp. 30-39.

Races, as individuals, have had to face a great variety of situations to which the group had to become accommodated. These attitudes and forms of reactions have one by one become woven with the tribal or national tradition and as such have provided the materials out of which were built the characteristic forms of behavior for all members of the group.

Two illustrations will suffice. The Pole is known for his inveterate thirst for distinction. Nothing to him seems quite so desirable as some form of recognition. Peasant, scholar, artist, public official alike seek it in every possible way and on all occasions. The origin is to be found in the peculiar character of the early Polish state. It was a political organization founded and perpetuated on the basis of a militaristic nobility. Only those giving voluntary service were members of the state, and the position of every such person was accurately defined in the hierarchy. Status was thus the most important thing in life and all social activities centered about the gaining of a more favorable status or claiming the prerogatives of that already attained. This point of view worked its way into every aspect of the national life until it became a characteristic attitude recognizable wherever a Pole appeared, whether at home or as an immigrant.[18]

The Jew, found in all parts of the world, furnishes probably the best example of a group whose psychic life and even physical type reflect the different accommodations that he has been obliged to make. A number of students of the problem have together collected a body of material that clearly reveals the process of adjustment that has produced the characteristic traits which have come to be known as Jewish.[19] From these studies it is evident that the fundamental fact to take account of in the creation of the Jew as he exists to-day is the persecution and restrictions under which he has

[18]Thomas, *ibid.*

[19]See, for example, Leroy-Beaulieu, *Israel Among the Nations;* Hilaire Belloc, *The Jews;* Fishberg, *The Jews: A Study of Race and Environment.*

lived and the isolated life of the ghetto, due in part to his own religious clannishness and in part to the ostracism of his neighbors.

The physical type of the Jew is almost universally recognized. And yet, as Fishberg points out, the significant elements in the type disappear as the causes are removed.[20] The short stature, the stunted, decrepit physique, the flabby muscles, the peculiar attitude of the body known as the "ghetto bend," all reflect inferior hygienic and economic conditions. As one moves westward in Europe he notes that these characteristics become less and less pronounced. In America the second and third generation of Jews is known to produce many splendid athletes, and the number of Jewish prizefighters masquerading under Irish names is undoubtedly considerable. The facial expression, which is even more characteristic than the bodily traits of the Eastern Jew, reflects the soul, the mental and spiritual life, which is the product of persecution, ostracism, and denial of the normal expression of intellectual and social interests. This "haunting sadness and mystery" which the face expresses is, however, noted in other groups subjected to the same type of persecution and ostracism, as, for example, the Armenians, the national Christians of Egypt, and the Basques in France and Spain.

The behavior traits of the Jew are equally as well marked as the physical, and the origin of these can be even more clearly traced. The strong family feeling and devotion to family life resulting in better care of infants and fewer permanent estrangements; the propensity for city life, making it difficult to develop agricultural colonies among Jewish immigrants; the predominance of mercantile and financial pursuits; a personal aggressiveness and persistence that secures results, even though very irritating to one's neighbors and competitors; a desire for learning that leads Jewish students into universities and high schools out of all proportion to other immigrant groups or native Ameri-

[20]Fishburg, *op. cit.*, chap. vii.

cans; these and many other mental and social characteristics are clearly traceable to the social situation to which for generations the Jew had to conform.

"They were everywhere limited as to the choice of residence, sequestrated in the Ghetto, Judengasse, or Jewry, and not allowed to leave their quarters without special permission; they were prohibited in every country from owning or even leasing land; the guilds nowhere permitted them to choose their occupation, and in most countries they were compelled to wear the infamous "badge" so that they might be ostracised as if they were of different color from their neighbors of other creeds. To all this must yet be added that in no country were they allowed to participate in the political, civic, and social functions of the citizen, being thus branded as an alien element."[21] In addition to the isolation imposed from without, his own peculiar religious ritualism, Sabbath observance, and separatism kept him still more within his own group. Education was practically the only avenue to any kind of social recognition in the community at large, and learning was enjoined as a religious duty by the Talmud itself.

While the main features in the picture of the Jew are generally applicable to all who bear the name, there are many variations because the Jews have lived under such widely different situations and the accommodating process has produced differing types. "Striking as the differences between the Jew and non-Jew may be, they dwindle to insignificance when compared with the individual and sectional differences within the Jewish group. The Jews of the East, of Asia, North Africa, and Eastern Europe differ profoundly from those of the West."[22] Where samples of these various types are gathered together from the four corners of the earth, as for example in the East side of New York, one may observe the tremendous possibilities of the accommodating process to create variety among human beings.

[21]Fishberg, *op. cit.*, p. 534.

[22]Louis Wirth, "Some Jewish Types of Personality," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1925, p. 91.

QUESTIONS

1. How does accomodation differ from adjustment secured through variation and selection? Of what value is accomodation?

2. How may physical condition be modified by environment?

3. How under slavery and feudalism were the more minute phases of specialization determined?

4. What factors are responsible for the modern increase in specialization?

5. Explain the distinction between the direct and the indirect influence of the geographical environment in determining culture? Which appears to be the more important?

6. How does cultural contact limit the influence of the geographical environment upon culture?

7. How does occupation influence the mind?

8. How may the differences be explained between the mind and character of the industrial worker and a member of the pecuniary group?

9. What are some of the facts concerning one's status that we need to know in order to understand his mind and character?

10. How does the status of dependence influence the character?

11. What characteristics become associated with the positions of dominance and of servility?

12. How may the reputation of the "half-breed" be explained?

13. Show how the Jew may be explained in terms of accomodation to social environment.

EXERCISES

1. Show how some aspects of the culture of your community reflect the geographical environment.

2. In what respects does a young woman in business differ from one who has not lived or worked away from home?

3. Describe somewhat in detail the differences in the attitudes, the points of view, the interests, and any other significant elements of culture, between the small town and the city.

XII

THE PERPETUATION OF SOCIAL DIFFERENCES

SOCIAL differences once established tend to become more or less permanent. The status, the occupation, the culture of the father is found clinging to his children, and his children's children. The influences which created the differences may long since have ceased to operate, while the distinctions themselves are handed down in successive lines from one generation to another.

A group in which status, occupation, and culture have become hereditary is known as a caste. As a matter of fact, however, the distinction between a society based upon caste and one in which open classes prevail is simply one of degree. There are present in all societies forces which tend to crystallize the form of social institutions and social organization. And it is merely a question of how freely these forces have made themselves felt or worked themselves out to a logical conclusion.

There are, of course, at the same time, factors that make for change and disruption in the social order. Whether or not the class distinctions of a society become crystallized or remain fluid depends on which set of factors gains the supremacy. Societies, therefore, differ from one another in this respect, and the same society will differ in various periods of its history as to whether the forces of crystallization or the forces of change are uppermost. But both sets of factors are always present, and always some tendency is felt towards a perpetuation of social distinctions once established. It is for this reason that we can draw no absolute distinction between a caste system and one of open classes.

Cooley has indicated the circumstances that favor the one or the other set of forces.[1] Unlikeness in the population, a slow rate of change in social, in economic, and political conditions, and a low state of communication and enlightenment favor the hardening process, while the opposite conditions favor the maintenance of open classes or a realignment of the old. The discovery of new territory or natural resources, the appearance of new inventions or new fields of industry, the coming of war,—all tend to upset the old arrangements and make for an exchange of places on the social ladder. A high state of intelligence and communication will make it possible for individuals to pass up or down in the scale according to their abilities and character.

It is important, however, to direct attention to the factors and instruments themselves which are active or are used for a maintenance of the *status quo* from one generation to another. Some of these are not designed for this specific purpose, but unconsciously work in this direction. Others are deliberately forged or manipulated by the favored classes to secure for their children the advantages which they themselves have gained.

A combination of the first sort is the union of the two institutions of private property and the family. We will not raise here the mooted question as to whether the family as an institution rests upon the institution of private property. We recognize them as two separate and independent aspects of the social organization of all societies above the most primitive. They have come into existence out of the experience of the race, and developed as forms of social organization found most desirable to meet a number of fundamental needs. And yet we have no more excellent example of the limitation of all human institutions than in the fact that these two indispensible agencies, while serving a necessary end, at the same time together become the instruments of gross injustice.

[1] *Social Organization*, chap. 19. See also Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 337-339.

The getting of property may be, and frequently is, an indication of the worth and of the services of the individual who gets it, and property might not be created in such quantities or used to such advantage unless we gave to the individual the right to dispose of it as he sees fit, although it is always open to question in any particular case whether the methods of securing possession of property or the manner of using it are consistent with the social good. The institution of private property has persisted so long because on the whole it probably results in more general social utility than otherwise. But when it becomes the means of giving the children of different families an unequal advantage in starting the race of life, we are forced to recognize a fundamental injustice. In a regime resting so largely upon property as modern civilized society does, this unequal start in life is a factor for crystallizing social status that may be combatted by other equalizing influences, but can never be completely balanced. Under its operation it is inevitable that entire equality of opportunity for the members of each new generation can never be attained.

But it is not merely in the handing down of property that the institution of the family tends to perpetuate social differences. The family is the instrument of society through which the advantages of wealth or the disadvantages of its lack are felt during the training period of the child; and it is also the agency which furnishes the principal part of the mental environment for the most plastic period of the person's life. Thus not only are differences in the advantages which come from wealth present in family life, but differences in the whole mental and moral acquisitions of the parents are necessarily transmitted through the home life. The parents' financial resources and their habits, their points of view, their types of reaction to established situations,—all constitute the medium in which the child acquires the foundations of his mental and moral life. For this reason the status, the mind, the character, the occupational trend of the parent, all are woven into

the very fibre of the child's life. Cooley well says it would be impossible to have a society in which there was not present some degree of passing on to children somewhat of the acquirements of the parents, so long as the family system and private property prevail.[2]

"The endeavor to secure for one's children whatever desirable thing one has gained for oneself is a perennial source of caste, and this endeavor flows from human nature and the moral unity of the family. If a man has been able to save money, he anxiously invests it to yield an income after his death; if he has built up a business, it is his hope that his children may succeed him in it; if he has a good handicraft, he wishes his boy to learn it. And so with less tangible goods—education, culture, religious and moral ideas—there is no good parent but desires his children to have more than the common inheritance of what is best in these things." Similarly it is inevitable that, whether the parent desires it or not, the child must take on much of the manner of thought and speech, the habits of life, in short, the mind of the parent. And it is equally inevitable that the community should think of the child as of the same status or position in the community as the parent, and treat him accordingly.

There thus exists in all human society a decided trend toward fixing more or less permanently on the child the whole social position of the parent and this tendency is bound up with the very existence of the family. Where the stereotyping process has developed to a considerable degree, every child is born to a somewhat predetermined position from which it is impossible to depart, unless a member of a higher class by some kind of misconduct may lose his position and fall to a lower one. This accounts for the fact that even in societies where open classes prevail, whenever class spirit is strong and an upper class resists stubbornly any encroachments on its prerogatives, the family will be exalted. Loyalty to family becomes synonymous

[2] *Social Organization*, pp. 211-216.

with loyalty to class, and membership in one of the "best" families is a *sine qua non* of association with the members of the class. On the other hand, in young societies or in those where social change is taking place rapidly one's family name is taken little account of. But even under these conditions the natural consequences of social heredity through the family work their course.

Perpetuation of social distinctions does not rest merely on the unpurposed consequences of family life and private property. The privileged classes have always deliberately sought to maintain the *status quo* by every device possible. The use of the state machinery has been the readiest and most potent method. We find them in politics seeking well-paying franchises, control of natural resources, measures for the protection of property. Provision for free public education and free higher education, inheritance taxes, expenditures for public recreation, child labor legislation, public health measures, have generally had their actual opposition. Government to them has meant primarily a device for the securing and for the protection of property rights rather than a means of promoting equality of opportunity, and their alignment in politics reveals this bias.

Privileged classes have not, however, confined their efforts to an alignment with the so-called "conservative" element of government. They have definitely sought to protect upper class prerogatives by positive restrictive methods. Probably the most harmless of these are the sumptuary laws which in different societies have been enacted to prevent the lower classes from the use of the dress or other articles of consumption of the upper classes. Thus the distinction between the classes is made more rigid, and there is less chance of the chasm being bridged.

Much more serious than sumptuary laws, however, are laws designed to give legal sanction to distinctions which hitherto have been simply subject to custom. By encasing them in legal form they are given a more

permanent character. In most societies where caste has come to prevail, the privileged classes have been able to give it its final form by securing the passage of these formal measures.

Thus the Laws of Manu not only prescribe definitely the rights and privileges of the various castes of India, but prohibit the occupations of the higher castes to members of the lower, and discourage marriage out of one's caste.

> A man of low caste who through covetousness lives by the occupation of a higher one, the king shall deprive of his property and banish.
>
> It is better to discharge one's own appointed duty incompletely than to perform completely that of another; for he who lives according to the law of another caste is instantly excluded from his own.[3]
>
> * * *
>
> A Brahmana who takes a Sudra wife to his bed, will after death sink into hell; if he begets a child by her, he will lose the rank of a Brahmana.[4]

Similarly in the Zend Avesta regulations were prescribed protecting the monopoly of the sacred activities by the priesthood of Persia, while the other caste divisions are recognized in the text. In the second book of Hellas is mentioned an enactment of Sesonchosis prohibiting the abandonment by a son of the trade of his father.

When class distinctions are finally set in legal form and members of one caste prohibited from the occupations of another or from marrying into another, the process of crystallization may be said to be complete. Nothing short of revolutionary methods can then bring about a regime of open competition on the basis of merit.

Inheritance laws are frequently drafted with a view to maintaining upper class dominance. The practice of primogeniture and entail for centuries in Europe, by making it possible to keep fortunes in the hands of single individuals and to limit titles of nobility to a single heir, kept fortunes associated with family names

[3] *Laws of Manu*, X. 96-97.
[4] *Ibid*, III, p. 17.

and prevented nobility from becoming too common. It is significant that the democratic spirit that pervaded much of the earlier legislation in the United States expressly prohibited these forms of property inheritance.

When the state abolishes slavery or serfdom, there is a practice which the employing class frequently falls back upon to retain its hold on laborers,—namely, peonage. In many cases the practice is continued long after it is technically made illegal, because the employing class is able to prevent the state from exercising too careful an oversight of its relations with its employees. Under this regime the laborer is by one device or another kept in the debt of the employer and is then forced to work for him until the debt is discharged. It is easy to manipulate the situation in such a way that the debt is constantly augmented so that the laborer and his children after him are held continuously under the employer's control, a control frequently as complete as serfdom or even, in some cases, as slavery. The practice still flourishes over a large part of Central and South America and is approximated in the relations of many plantation owners with their negro laborers in the southern part of the United States.

Another instrument that has been utilized for perpetuating social distinction is the educational system. The distinction between the learned and the ignorant has nearly always been parallel with that between the privileged and the unprivileged. The learning which the privileged have procured for themselves has been a useful means of maintaining their position.

The school began as an agency to impart a special type of instruction to a small group,—namely, the candidates for the priesthood. From that point, even down to the modern public school system and state supported higher education, there has been a more or less marked aristocratic ideal for formal education, and in practice it has always been worked out on somewhat undemocratic lines. That is, it has been conceived of as

an institution existing for only a part of the population, and by imparting a certain culture to that part it has helped to maintain the chasm.

The earliest societies of which we have historical records, the Egyptian and Chaldean, seem to have had schools to train the priesthood. A certain body of esoteric information was thus secured that increased the power of the priesthood. This is probably the beginning of a learned class. Says Monroe:

> But above and beyond this educational function of the priesthood is another one,—the special interpretation of these doctrines to the prospective members of the priesthood themselves. Here has grown up in many instances an esoteric doctrine that is far different from that imparted to the multitude. The training of the multitude yet consists in indicating the "What to do," and the "How to do it"; while in that of the priesthood itself is added the "Why it should be done." This inquiry into the meaning of these ceremonials and the attempt at a further interpretation of doctrines beyond that given to the multitude gives rise to the first real processes of instruction and the first distinct educational institutions. Though it is yet but a "school for priests," this instruction of the prospective priests by the priesthood constitutes a school in the modern conception of the term. Among the ancient Egyptians and Chaldeans, even before Abraham was called from Ur, these schools first appeared. In other words, at the very dawn of history these people are found to have passed from the stage of barbarism to that of the earliest civilization.
>
> This elaboration of an esoteric doctrine further gives rise both to intellectual development and intellectual differentiation. Out of this inquiry, as is clearly seen among the early Egyptians, grew the cosmologies, the early philosophies, the mathematical, the physical, and the biological sciences. Through this study the priesthood advance from a wholly animistic or spiritualistic interpretation to one partly metaphysical and even, as is evidenced in the anatomical and hygienic ideas of the Egyptian priesthood, to an interpretation partly scientific. Some of this occult meaning is hidden in the formal teaching to the multitude, as in the case of the hygienic values of the ceremonial of both Hebrew and Egyptian.
>
> The third respect in which the advance in educational function by the priesthood at this stage is to be seen is in the invention of a written language. With the elaboration of a body of doctrine and ceremonial, and the philosophical, cosmological, and scientific interpretations, it becomes necessary to commit them to permanent form, either through the invention or the borrowing of a written language. An elaborate literature quickly results, and

offers the basis or means of a formal education. In addition to this body of orthodox and formal interpretation to be given to the multitudes, theoretical education has become, on the part of the priesthood, the mastery of the written language and of this literature which contains for them, as our literature does for us, the culture history of the race.[5]

The Chinese education of the old order was fundamentally aristocratic. The examinations conducted by the state were theoretically open to any who applied. But the preparation was of such a sort that it could be taken only by those who were so situated economically that they could withdraw from productive labor for a considerable period. And the learning when once acquired set its possessor far apart from the common crowd. Probably no other nation ever based its class distinctions so exclusively on learning.

In Greece the schools were only for the freeman. Within this class, the schools were probably designed for a larger part of the population than was the case in any preceding society. Sparta provided a state education for all citizens, boys and girls separate. Athens depended on private schools, but practically all the male youth of the citizen class received some systematic instruction. In Rome there were no schools until a somewhat late period, and when they did come they were private and appealed only to the upper class.

During the medieval period in Europe the only schools that existed were in the hands of the church. The monasteries first instituted formal instruction for the novice, and until the eighth century practically no others were admitted. During the eighth century a movement began which resulted in the extension of the monastic schools so that they became more numerous and were opened to others than the novices or those expected to become such. This supremacy of the monasteries in formal instruction continued till the thirteenth century. During all this time the church had maintained a process of instruction for those who were contemplating membership. The children of believers, Jewish converts, and adult heathen converts

[5] *Text Book of the History of Education*, pp. 9-10.

constituted the membership in these catechumenal schools. In some places these schools expanded into more elaborate types of instruction and came to be called cathedral schools. From the thirteenth century they came to rival the monastic schools. But all formal instruction was centered in one or the other of these two types of church schools. The proportion of the population served by them was exceedingly small. In the later eleventh and early twelfth centuries the universities began to take form from some of the monastic and cathedral schools. While this movement increased the number of advanced students, it did not increase the proportion of educated people. In fact it tended to widen the gap between the few learned and the masses of the unlearned.

In the late medieval period semi-secular schools began to spring up so that by a century before the Reformation considerable provision had been made for this sort of instruction. The charity schools, taught by priests, but open to all the children of the parish, and gild schools, open to the children of gild members, became rather numerous. Some private schools also appeared in various places. This period was the beginning of the modern epoch, and elementary instruction for all grew apace from the sixteenth century onward. A system of elementary education for the entire community, however, was still far from realized in any country of the western world at the beginning of the nineteenth century. And the masses of the people were widely separated in education from the small learned class.

The school system down to the modern period must, in the light of the above facts, be regarded as an agency for maintaining cultural differences. It has been an instrument to help perpetuate an advantage of the privileged classes over the unlearned.

With the advent of the modern state-supported public school we face an entirely different situation. At least the elements of learning are put at the disposal of all members of the population. Where carried out

to its logical end as in the United States and provided on an equal basis for all classes in the population, it becomes the most equalizing instrument ever invented.

It is only in countries with a strong democratic spirit, however, that it is permitted to become such a means of promoting like-mindedness among all classes. Most modern nations still maintain a distinction between the schools attended by the children of the proletariat and those attended by the sons of the well-to-do. Ross notes concerning the system in Chile: "The ruling class keeps the bright boys from the mud huts of the *inquilinor* out of the better-paid occupations by providing a public elementary-school system which does not connect with the free state high school and University. Only private schools fit pupils to enter the state system; so that the children of those too poor to pay tuition have no access to the government service and the liberal professions."[6]

In practically all European states the schools for the lower classes do not lead to the higher schools, since it is not expected that the children attending them will go beyond an elementary education. Even in democratic England the private schools attended by the better classes are distinct from the free schools of the proletariat. By one means or another most poor youths are eliminated from Eton and Rugby, Oxford and Cambridge.

The United States and her neighbor Canada have gone farther than any other state in providing both elementary and higher education of an equal character for all classes. And in no other country is there found the mingling of the children of all classes as in the American public schools and state universities. Even the privately endowed colleges and universities are attended by many who earn their own expenses. But even here it cannot be said that a complete equality of educational opportunity exists. A very large part of the children from the lower paid families leave the elementary grades before the work is completed, when

[6] *Principles of Sociology*, p. 366.

the legal age requirement is fulfilled. Some sections of the country, especially the poorer rural districts, are supplied with much poorer equipment and teachers than others, and the curriculum of the higher schools is yet more adapted to the needs of those preparing for the professions and for an aristocratic culture than it is to the needs of the wage-earning population. Moreover the growth of private schools patronized only by the children of the wealthy cannot be neglected as an influence creating class isolation.

It must be clearly understood that equality of educational opportunity is not the same thing as uniformity of curriculum. In a large and complex population the activities and interests of different sections of the people demand considerable variety in the education provided. In such a situation uniformity amounts to a denial of educational opportunity to a large part of the population since the type provided will meet the needs of but a part of the people. If educational opportunity is equal there must be some diversity of provision for young men and women at least in the vocational training offered: diversity between city and rural education, between professional, mechanical, and business training. It is the lack of such provision for diversity of activities and the retention of a uniform type based upon the old aristocratic conception of education that has kept the modern educational system from being as thoroughly democratic as it has professed to be.

Private property and the family, conservative government, legalization of class, occupational and religious differences, primogeniture, peonage, an aristocratic educational system, these are some of the socially created factors that tend to fasten upon the coming generations distinctions that have once become prevalent. In so far as these factors operate there are given to the members of the newer generations their respective places in the social system without reference to their own inherent qualities. But there is always the pretense that the inherent worth of the individual is the determining factor. So there arises

among the privileged classes in those societies where these forces prevail, the satisfying philosophy that inheritance of privilege is a natural consequence of inheritance of ability.

QUESTIONS

1. What is the distinction between a social class and a caste? Why cannot the distinction be an absolute one?
2. Show how the family becomes an instrument of perpetuating social differences.
3. How may a privileged class seek deliberately to make social distinctions permanent?
4. How has the school been an agency for maintaining social distinctions?
5. What must the modern school system do to escape entirely the aristocratic effects of the earlier school?

EXERCISES

1. Select at random ten to twenty men of your acquaintance and find to what extent their occupations resemble those of their fathers?
2. Get the occupational classification of the families from which the students of your college come and compare it with the census figures for occupational distribution of your state. Are some occupations contributing more than their share to the college population?
3. Can you cite instances that tend to show that American social classes are not castes?

PART IV

SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE

XIII

SOCIAL DIFFERENCES AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

DOES the differentiation of a society increase the wellbeing of its members? Is it a mark of social progress? There is a popular notion, derived from the Spencerian concept of evolution, that society is constantly increasing in specialization, proceeding from the homogenous to the heterogenous. A second notion, generally holding the relation of a corollary to the first, is that this evolution is synonymous with social progress. That is, the history of human society shows a constantly progressing differentiation which is one of the marks of social progress.

More recent thought on the history of society has destroyed the validity of both notions. We now recognize that there is no gradually increasing heterogeneity in all respects. In some respects later society does show a higher degree of differentiation than earlier. But in other respects there is greater homogeneity. Thus in the United States, the tendency is constantly toward increased ethnic homogeneity. The disappearance of localism in this country has also made for a greater homogeneity of culture. Modern democratic states have a smaller degree of differentiation in rank than did Medieval or Roman society. Moreover, as will be shown later, not all of the differentiation that has taken place has made for increased wellbeing. Much of it retards social progress rather than increases it.

It is an important question to raise, therefore, as to the extent to which the increased differentiation which has taken place has contributed to human wellbeing. In what respects are we the better off for it? The two fields in which, on the whole, the greatest degree of differentiation has occurred are the functional

and the cultural. There is no denial that later societies show a vastly greater specialization than the earlier in occupational pursuits and in the variety of their cultural patterns and materials. In what ways has this development promoted human progress?

Probably the most obvious benefits that have been derived from increased functional differentiation are the economic advantages of a division of labor. Since the appearance of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* there has been no lack of appreciation of this aspect of social organization. Its advantages have become a commonplace of all economic literature. Since Smith's day the division of processes into minute tasks, and the increased use of machinery, which is an incident of the former, have been so greatly developed that the increase in productivity is vastly more than it was when Smith wrote.

In considering the effect of the division of labor upon human progress we must consider it in connection with the development of the use of machinery. The two are so intertwined that they are parts of one development. The outstanding consequences of their increased influence in modern production are the enormously greater variety and quantity of goods and services produced, and the greatly improved quality.

Undoubtedly many influences other than the highly developed division of labor and the use of machinery have contributed to this increase in the variety, quantity, and quality of production, such as the improvement in scientific knowledge and the discovery of new ways of utilizing natural forces. But that the specialization of effort and the use of mechanical appliances are among the chief influences cannot be questioned. The improvement in the standard of living of all classes of persons in the modern world through this influence is one of the outstanding facts of the present times. Human experience has been greatly enriched and the satisfaction of human wants enormously increased. The variety of services and goods offered has given expression to many sides of human

nature that otherwise must have lain dormant. The increased quantity has provided better nourishment and protection of the body and means and instruments by which the mind and spirit of man have unfolded. The improved quality of both goods and services has reduced suffering, made possible a refinement of the tastes and sentiments, and released new forces. That such results are a significant part of human progress needs no elucidation.

In addition to contributing to the standard of living through increased variety, quantity, and quality of production, the specialization of function has further promoted social progress by increasing social cohesiveness or unity. The biological sociologists have not been the only writers who have shown a fondness for drawing analogies between human society and the physical organism. Economists and political scientists have dwelt at length on the increasing perfection that comes with the greater variety and interdependence on the part of a society, although very little has been done to show in a concrete way just why such development of heterogeneity and interdependence in social groups has contributed to human progress. It is not necessary, however, to rely upon analogies of society with a physical organism to appreciate the fact that cohesiveness or solidarity of the group has contributed to progress.

One of the dangers always hovering over early societies, and in lesser degree later societies as well, has been that of disintegration. The development of economic and spiritual resources waited upon the maintenance of the somewhat permanent existence of the social group. The path of human history is strewn with the wasted beginnings of great achievements, because the social groups within which these beginnings came to light have not been able to maintain their existence. While there are many illustrations of this in the break up of empires and of smaller states within the historical period, the amount of such loss in the long period before the establishment of orderly government must have been much greater. We have no record of

the countless number of splendid beginnings that must have been lost, because the group was broken up by outside enemies or by lack of internal cohesion. Whatever, therefore, contributes to the ability of the social group to maintain its existence undoubtedly is providing a medium within which human achievements become possible. That specialization of function does this is obvious. The earlier societies that succeeded in maintaining themselves were those in which among other favorable circumstances a mutual dependence of the classes resulted in a strong loyalty to the group life.

It is not necessary to go the whole length with the older German sociologists who maintain that the dominance of one class over another is the only condition under which a state can ever exist.[1] It is true that the subjection of one group to another was the condition under which orderly and stable government was first set up and we may agree so far with them as to say that without this authority early social groups would have found it impossible so to maintain themselves as to permit the development of cultural activities of any considerable sort. The essential point to note is that the differentiation of function, at first made possible by conquest, created a condition of social solidarity that helped to perpetuate the social group.

Durkheim shows that it is not so much the element of authority that makes for social solidarity as the interdependence of the various parts of the social group whose ability to strengthen and supplement one another rises from functional differentiation.[2] Homogeneous societies may indeed maintain their existence through the repressive measures that an authoritative government sets up, but where variety of function is developed the cohesiveness is secured through interdependence of parts. The solidarity which is secured through repression Durkheim calls mechanical solidarity, and that attained through interdependence, organic solidarity.

[1] See, for example, Schmoller, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 20, p. 510, translation by A. W. Small. Also see Ratzenhoffer, *Sociologische Erkentniss*, pp. 203-204.

[2] *De la Division du Travail Social*, chaps. 2 and 3.

It is evident from observation of modern states that the organic solidarity is much more permanent and stable than the mechanical.

The so-called Mercantile policy that had its beginnings in Europe in the early part of the modern period undoubtedly grew out of a firm realization that a nation to be strong and self-sufficient must have a great variety of industries. The policy of developing within the state those resources that would enable it to maintain itself in time of war was a sound policy under the circumstances of the period. And the policy of developing a variety of national industries through the protective tariffs in modern times has had the support of many thinkers and statesmen. While carrying along many abuses of special privilege to certain groups within the nation, the very general use of the policy by most modern states at some period is evidence that at a certain stage of national development the policy has been a valuable factor in promoting the strength of the national life. That the later development of international relations should seem to render many features of the policy obsolete does not detract from its earlier value. With the development of freedom of trade between states and national specialization on particular industrial processes, it still remains true that no modern state exists which does not have a great variety of occupations, and this variety, making for a high degree of interdependence of all groups within the state, is one of the strongest forces of social cohesion. In fact, it constitutes the chief bond of modern society and is an effective substitute for the autocratic authority of earlier days.

There is another aspect of functional differentiation that has contributed to human wellbeing in quite a different way from its effect upon social cohesion. That is its effect upon the socialization of the individual. I have already noted that the increase of mutual dependence of persons on one another through a division of work has had a great deal to do with the merging of the life of the individual into that of the group, and there-

by making him more social in nature.[3] In still a further way is this accomplished through the aid given to social control that comes from functional differentiation. Both Durkheim[4] and Cooley[5] have pointed out that the formation of particular codes of ethics within the various occupations has greatly contributed to the moral strengthening of the individual. Each occupational group develops a standard of excellence not only of skill but of ethical conduct that has a much stronger hold upon the individuals comprised within that section of society than does a general code for the whole nation. The particularization that is possible within the narrower confines of an occupational group makes it possible to bring much more direct and personal pressure upon the individual than can be done when the code is a general one. Undoubtedly this has done much to strengthen the efficiency of social control.

In addition to the influences favorable to social progress arising from a differentiation of function, there are those benefits which are derived from a differentiation of culture. It is important to note that we are not discussing here the advantages to the human race in general of the development of various types of culture in different parts of the world, but rather the beneficial results of the appearance within a single group, such as a nation, of variety and difference in modes and content of thought, in habits of life, in ideals and convictions.

The first of these to be noted is the increased richness of experience that comes to members of the group from contact with variety in the mental environment. Since the content of the individual mind is built up out of the materials provided by the social environment, it is obvious that the quality of experience that the individual achieves depends directly upon the quality of that environment. So long as a dead level of uniformity is maintained, as is the case in primitive groups, the experience of the individual must be narrow,

[3]Chap. ii.
[4]*De la Division du Travail Social*, p. 289.
[5]*Social Organization*, pp. 209-210.

petty, and uninteresting. The so-called provincial type of mind in modern society illustrates very well such a condition. Where through some form of isolation a group is shut off from mental contacts with a wider circle of experiences, the minds of the members of the group present a vacuity and narrowness, a pettiness and intolerance that is in striking contrast with the cosmopolitan type of mind with its sympathetic tolerance of differences of opinion, its appreciation of all that life in any form may present. The difference that more than any other has distinguished city dwellers from rural and village dwellers, for many centuries, is this contact on the part of the urbanite with a rich and varied mental environment, and the confinement of the countryman within a comparatively narrow range of mental contacts. This is the reason why the city has symbolized the highest point of culture.

Besides contributing to a richer experience, variety of cultural elements also stimulates the mind to further achievements. The mind like the body grows by what it feeds upon. Without the stimulus from a variety of ideas the mental processes do not reach that stage of activity that is necessary for creative thought. Whenever for selfish interests the rulers of a group have succeeded in shutting off the supply of new and varied ideas and impressions, the intellectual life of the group has come to a stand-still. Religious uniformity furnishes an excellent case in point. The highest development of religious thought and practice comes, not from those groups where a state religion occupies the whole field and rigorously represses all forms of heterodoxy, but where a great variety of belief and practice stimulates the mind and spirit of leaders. In those groups where any one of the various branches of Christianity exists alone, the religious tone of the group is poorer than where competitive types exist side by side. It is a commonplace among scientific workers that the clash of differing opinions is the necessary medium for the cultivation of new ideas and formulas. The great dis-

coveries and inventions have come from minds that were in contact with a great profusion of differing stimuli.

Moreover, the policies and practices and ideas that are from time to time chosen as the guiding principles of the group, the opinions and ideals and convictions that come to dominate the minds of the members, will be of a higher order if there is a variety to select from. There is much the same process of selection and survival of ideas as of physical organisms in the struggle for existence. It is an established biological fact that the greater the variation in a given species, the more opportunity is there for the process of selection to secure a favorable type. The same is true among ideas. The process of elimination and selection of ideas is constantly going on in the life of a social group. The greater the variety, the better is the selection.

Finally, along with a greater richness of experience and greater activity of the mind, there is to be noted also as a consequence of variety of culture, a greater development of individuality. The development and expression of a high degree of individuality is, especially in the western world, recognized as one of the most significant aspects of social progress,—not that individuality is useful merely to society, but that as John Stuart Mill so well says in his *Essay on Liberty* it is "one of the elements of well being," and an end to be desired in itself.

There seems to be an innate repugnance to being like others. No individual is so mean as to admit that he is exactly like anyone else. Each craves for himself a recognition of his uniqueness as a part of his selfhood. Many pathetic attempts to express this by persons whose occupation or manner of living give little opportunity for self-expression are manifest. Those who have greater abundance of material resources prize them largely as instruments for securing for themselves a high degree of uniqueness. Communistic societies have always encountered this as one of the most formidable obstacles to their success. The uniformity of

costume or dwelling or standard of living which they impose seems an insult to the human thirst for being unlike.

Whatever, therefore, gives to the individual a larger field within which he may find those particular materials of thought or practice which are peculiarly adapted to his native impulses will make possible a larger development of individuality. Wherever we find religious belief and practice, political opinion, scientific concepts, recreational opportunity, literary and other artistic forms of expression, customs and habits of life, ideals and convictions, developed into a variety of form and type, there we find all the various kinds of innate character and temperament developing each in accordance with its peculiar bent. But where a condition approaching a dead uniformity prevails in respect to these spiritual materials of life, the mind and spirit of man never reaches a high level. It is this monotony arising from the terrible uniformity of mental life that so depresses the personality of most savage or nature peoples. The expression of individuality is always proportionate to the opportunity for contact with varied materials for the mind to react upon. Mill deprecates the fact that some modern tendencies seem to force us into a practice of reading the same things, seeing the same things, going to the same places, having our hopes and fears directed to the same objects. Whatever promotes a uniformity endangers individuality. Whatever provides for the individual a wider scope within which he may find that which strikes a responsive chord within himself is a promoter of progress.[6]

Simmel has expressed something of the same point of view in his theory of the intersection of social circles.[7] As culture becomes more varied the individual becomes a member of an increasing number of groups. Each of these circles represents some distinct cultural interest. Membership in them is an expression of the

[6] *Op. cit.*

[7] *Soziologie*, chap. vi.

free expansion of the mental and emotional life of the individual in these various directions, and his personality is to be defined in terms of a composite of the social circles to which he belongs. Whatever is unique or peculiar in the individual's make-up finds some chance for expression and in this way not only is the individual given a large field for expansion but the inclusive social group benefits from the development of all the inherent possibilities of the individual.[8]

The differentiation of rank has involved so much that has been inimical to human welfare that we are inclined to regard it as wholly detrimental. A more careful inquiry into the actual results of some phases of this form of differentiation, however, leads to the conclusion that along with the many evils there have been some benefits to mankind. We may select to illustrate this the extreme form of rank differentiation, that in which a society is divided into two or more divisions, one of which comprises masters, another slaves. We have in modern times come to regard slavery with a peculiar horror. It is so repugnant to every modern sentiment of humanity and justice that we find it difficult to appreciate any advantages that it may have had. Nevertheless, like another object of modern repugnance, war, it played a conspicuous part in early society in promoting culture and making for stability.

Slavery was first the result of conquest, which imposed the authority of one group over another. In a still more primitive stage such conquest was followed by an execution of the conquered. When the labor of the vanquished became profitable their lives were spared and they became a servile class. This creation of a distinction in class, harsh and unjust as it was, promoted human progress in at least three ways: it began the discipline of the race in continuous labor; it frequently brought a group of lower culture into

[8]For a clear exposition of the various ramifications of Simmel's theory see Spykman, *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, chaps. vi and vii.

beneficial contact with one of higher culture; it released a part of the population for the pursuit of higher culture and necessary military activities.

Man is by nature averse to continuous manual or intellectual effort. So long as primitive man was not compelled by force to undertake such work, he remained an undisciplined savage. Slavery provided the beginning of regular, continuous, routine labor. While frequently accompanied by unnecessary harshness and cruelty and injustice, this compulsory toil was the discipline that apparently was necessary for the human race. We might speculate as to whether men would not eventually have learned to apply themselves to regular work without such a taskmaster. But the historical fact is that slavery apparently was the channel through which this forward step in human progress actually was taken. Ingram in his *History of Slavery and Serfdom* succintly remarks that "nowhere has productive industry developed itself in the form of voluntary effort, but that in every country of which we have any knowledge it was imposed by the strong on the weak and wrought into the habits of the people only by the stern discipline of force."[9]

While it is true that in some cases a peaceful agricultural people were conquered and enslaved by a ruder, nomadic, military group, it very frequently happened that conquest meant the raising of the conquered to a higher level of culture. Von Götzen in his "Durch Afrika" points out instances of African slaves taking pride in the fact that they had come to belong to the "cultivated" instead of remaining "wild men."[10] Rome through her conquests undoubtedly brought many untutored people within the circle of her culture. We need not assume any but the most selfish motives on the part of the conquerors, but the results were frequently beneficial to the conquered.

Probably the most significant of the effects of the regime of slavery was its release of a part of the popula-

[9]Ingram, *History of Slavery and Serfdom*, p. 6.
[10]Quoted by Sumner, *Folkways*, pp. 262-263.

tion from labor. The great bulk of the upper class were thus free to devote themselves to military pursuits. While a great part of the military activity came to no useful social end, some of it was the means to the establishment of stable and orderly society, and the organization of political control of large territories. Here, as in the case of the disciplinary value of enforced labor it is not a question of whether the step might have been taken in some other way, but it is an established historical fact that the existence of a military class was the means to the establishment of organized political government. The warrior and the slave laborer in this matter performed complementary functions, each necessary to the other, and both playing parts that they far from comprehended in laying the foundations for human progress.

In addition to releasing the military class from the necessity of labor, the work of the slaves also provided leisure and surplus for the development of the fine arts, scientific pursuits, and philosophic speculation. The higher culture is a most tender plant, especially in its earlier days. Without leisure and resources beyond the immediate needs of existence, men do not pursue it. Odin and Ward have shown that productive artists, literary men, scientists, philosophers have almost always come from those classes in the population who have been supported by the laboring classes. The higher culture, like stable government and willingness to labor regularly, seems to have been purchased at a large cost of suffering and unrequited toil on the part of those who have labored with their hands. The specialization which produces the higher achievements of the mind has come exceedingly slowly. It would seem that the human race has with difficulty realized the value of such work. The artist and the thinker have never found the market for their wares among the general public that have the producers of more material goods. If that is true to-day when appreciation of spiritual values has become more generally possible through popular education, how much more was it true when the

race was struggling to acquire a firm grip upon the bare necessities of life, and upon the elements of social organization. The privileged overlord and master who used a part of his ill-got surplus to nourish art and science and philosophy builded much better than he knew. Human life has been made richer and completer because many toiled painfully, they knew not why, and a few were privileged thereby to dream and think.

The above contributions which the differentiation of function and of rank through slavery made to social progress were confined almost entirely to the primitive and barbarian periods. Modern slavery has without doubt a few advantages to its credit. But it has differed so completely from the earlier form, and the conditions of economic, political, and social life have been so different that it cannot be held to have promoted social progress in any effective way. On the other hand it has been one of the most depressing influences on human advancement. Much the same can be said of other forms of privilege that have come down to the present. In a later chapter I shall discuss the removal of privilege through democracy as one of the essential problems confronting modern societies.

In this chapter we have considered only the respects in which social differentiation has contributed to social progress. There are aspects of social differentiation, however, which are hostile to social welfare and which retard progress. One of these is overspecialization, to which the following chapter is devoted. Another is a differentiation which develops out of the individualistic impulses of interest groups which put private advantage above the common good. To meet this situation society is greatly in need of a control consciously exercised by the whole group over the development of differences among its members. Finally there is the establishment of social differences on the basis of special privilege, which it is the task of democracy to remove.

QUESTIONS

1. Explain the ways in which increased division of labor has increased social welfare.
2. What was the value of the Mercantile policy and its modern successor?
3. How is the socialization of the individual promoted by increasing functional differentiation?
4. Enumerate the specific advantages that come from a wide differentiation of culture within a group.
5. What benefits did ancient slavery contribute to society?

EXERCISES

1. Is there any danger in the United States today of suppressing variety of thought and feeling?
2. What do you believe should be our attitude toward the culture which the immigrant brings with him? Why?
3. Point out some concrete gains that have come from professional specialization.

XIV

OVERSPECIALIZATION

OVERSPECIALIZATION is the term used to describe all those situations in which social differences are carried to a degree that limits the expression or development of personality or threatens the welfare of the social organism.

The form of overspecialization that is most generally recognized is the functional. In previous chapters there has been described the extent to which a division of labor has taken place in the modern world and its contribution to social progress. What was not pointed out in that connection is the fact that functional specialization may be carried to the point where it is inimical to individual and social welfare instead of contributory to it. That this has taken place in some measure at least is a patent fact to any thoughtful person.

The distinction between brain and hand workers is one that has considerable historical significance. In the days of a privileged leisure class, manual labor was the mark of servitude. The opprobium attached to it has never been completely eliminated. Consequently the intellectual class—the professional, literary and artistic workers—has held distinctly aloof from work that involved any degree of manual effort. In the modern industrial world the group associated with the pecuniary and managerial tasks has been regarded as somewhat in the same class as the so-called intellectual group. At least the "invidious" distinction between the managerial and production departments of industry has been sharply maintained.

The result is that there has come down into modern life a decidedly sharp differentiation of mental and manual workers, the professional, employing, managerial, and financial groups constituting one division

and the manual laborers the other. This functional differentiation constitutes one of the most significant aspects of modern social organization. Of course, on logical grounds the distinction cannot be made absolute. There is no manual work that does not require some degree of mental effort, much of it a high quality of intellect, and there are few so-called intellectual occupations that do not demand some physical exertion. Moreover, there are many border-line occupations, as various types of engineering, which from a strictly logical point of view, are difficult to classify. The distinction is in fact a traditional one, the classification of any particular occupation depending on its historical association with the ruling or with the servile class, rather than upon the distinct nature of the work performed.

Broadly speaking, however, there is a basis in fact for the modern specialization of the two groups. A considerable part of the work of the world calls for effort that is primarily and chiefly intellectual, while another considerable part involves less intense mental exertion and greater physical effort. It is in the interest of social efficiency that workers should spend at least the great part of their working hours in that field for which their natural abilities best qualify them.

Overspecialization comes in at the point where the individual is so completely absorbed in one particular kind of effort that the other part of his personality has no opportunity for a necessary minimum of expression. There are two kinds of disutility which result. One is in the quality of the work, the other in the personality of the worker. The mental worker who forgets that he has a body may produce a type of work that is so far divorced from the realities of the actual world that it has no value in such a world. At the same time his neglected body may rebel in all sorts of physical ailments. The physical worker may be so shut off from mental effort that he does not put the necessary skill and thought into the process, to the detriment of his product, and simultaneously he becomes an automaton

with no power of putting forth the mental effort necessary to being a good member of society.

But this distinction between mental and physical work is not the whole story. To it must be added the specialization that arises from the breaking of each of the kinds of work into a greater number of minute tasks so that the product of a single worker lacks any considerable degree of completeness or wholeness. This is seen in the case of both mental and physical tasks. The tailor no longer makes a garment but a tenth or lesser part of a garment. The factory worker is a riveter, or guides similar pieces of metal under a punch from day to day and month to month, or pastes labels on food containers whose contents have gone through a hundred different hands, each contributing some slight part to the complex of tasks that prepare the food for the consumer. The following description of the work of the operator of a trimming-machine in a shoe factory is typical:

> The trimming machine consists of a sharp knife edge, operating constantly against a sharp edged revolving top. The man who works the machine stands, holding upside down somewhat below the level of his eyes, the partly made, still unsoled shoe. He turns it skillfully and rapidly on the revolving top, against whose sharp edge the second knife-blade operates, cutting off all the surplus crimpled leather. The work is extremely rapid and absolutely uniform. But it takes skill and close attention. The machine could easily cut off too much, or could cut into the upper, if the swift handling of the shoe were not exactly correct. The workman must be skilled, but all that constitutes his work is daily to revolve in his two hands about 2600 pairs of shoes, or 5200 single shoes. The expert workers are able to trim off that number of uppers daily in this machine. It is not surprising that such monotony of occupation should be a factor in fatigue. For the work is unvaried. The man who operates the upper trimmer does nothing else. His skill and speed have been acquired by the extremest specialization. He performs, perhaps, less than one-hundredth part in the making of a single shoe, and he does not know how to operate, or would be extremely awkward at, the machine next him which performs a different hundredth fraction of the manufacture.[1]

[1]Goldmark, *Fatigue and Efficiency*, Part I, pp. 65-66. See also Pound, "The Iron Man and the Mind," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 129, pp. 179-189.

A similar specialization prevails in the field of the mental workers. The teacher more and more becomes a teacher of one subject or more particularly a restricted phase of one subject. The physician becomes a "specialist," the musician becomes a performer on a single instrument, the merchant the head of a single department in a store, the industrial head the manager of a particular branch of the business.

The consequences of this kind of specialization for both brain and muscle workers are similar to those following the extreme differentiation between mental and manual work,—namely, the personality and body of the workers are injured and the quality of the work may suffer. The humanists, such as Carlyle, Ruskin, Emerson, Tolstoy, have in many passages bitterly attacked the repression of personality that modern industrialism brings. The worker is unable to realize any wholeness in his product. Because his imagination cannot compass the relation of his product to the whole, the manual worker becomes detached and uninterested in his achievement. The joy and self-expression that comes from the performance of a complete task and the pride in its perfection is impossible.

The quality of the work must suffer as well as the worker's personality. Lack of pride and interest in the product inevitably reacts on the efficiency of the worker. Much of the complaint of employers against the worker's neglect of his work must undoubtedly be traced to this. In the field of the mental workers the narrow specialist is constantly in danger of going off into some unsubstantial vagary or of wandering hopelessly in the intricacies of some academic trifle. Hobson well says of him:

> The detailed superstructure of his edifice is often marvellously wrought, but its foundations are generally weak. Your refined specialist in medicine has commonly accepted, on utterly insufficient authority, and without "special" inquiry some large theories about the digestive and the nervous systems; your monetary specialist in such a science as economics has erected an admirably-carved financial system upon some hollow, quantitative theory of money which he has swallowed wholesale and *a priori*. . . .

Minute specialism sterilizes action. The academic student of this order seldom reaches any definite opinion upon living issues, for he can seldom find a definite opinion justified. "Heaven forbid that I should fetter my impartiality by entertaining an opinion," said the learned barber in George Eliot's "Romola." Such vain pursuit of knowledge leads to a minimum of serviceable truth, sometimes defending its futility by the taking paradox that the search after truth is better than the attainment of truth—a view which reminds us of the theory of the unsuccessful fisherman, that the fewer fish there are to be caught, the more sport there is in fishing. The reaction of over-specialism upon the student is closely analogous to its effects upon the industrial worker; by peering incessantly into one little group of facts, he blunts his intelligence and injures the focus of his mental eyesight. His abandonment of the wider survey of knowledge, the renunciation which is either forced upon him or is self-imposed, destroys his intellectual judgment. Every bit of new knowledge needs to be assayed by submission to the touch stone of the Universal before its value can be ascertained or it can be set in relation to knowledge as a whole.

The over-specialist has let slip the standard of knowledge, and is at the mercy of all sorts of private superstitions and illusions. Thus, with misspent scrupulosity, he squanders his labor on vain trifles, counting every bit of knowledge worth the pains it has cost, because he owns no standard of economy. Man is the measure of all things, and the specialist who has made himself less than a man can measure nothing. The industrial specialist becomes a machine, the intellectual specialist a pedant or a faddist. The great work of the world has been done by hard workers, but not by close specialists, even in the nineteenth century. Kant, Geothe, Wordsworth, Browning, Mill, Darwin, Spencer, Ruskin—the greatness of the work of such men depends upon the quality of universality. In theory this will be readily admitted: in practice everywhere the forces of specialism corrupt and destroy the sane sense of the universal.[2]

The personality and the quality of the work are not all that suffer from a narrow specialism. In the case of manual workers particularly, monotony of effort registers itself in a heightened fatigue of the body and sometimes in serious functional disorders. Constant use of the same muscles and nerve centers induces serious overwork of a part of the mechanism and under exertion of others. Says Miss Goldmark:

The monotony of so-called light and easy work may thus be more damaging to the organism than heavier work which gives

[2] *The Social Problem*, pp. 232-234.

some chance for variety, some outlet for innate revolt against unrelieved repetitions. Monotony often inflicts more injury than greater muscular exertion just because it requires continuous recurring work from nerve centers, fatigue of which, as we have seen, reacts with such disastrous consequences upon our total life and health. The evils of monotony illustrate again how closely all the functions of our life are bound up together; how the physical and nervous and psychic parts of us react and interact upon one another. Aversion from a monotonous grind of work, the effort of the will "to keep up" requires just so much more nervous stimulus from already tired nerve centers.[3]

We may now inquire, what is the remedy for this kind of overspecialization? Are we to abandon a division of labor or limit its development? Nothing seems more impracticable than such a proposal. The advantages that come from a high degree of specialization in increased production and generally in a better product, both in the industrial and in the intellectual fields, are too great to abandon. A minute division of labor has become an inseparable part of the organization of the modern world. In fact present indications seem to point to an ever increasing degree of it rather than to any diminution.

There are two remedies for the situation that not only appear possible on *a priori* grounds but which have already been demonstrated to be practicable and useful when practiced,—namely, a broadening of the educational process and a shortening of the hours of labor per day. A more complete educational foundation would prevent much of the intellectual incompetency of the specialist, whether professional or manual. The needs of the intellectual specialist are a breadth of fundamental knowledge, and an appreciation of the limitations of his particular specialty. Without these nothing but a miracle can prevent his product from being lopsided or petty or visionary, or unfocused, or pedantic, or, indeed, all of these. Any training for professional work which does not provide for such foundations and such knowledge of the interrelation of different fields of knowledge must be regarded as superficial or fragmentary, and this educational process

[3] *Fatigue and Efficiency*, Part I, p. 68.

cannot be limited to the period of preparation before entering upon a profession. Unless the specialist is constantly exchanging views with those in somewhat different fields his capacity for seeing his own work as others see it and in relation with the work of others must inevitably atrophy.

In the case of the highly specialized manual worker the right kind of education can do much to prevent the intellectually and spiritually callousing influences of constant applications to a routine task. With lengthened childhood and a public school system adapted to a wider range of interests, every normally minded member of the nation might have an abiding interest and knowledge in past achievements of the race, and in its present thought and action, in other words a genuinely cultured mind. With increasing hours of leisure a mind so trained in childhood and youth would find no difficulty in maintaining a wholesome interest in the intellectual and spiritual world.

An educational system that had such a purpose would, however, provide a continuous fund of intellectual stimuli for all, throughout adult life, in the form of lectureships, museums, libraries, art galleries, public musical productions. That such a proposal is not utopian is evidenced by the fact that we already have the beginnings of such a system in operation in most metropolitan centers. It is true that a great number will never make much use of such facilities. But no one doubts that a very great part of the manual workers would do so under an adequately developed system and particularly if their earlier education had been properly directed.

But to take advantage of these educational opportunities, both mental and manual workers must have a greater amount of leisure than most workers at present enjoy. Moreover, the physical and mental strain of highly specialized effort can be relieved by no other method than by a shortening of the hours of labor. The movement for reduced hours is a necessary corollary of the constantly increasing degree of specialization.

We will not discuss here the relation of the shortening of hours to the economic needs of the modern world. There seems to be a difference of opinion in the minds of the economists as to the adequacy of the present productive capacity to meet the need for goods. But a shortening of the hours of labor should not be regarded as a corresponding reduction in production. In some cases the production has increased and in many others it has been maintained at the same level when the hours have been shortened.[4] The greater daily efficiency of the workers, their longer life and decreased morbidity, all together probably overbalance the apparent economic loss of fewer working hours per day.

As a matter of fact, however, quantity of goods is one only of a large number of factors that make for happiness and welfare. And in a world where human values are made dominant over economic values, these other items will be given greater consideration than at present. Among these factors that must claim a larger place in the coming social order is leisure, leisure which means opportunity for the functioning of repressed impulses; the relaxation of overworked muscles and nerve centers; and time to live a normal family life and participate in those activities of the nation and community that democracy demands of all citizens.

The loss of leisure is the great price that civilization has exacted as man has emerged from savagery. But deep in his soul there has remained that thirst for opportunity to allow his varied interests to find free play, unfettered by the prison that routine labor shuts him within. Hobson fittingly remarks: "Those who regard this movement (for a shorter working day) chiefly as a demand for increased leisure, for idleness, or wasteful enjoyments utterly misread the deeper issue. It is the over-specialized workers' other faculties, which are at present thwarted and repressed, that are lifting their voice in demand for a fuller individual life. In every worker confined to a long day of narrow, monotonous toil lies a score of imprisoned faculties,

[4]Goldmark, *Fatigue and Efficiency*, p. 345.

each a potential worker, and clamoring for work and enjoyment. It must take some time for the undeveloped faculties—'dim eyes, cramped limbs, slowly waking desires'—to gain their proper place in the economy of human forces which make true life. But surely progress, if anywhere, lies this way."[5]

There is a particular form of over-specialization that calls for special consideration,—namely, specialization between the sexes, both in function and in rank. In an earlier chapter an effort was made to appraise the importance of sex differences as a foundation for social differences between the sexes. The conclusion there reached was that while there is a fundamental biological basis for some differentiation, there is no natural warrant for the excessive distinction that in many cases has prevailed between the social positions occupied by the two sexes. The extreme differences developed in the occupations of men and women, in their relative status, in their outlook upon life, or in their character and their thinking, must be regarded as a form of overspecialization. There may be some difference of opinion as to which sex is most highly specialized or removed from the mean. Undoubtedly the occupations of the male present a much higher technique than those of the female, that is, in modern society. His skill and proficiency are acquired with a much more elaborate and careful preparation. There are nowhere such numerous educational institutions for training women in their peculiar occupations as there are for the training of men. Moreover, it is frequently asserted that women live more in the central current of life and react more normally to the fundamental human impulses while man is particularized and detached.

On the other hand the fundamental note of the modern feminist movement has been that woman needs the normalizing influences of the man's world, and that in removing the limitations that have been placed upon

[5] *The Social Problem*, p. 237.

her she is "breaking into the human race." A number of writers have asserted that the limitation of women to child-bearing and rearing and to purely domestic pursuits has overspecialized her to the point of keeping her separated from many activities and stimuli that are essential to a normal human existence.

The determination of which sex is the more highly specialized in modern life would doubtless depend on the point of view. The fact to which I wish to call attention, however, is that, whichever may be the farthest from the mean, the two sexes are still too far apart in their work, their thinking, their standards of social proficiency and their rank, though of course decreasingly so. Admitting that the biological facts of sex do make for some very definite social differentiation, it is equally clear that the degrees of separation in the middle and more well-to-do classes is not justified by the inherent sex differences and constitutes a situation humanly and socially disadvantageous. The extent and character of these differences were explained in an earlier chapter.[6] It is intended here to indicate the consequence of the overspecialization and a possible line of improvement.

Wherever the pursuits and interest of men and women are far apart, the members of one sex or both are being deprived of some valuable element of life. The majority of women of the middle and well-to-do classes today have little or no part in the economic functions of society. With the exception of that minority who are engaged in "gainful occupations" they are outside the main current of those processes through which the material forces of society are controlled. They miss the self-expression and personal development which comes from such participation, the effects of which on their personality and character have been referred to in a previous chapter.[7] On the other hand the man, so completely absorbed in the economic processes, loses much of the cultural development that the

[6]Chap. vii.
[7]Chap. xi.

women of his household have opportunity for. The opera, the library, the museum and art gallery, the musical concert, the lectureship, church activities have their principal patronage from the feminine portion of the population, and the majority of those men who are found in attendance at many of these performances are there at the urgent request of their "women-folk" and endure the occasion with as good grace as their affection and good humor permit.

Wherever an individual is deprived of an element of personal expression and development, the group also loses what he might have contributed. The productive power of the world is very greatly curtailed by the failure to utilize the economic force of these women who are not now contributing anything to it. It is assumed that if a woman is expending her whole work-time energy in rearing children or in managing the household she is making her full contribution to the group. The loss to society comes from the non-productiveness of that large number of adult women who are not engaged in either of these occupations or any other that contributes to the satisfaction of group needs. Likewise it is a distinct loss to the cultural life of the group that such a great part of its masculine element should mentally hold aloof from it. Much of our literary, musical, and religious product would be of a higher order if produced for a public that contained a larger masculine element. The fine arts and religion can never occupy the place in the social order to which they are entitled unless the demand for them comes equally from both sexes.

Another disutility that results from the wide separation of occupation and interest between the sexes is its effect upon the relations of men and women in the home. The ideal toward which domestic relations in the modern world have tended is a comradeship of equals. The older conception of male dominance and female acquiescence in the word of her lord has given place to one of a partnership of mutual contribution and acceptance. There is little basis for a relation of

comradeship between those whose occupational interest have nothing in common and whose contacts with life are established at such divergent angles. If men and women are to live together on a basis of deep understanding and joyful companionship in a common task, their minds must follow somewhat the same channels and their souls respond to similar calls. It must be admitted that sex-attraction is the sole or primary factor which brings together and unites a very great number of husbands and wives. This can never in itself be a sufficient foundation for a satisfactory family institution. The number of divorces well attests this fact. Without mutual respect, similarity of tastes and ideals, essential comradeship, marriage is shown to be attended with a high degree of instability and uncertainty. Even many apparently successful marriages never rest upon any completely satisfactory foundation. As Thomas somewhat humorously remarks: "An examination, also, of so-called happy marriages shows very generally that they do not, except for the common interest of children, rest on the true comradeship of like minds, but represent an equilibrium reached through an extension of the maternal interests of the woman to the man, whereby she looks after his personal needs as she does after those of the children, cherishing him, in fact, as a child—or in an extension to woman on the part of the man of that nurture and affection which is in his nature to give to pets and all helpless (and preferably dumb) creatures."[8] So long as the social order demands that men and women shall each cultivate a separate and highly specialized field in life, the family cannot be an institution resting primarily on comradeship.

Still another result of the habit of thinking of men and women as occupying separate worlds is the frequently-mentioned double standard of morality. While the term usually is meant to refer to sex morals, the situation applies also to the standards of conduct in many other sides of life. It is a well known fact that

[8] *Sex and Society*, p. 246.

women and men have not been held to the same standards of honesty and honor in business relations, to the same regard for the rules in sports, to the same conception of honor in personal relations. In some of these cases, as in those of sex, the requirements demanded of women are stricter; in others, as business or sports, men are held to a stricter accountability. This follows of course from the fact that woman's world has been chiefly one of the primary or secondary sex activities, and that man's world has been one of objective management and control.

It might seem that the existence of such a set of double standards is an entirely harmless matter if men and women could be kept each in his separate world. But unfortunately, or fortunately, life is not so simple, and the exigencies of life constantly show the necessity for both men and women to be held to the higher requirements of both sexes. The failure to apply to man the sex standards imposed upon women has been one of the principal factors that has created and maintained prostitution, now recognized as a fundamental social menace. The lack of inculcating man's standard of business, civic, and personal honor in woman's character is largely responsible for a certain contempt felt for women not only by men but by women themselves. This failure, in both cases, arising as it did from thinking of men and women as occupying different compartments in the social order, or as fulfilling absolutely divergent social functions, can never be remedied unless this conception of the relative spheres of the sexes be changed.

Fortunately the remedy here, as in the case of the industrial and professional overspecialization, lies already in view. The continued enlargement of educational opportunities for women, the opening of more occupations to them, the enfranchisement of women, all point to a narrowing of the gap that has separated the sexes. We doubtless may expect these movements already under way to bring men and women so nearly into the same world that each will live a richer existence and find in family life a finer comradeship.

A final form of overspecialization, or what in this case would be called over-differentiation, is that in which the different groups within a state or within a community may develop such an extreme degree of unlikeness of interest as to abstruct the coöperative life of the community. We have spoken in an earlier chapter of the interest conflict in all developed societies.[9] It is evident that with the appearance of cultural differences and of social classes some degree of conflict becomes a normal aspect of all societies.

It is not possible to know just when this reaches a degree that may be called abnormal. Some societies can contain a greater amount of conflict than others, depending on the forces of cohesion, and still endure. In general it may be said that the danger point has been reached when coöperative action for the common good becomes impossible. So long as groups believe that the preservation of the common good is of more importance than the advantage to be gained by the victory of one over the other, so long will the necessary minimum of coöperation continue to outweigh the conflict elements. It may, and frequently does occur, however, that the conflict of interest becomes so intense and bitter that one or both parties to the conflict may prefer that the common life be entirely dissolved rather than endure the dominance of the other interest.

The forms of conflict that most often reach this point are the political, the religious, and the economic. In the case of the political conflict, the struggle is for the control of the machinery of government or some part of it. The different parties in the state may become so hostile toward one another that one or more of them may prefer to wreck the state organization rather than leave it in the hands of the other party. As a matter of fact the existence of the state is frequently threatened by such conflict even when such an outcome is not actually desired by any of the conflicting parties. In their eagerness to secure control

[9]Chap. v.

they so weaken the forces of cohesion or defensive resources that outside enemies step in and effect a dominance over the whole state, or other internal differences add their weight to the political, and the state breaks up into several independent groups.

In the case of religious or economic struggle the existence of the state is not threatened unless the parties make use of the political machinery to secure control. The religious wars of Europe offer good examples of this kind of situation. There the religious and political often became so confused as to make an understanding of the struggle extremely difficult. And not only does a religious party seek the assistance of a political group to effect a victory over another religious party, but the political interest may also seek to fan religious prejudice in order to bring to its side the strength of one of the parties, or to weaken its opponent by dividing it on religious grounds.

So preponderant has become the economic interest in recent times that most struggles that threaten the life of states may be traced back to them, as of course, can the conflict between states. And hence most modern struggles that appear to be political on the surface are actually economic at the bottom. The long drawn out internal troubles of Mexico in recent years seem a clear case in point.

Of course there is much conflict of interest groups that does not endanger the existence, but which does seriously impair the welfare, of the common life. Economic conflict, religious contention, conflict of moral standards, opposition of political parties, struggle for prestige between sociable cliques, opposition of conservative and liberal, make up much of the life of modern society. Much of it is of value in stimulating individuals and groups to greater or better effort. But on the other hand a very great deal consists merely in the wearing out of strength and resource in opposing one another until there is little left to contribute to the common life. This is the *bête noire* of modern society. Has the differentiation of culture and of function and

of interest which have accompanied the evolution of human society from the horde to the life of today ended in creating such a complex of oppositions that men must spend a very large part of their resources of energy and goods in attempts to defeat one another? Undoubtedly no one can contemplate the wasteful struggle of interest groups in modern society without some feeling of pessimism. This is true whether we have in mind the relations of nations to one another, the relation of interest groups within a nation, or the conflicting forces of a local community.

No remedy lies at hand which promises very immediate results. It seems apparent that wasteful group struggle must continue for a very considerable time to characterize the life of society. The hope of improvement lies chiefly in the direction of so developing a social control that the common good will gradually come to dominate over the individual group advantage. The development of large stable states has greatly reduced the petty and continuous warfare that was once the dominant characteristic of inter-group life. In the same way within these states an increase in the effectiveness with which the common good can be made to dominate the whole life of the state will gradually silence much of the conflict of individualistic groups.

This can come not so much through the creation of new social machinery as through a magnifying in the social mind of the importance of the common life. The issue is really a spiritual one, a question of different values. In proportion as an appreciation of the values of the common welfare comes to predominate over the evaluation of individualistic group advantage, to that extent will a control of the life of the whole group in the interests of the common welfare gain strength. To be more specific, the antagonism of religious groups can be reduced only when the common elements in all religions is more clearly discerned and evaluated above the sectarian and partisan elements; the opposition between political groups, in so far as it is genuinely a conflict of political conception, and not an economic

struggle in disguise, can be reduced only as there develops an appreciation of the value of having the voices of all heard in the councils of the state; the class struggle between economic groups can only be reduced as men become keenly sensitive to the national and human importance of maintaining the highest possible minimum standard of living for all classes, and come to appreciate the common welfare above a selfish advantage.

Such a developed social consciousness will of course express itself in definite social organization, and this will react and strengthen the evaluation of the common good. Political machinery for registering the will of all groups within the state; an organization of industry that will keep it more sensitive to the economic needs of the whole nation and adjust compensation more completely in accordance with services rendered; a religious organization that will actually put different religious groups to working together for the accomplishment of their common purpose; a world parliament that will express the common interests of national groups—such social machinery as this may be expected to emerge as the individualistic and partisan ends of life are gradually replaced by an increasing appreciation of the common good. And it is only as this takes place that we can hope for a diminution of the conflict of interest groups that wastes such a large part of the resources of modern society. Such an accomplishment is not the work of a few years. It is a part of that slow growth of the spiritual element in social organization whose emergence, gradual as it has been, has made human society possible.

QUESTIONS

1. What are some evil consequences of the sharp distinction drawn between mental and physical work?

2. What are some effects of devotion to minute subdivisions of work?

3. What remedies seem desirable for the evils of over subdivision of work?

4. What are some consequences of a wide separation between the work and interests of men and women?

5. How can we combat the over development of differences of interest that characterize modern life?

EXERCISES

1. Cite some cases which you have observed where there is an over emphasis on the distinction between physical and mental work.

2. When should specialization begin in the education of a professional man or woman?

3. How far should the higher education of men and women be differentiated?

XV

SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION AND SOCIAL CONTROL

IS A SOCIAL group responsible for the differentiation which prevails among its members? Or is the development of social classification one of those natural processes which go on regardless of human purpose? That is, is a conscious social control of differentiation possible?

It is evident that those distinctions which arise from biological factors present a somewhat different problem from those which are created by social organization. The latter obviously reflect more nearly the will of the group, or of that part of the group which exercises control, than do those which bear a more direct relation to the inherent qualities of individuals.

It appears, however, from the discussion of the biological factors that even these do not predetermine any precise system of social distinctions that must inevitably exist. It is evident that different societies and the same society at different periods in its history give very contradictory recognition to the biological differences of the members. Probably in no two situations do we find the same relative positions of the sexes or of the different age groups or of the various ethnic elements contained in the population. That is, there appears to be no finally predetermined social position to which one's biological characteristics assign him. The social group always passes judgment on what recognition should be given a particular biological quality, and this judgment varies from time to time and from place to place.

To be sure there is a limit to what the social group can demand of its members. It cannot by mandate make it possible for a child to perform all the functions of an adult; nor can it at will exchange all the social

functions of the sexes, or secure from its members who are weak in intellect those services which require considerable intellectual ability. It appears that the biological factors do predetermine, without let or hindrance, some kind of social distinctions between the members of any social group. But the precise nature of these social distinctions, and the place where the lines shall be drawn appear to be always socially determined. Societies do exercise a control, within biological limits, of the social distinctions of their members. No naturally foreordained sanction can be claimed for any system of social distinctions that has ever existed. A control of this aspect of its life appears to be a fundamental part of the entire system of social control which characterizes all societies.

This social control has not always been consciously exercised and it seldom has been directed toward any deliberately chosen end. It has frequently been guided by ignorance, prejudice, passion, greed, and directed toward some immediate end, temporarily desired by the ruling part of the group. For example, as shown in the chapter on age differences, a rational, thought-out social policy toward the child and the adolescent is only now slowly emerging. Sex social differences have been determined on the basis of custom, superstition, passion, or temporary expediency. Social differences of race even yet are determined nearly everywhere in the civilized world largely by ignorant prejudice. Laws of inheritance or economic influences creating or maintaining caste have generally come into existence through some temporary advantage which one part of the population was able to secure for itself for the time being. In short, the social control of social differences has generally lacked intelligent understanding, deliberate foresight, and any clear conception of the common welfare of the group as a whole.

It is perhaps true that this could be said of the control which society has exercised over most other phases of its existence. Conscious, deliberate, intelligent control, exercised with the end of the common welfare

in view, is an achievement which human society is only very slowly attaining. Self-examination and self-criticism, or in fact awareness of its organic nature are processes that have been very late in emerging in society. Intelligent control, consciously directed, must come after these other processes have been more fully perfected.

In raising the question of the social control of social differences, we should, therefore, not be led into any impractically idealistic conception of what is immediately attainable. The most that we can do is to see the direction that such control must take, some of the steps that are now possible, and the principles on which any desirable control must rest.

It is frequently maintained that the function of the group is fulfilled in securing a free field for the competition of its members. According to this view all social differences are justified and socially desirable if they are the result of competition between the individuals or groups concerned. For example, the subjection of one race to another is frequently defended on the grounds that the fact of dominance is evidence of the superior social worth of the dominant race.

This is merely a form of the old argument for *laissez-faire* and it would seem that in the twentieth century it is hardly necessary to refute again that outworn theory, the consideration of which should now be a matter of historical interest only. Because, however, so many social distinctions are still defended on those grounds, it may be in place here to point out why such a principle of social control is indefensible when applied to social differences.

Worth, both of individuals and of groups, is always worth for some specific end. Society has many needs, and social worth is estimated in terms of one's ability to fulfill one or more of those needs. There are battles to fight and soil to till and buildings to erect and fabrics to weave and songs to sing and pictures to paint and prayers to offer and poems to write and many thousand

other things to be done that are essential to the welfare of the group. It is hardly conceivable that superior ability in one field will necessarily mean superiority in another. Ability to conquer by military prowess does not mean ability to make laws or to till the soil or to promote scientific research. Ability to acquire property for oneself is not evidence that in the getting of it one has actually rendered a service to the group. It may have been wrested from those whose toil has created it. Nor is it evidence that the welfare of the group will be furthered by this class retaining the control of the political or economic processes of the whole group. Military or acquisitive ability is in no wise necessarily accompanied by ability in social administration. While, therefore, it may be impossible in the present stage of social organization to secure for each class a reward in proportion to its services, we can at least deny to those in possession a justification of their holdings on the mere grounds that they have secured possession of them. And the development of an effective social control will apportion the rewards on the basis of encouraging those particular forms of service of which it has particular need.

This is but another way of saying that a free and unregulated competition that leaves in the hands of any individual or group what it can get, is not the proper basis for social control. Society has always been interested in limiting competition to particular fields, and in proportion as a common welfare has been sufficiently recognized to furnish the basis for an effective social control, it has so limited it. And it has gone farther than this. It has set up standards or rules to govern the competition that it has permitted to exist. Every occupational group has its particular code of ethics which undertakes to govern the competition that goes on between its members. It is true that these codes are frequently violated, just as the state has never been able completely to prevent some groups from aggression on other groups. But the essential point is that these limitations and regulations of com-

petition have been brought into existence and enforced, in proportion as the organic unity of society has been perceived and the common welfare recognized as the controlling factor.

We may say that this limitation and regulation of competition lies at the very foundation of social order. The very development of organized society from the most primitive stage has been marked by the control that the group has exercised over the competition and struggle of its members. To say, therefore, that the goal of social welfare is in the direction of creating conditions for more full and unrestricted competition and justifying morally the outcome of such competition, is to deny the essential element on which the development of human society as an organized entity has depended.

On the other hand, it is true that if the proper limitations and regulations are enforced, competition is the basis on which most social distinctions should be based. In fact, it is in many situations the only method by which the highest social welfare can be secured. A fair and open race which will test the relative merits of various competitors with respect to some particular ability, is undoubtedly the only method by which the social group can determine the most fit for particular services. And it is in the atmosphere of such competition that the abilities of the competitors are brought to their highest expression.

It is in maintaining such competition that society is particularly interested, not only for the sake of securing justice, but primarily for the sake of securing the best services for the common welfare. But it requires regulation and control to see that the competition is fair and that it really tests the ability that the social group wishes to encourage. A civil service examination in which the questions asked do not really measure the ability that is required in the service, or in which dishonesty is permitted, is of no value in determining which candidate should be given the position. It is undoubtedly true that much of the competition

that takes place in society to-day is of this sort, and as long as it continues, this uncontrolled competition cannot be regarded as an adequate basis for social differentiation. In short, not only must competition in some situations be limited, but a social control of its conditions must be established in order that the race shall result in an actual victory for the most competent.

In view of the above considerations, we may say that the first principle of the social control of differentiation is that the social group shall limit and regulate the competition of its members in order to secure the largest common welfare, and shall undertake to create the conditions under which the competition shall work to this end. What are some of the implications of such a principle, when applied to modern society? In the first place we may say that it takes certain groups entirely out of the competitive process. Children and adolescents are assigned a function and status which keeps them out of competition with other age groups. Of course, this has always been true of young children to a limited degree. But it is only in modern society that we find the social group assuming so largely the right to determine what children shall do and what shall be done for them. And modern society has greatly increased the age limit of those whom it would withdraw entirely from the competitive struggle. The assumption, and increasingly the practice, of modern society is that common welfare demands that children and adolescents shall have a function and a status that is determined not by any place they can make for themselves but by what they may contribute in the future to the common welfare.

Some phases of the competition between men and women show a similar limitation. As women come into the same occupational fields as men, there appears a decided tendency to give women a protection with respect to hours, wages, and conditions of work that would not appear if men and women engaged in unlimited competition with one another.

Again, as our study of individual differences makes more clear the great variation in personal capability and adaptability to social life, an increasing number of both sexes will be withdrawn from the competitive struggle and given such consideration as their weaker abilities demand. It is now evident that certainly not less than two per cent of the population must be given such protection in the interest of the social welfare.

And not only does a wise social policy dictate that certain groups shall in some aspects of their activities be withdrawn from the competitive struggle, but in the interest of a general group welfare, a necessary minimum of goods must be guaranteed all individuals regardless of their comparative worth. The injury to the common welfare that arises from considerable numbers of the population living below a necessary minimum standard of living is increasingly evident. The limitation of competition in the interest of the common welfare will ultimately require that competition for economic goods take place only above this line of a necessary minimum. Until this is secured for all the members of the state, it is manifest that the distribution of goods on a competitive basis results in much social disutility. The possession by some sections of the population of an abundance of economic goods while other sections have such a low income that physical health, morality, education and citizenship needs are neglected, is clearly not in the interest of the common weal.

More important, however, than the removal of certain groups or phases of life from competition is the setting of standards for the competition that remains. Since the economic field is the one in which the greatest amount of group and individual struggle prevails in modern society, it is here that we find the greatest scope for the social regulation of competition.

Within the past half century every modern state has put on its statute books an enormous number of laws regulating economic processes. The *laissez-faire* theory has been pushed back farther and farther until

few persons can be found to-day who would champion the validity of the principle as it was held a generation ago. Those who still are fighting against the social control of these processes take a stand merely against an increase over the present amount of control. Practically nowhere can be found those who would advocate a return to the state of unregulated competition which the classical economists of the first half of the nineteenth century desired.

And yet it is clear that no adequate social control of economic processes has yet been attained. The development of the industrial and commercial and agricultural processes within the past century has been so enormous that it has far outrun the social control that has been set up to regulate them. We have, moreover, been hampered in developing an adequate control by the *laissez-faire* theories which dominated the thought of the western world for the first half of the period during which this great development of economic processes has been going on. Although *laissez-faire* has fought a losing battle, the struggle has been a stubborn and hardly contested one. It has managed its retreat with such skill that the advance of an adequate social control has been seriously delayed.

The consequence of this delay is that the competition of groups within the state and across the borderline of states is still of such a character that we have no guarantee that the socially best is to win or that those rising to the top do so by virtue of any contribution they make to the common welfare. Here and there some gain is seen. An interstate commerce commission provides some control over the competition of transportation corporations. An anti-rebate law prevents the creation of some new monopolies by unfair stifling of small producers. An abundance of anti-trust legislation prevents a small amount of unfair combinations in restraint of trade. But the market is still frequently "cornered" in the interest of some small group of highwaymen, who for the time have the opportunity of pressing their pistols against the

buttons of their victims while the "lambs" are fleeced. The agricultural producer is made to suffer the principal loss on the downward process of prices following a period of inflation. As this is being written, two strikes in basic industries are in process, while federal and state governments are apparently helpless to protect the general public from the consequent disturbance of normal processes. The past quarter century has seen the creation of many vast fortunes while the general level of living of the producing classes has not been materially raised.

Until a more adequate control of the economic struggle can be secured, we must expect a continuance of the situation. Fighting we must have, but we should also have an adequate code of rules and an umpire who is strong enough to enforce them if the game is to result in the victory of the best and in the welfare of the social whole.

But it is not enough that the group should limit and control competition. We have seen that many forces inevitably lead toward such a crystallization of status that an advantage once gained is perpetuated indefinitely. An adequate and intelligent social control will see that social relations are kept so fluid that the best of each generation will come to the top and society will be constantly enriched from the wholesome competition that keeps all alert and up to their best.

It is true that many of the forces working toward the perpetuation of social differences are unconscious and inevitable forces, as indicated in an earlier chapter. The accommodation of the mental life that comes with occupation and status, family inheritance, the influence of stability, or more settled conditions within the institutions of society,—all these are probably impossible of control through any conscious action on the part of the group. On the other hand there are factors which are susceptible of control, and any social group which is permeated by a strong desire for the maintenance of equality of opportunity can find ways

to offset the inherent forces of crystallization and keep the field clear for a fair race.

Among these may be noted the guarding of the machinery of government to keep it responsive to popular will; laws of inheritance, inheritance taxes, and other forms of taxation that will discourage the perpetuation of large fortunes as units from one generation to another; public control of natural resources such as mines, water power, forests; an agrarian policy that will keep land in the hands of small cultivators; encouragement of organization for united action on the part of those groups whose economic position puts them at a disadvantage with other groups; effective public control of health and of working conditions and of housing that will guarantee to all classes equality of physical vigor; a condition of ease and facility of communication that will keep all persons informed of the essential activities in process and that will enable members of each class to develop and express group solidarity.

Of all measures, however, which work toward a perpetuation of equality of opportunity, probably the most potent is an educational system that will give to every child and adolescent full opportunity for adequate training, and to all adults opportunity for continuous contact with the intellectual and cultural resources of the world.

An adequate educational system will provide a most effective opposition to those unconscious crystallizing forces that arise from the accommodation of men's minds to their occupation and status, and from the inevitable tendency of family life to pass on its advantages or disadvantages to children. The school, library, lecture course, and extension education may go far toward effectually equalizing cultural opportunities for all, and providing the training that will make it possible for any individual to rise to the place that his natural abilities make possible.

By equalizing culture and training and offsetting the tendency for men's minds to be limited by the

groove of their occupation and status, communication and intercourse between the different groups of a society are made easier. The like-mindedness and the mutual respect which must follow from such a situation is the most effective barrier to the growth of caste that could be erected.

In addition to the limitation and control of competition and to keeping the field open for wholesome competition, there is a further measure of control over differentiation that the group may exercise,—namely, vocational guidance. This assumes that the group may undertake to exercise some control over the occupation that the individual may follow, and over the number of persons entering particular fields. Since occupation exercises such a great influence over one's class or status and over his mental content and his interests, any control of occupation is a most fundamental one.

That modern society is greatly in need of some measure of control over occupational choice is very evident. The amount of vocational failure because of choosing the wrong occupation is manifestly very great, with an enormous loss of effective work and a corresponding amount of unhappiness. There are three possible sources of this maladjustment of individuals and their occupations. In the first place there are many persons who enter vocations where the intellectual demand is above their abilities. Then there are those who select or drift into occupations which are beneath their ability, and become discouraged or waste their resources. Finally, there are other personal factors than intellect, not yet susceptible of measurement, in which there is lack of adaptation. These qualities include emotion, temperament, physical abilities, disposition.

It is not to be assumed that all vocational failures are due to a maladjustment, arising from one or more of these factors, of individuals to their occupations. There are, of course, many causes of failure. In fact, just what constitutes success in an occupation is not always entirely clear and it would probably be im-

possible even to compute accurately the percentage of failures occurring from any cause, unless some rather arbitrary measure of success were adopted. Many of the causes undoubtedly lie entirely outside the relation of the individual to his occupation, as is evidenced by the greater number of financial failures in some periods than in others. But at least here, in the degree of adaptation of individuals to occupation, we have one important cause, the reduction of which would add greatly to social welfare and individual happiness.

There is another aspect to the situation other than the question of adaptation. The needs of a society for a particular kind of work vary from time to time. There is no constant proportion of the population which is needed in any particular field. Under present conditions the knowledge of how many are needed for any type of work, and the consequent probability of success even for a well adapted individual become known only in a very rough way and only after many failures have occurred. The law of demand and supply very clearly does not operate well enough in an imperfectly controlled social order, as we now have, to prevent a vast amount of waste.

It may be questioned whether these two problems of personal adaptation and of adjustment of supply to demand are capable of control. Is there any better way than the trial-and-success-or-error method? The development of intelligence tests in recent years has quickened many hopes that at least something is possible in the prevention of personal maladjustment.[1] In an earlier chapter I have summarized the present status of intellectual measurement and indicated the possibilities. As shown there, the evidence seems to make clear that we can with some degree of success measure the intellectual possibilities of a person. A beginning has also been made in measuring the intellectual requirements of some of the occupations. When this has been pushed farther, as it undoubtedly will be, we will be in a good position to determine whether a

[1]See Terman, *Intelligence of School Children*, chap. xii.

person's range of intellect is sufficient for success in a given field or so much above the requirements of the position that some of his abilities would be wasted and he would probably become restless and discontented. The personal factors cannot yet be very accurately measured, although many of them can be somewhat accurately observed in children by teachers and advisors. It is probable that we shall before long have more definite means of measuring these.

The possibilities of vocational guidance through even our present limited facilities for gathering data were indicated in the results obtained in the use of the army tests referred to in Chapter ix. It was intended, at the beginning of the effort at measuring the intellectual capacity of the men, to use the process only for the purpose of eliminating from the army those whose abilities were so meagre as to make their retention impracticable. But as the results came in, it became evident that they could be used for assigning the men to different tasks on the basis of their gradings. The ultimate results in the selection of officers and in the distribution of the different grades of intellect into different branches of the service were highly satisfactory and demonstrated that at present we do have facilities for improving greatly on our methods of getting individuals into occupations to which they are adapted.

Another important beginning has been made which bids fair to add materially to our ability to secure personal adaptation to occupation,—namely, personnel management. In a number of industrial establishments very great success has attended efforts to study the practical adjustment of individuals to different tasks within that establishment. Problems both of intellectual capacity for, and of emotional adaptability to, different pieces of work have been met by a skillful administrative management. This involves not merely the individualistic adaptation to a machine or a process, but the relations of workers to one another and to the management. Personnel management by study-

ing the workman on the job, with reference to both of these problems, is able to fit the worker much more successfully into the particular niche in the establishment to which he is adapted.

There is, of course, a limitation to the significance of this for vocational guidance in its larger aspects, since the personnel manager is limited in the work that he may select for a particular workman by the possibilities of his particular establishment. But with the growing tendency to assemble large numbers of workers under a single management, there is an increasing possibility that personnel management may contribute considerably to the successful adjustment of individuals and tasks.

Much less has been done in attempting to determine the need for workers in different fields than in measuring individual adaptation. It is generally recognized that several of the professions are overcrowded and that there is a dearth in some other fields. We have, however, little accurate data on the subject. But enough has been done to demonstrate the possibility of considerable effective work in this direction.

The public labor exchanges have made a number of studies of needs in particular fields with results that show that much can be accomplished with more widespread and more painstaking efforts. Industrial surveys of particular localities have secured much good information for local bureaus of guidance. During the World War, without any previous preparation in the gathering of data, and in a rather crude way, estimates were made of the needs in different basic war industries for the purpose of exempting from military service those needed at home. If once the resources of the central government were put behind a careful and accurate study of the needs in different occupations, it is unquestionable that satisfactory data could be secured for advice to individuals considering the different occupations.

It seems to be clear from the above considerations that we are now in possession of facilities for securing

some degree of control both over personal adjustment to occupation and over the relation of supply to demand in different occupations. It is equally clear, however, that our present facilities are extremely limited and that the control which we can at present exercise is far from what we desire that some day we may exercise.

Moreover, there are certain limitations which seem inherent in the situation. In the first place it is not practicable, at least at present and possibly never will be, to undertake to guide an individual into a particular occupation. The most that can be determined by present methods of psychological analysis is a general fitness or unfitness for a field of occupation, as the unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled, or professional.[2] It seems probable that fitness for a particular one of these general fields will make one fit for any one of a dozen or more occupations within that field. Personal taste, family tradition, opportunities within the occupations may well have their part in determining the particular occupation.

In the next place guidance can never assume the place of dictation. As Meyer Bloomfield, a pioneer in vocational guidance, well says, "Decision is not the business of the counselor, but that of the applicant." The most that can be done is so to present the facts about himself and about the field that the applicant will make the judgment of the counselor his own. If he fails to do so, there is nothing more that can be done. In a democratic society no pressure can ever be brought to bear on an individual to coerce him into or out of a particular occupation. And in this case the advantage of the group cannot be sought at the expense of the individual. The welfare of society will be best advanced in the long run by the individual being directed, not coerced, into the occupation where he will be happiest and most successful. Durkheim is entirely correct in holding that a proper division of labor constantly approaches the ideal of spontaneity.[3]

[2] See Terman, *op. cit.*
[3] *De la Division du Travail Social*, p. 374.

There are, of course, many practical difficulties in the administration of a program of vocational guidance.[4] If given too early, there is danger of the child's beginning his specialization too soon; if too late, decisions may have been made which take the child out of the hands of the advisor. Employers, workers already in the field, parents,—all have their particular points of view and interests which very frequently conflict, and the system and its administration must be subject to pressure from all these sides. Dilettantes will follow in the wake of any system which is inaugurated, and do much harm by giving advice which is based upon entirely insufficient knowledge.

But in spite of the present insufficiency of data, inherent limitations, and practical difficulties, the vocational guidance movement has now gone far enough to demonstrate its great usefulness and to give promise of greater usefulness in the future. It seems not extravagant to hope that we may in the not distant future build up such a system that will give society a considerable degree of control over the choice of occupation by individuals.

The problem must, of course, be conceived from a much larger angle than it has yet been in most cases where it has been discussed. When sufficient data have been collected and helpful counsel given to large numbers of individuals, the reaction on the occupations themselves will doubtless be considerable. For example, occupations for adolescents, just out of school, and occupations for married women may be so controlled as to provide wholesome opportunities outside of competition with other groups. At present both of these groups coming into the field with less of strength or experience or time to give to a vocation, are seriously handicapped by competition with others not so situated. Under study and proper guidance, certain occupations might become recognized as belonging to particular groups of workers, and the industries organized so as to attract those groups. Or when any one

[4]See Robbins, *The School as a Social Institution*, pp. 185-186.

occupation becomes overcrowded, coöperation between employers in that field might, under the guidance of vocational counselors, result in so raising the standards of entrance that the numbers would decline. Other occupations, undermanned, might well, on the basis of careful study, so change the conditions or opportunities in that field as to attract the requisite number. The relation of this to a socially determined wage is significant. When once the principle has been clearly accepted by society that it is possible to exercise a considerable degree of control over occupational choice, many possibilities will present themselves. The first need, of course, is the development of facilities and staffs for investigation of the facts and for making the necessary information available.

The schools must naturally continue to occupy an important place in any system that may be developed. Since the schools are in contact with practically the whole population at the time when all individuals are most in need of guidance, they occupy a most strategic position. Moreover vocational guidance is inextricably bound up with the educational system. No effective guidance is possible which is not based upon considerable observation by those who have the opportunity and the ability to understand the mental development of the child or adolescent. And any guidance that reaches very far will include directing the individual into the particular kind of training that will fit him for the field he is to enter.

But a system of occupational control that reaches its full social possibilities will go farther than the schools can carry it. Public labor bureaus or exchanges when properly developed have their place in the system. And some bureau equipped to make continuous studies of the occupational fields and to inaugurate movements among employers and workers themselves will be necessary. The possibilities of social control in this field are so great, and the consequences to social welfare so far-reaching, that nothing short of an elaborately organized system will be adequate to the problem. But

in this direction lies much progress toward the goal of a society consciously and intelligently directed toward worthy ends.

Closely akin to the problem of controlling the occupational distribution of a population is the one of eugenics. The quality of the material out of which the population is built must affect very greatly the assignment of the different elements of that population to different tasks. Changes in the proportions that different lines of ability comprise in the whole must be followed by profound changes in the occupational groupings. But the problem of differentiation, *per se*, however much it is affected by this factor, consists in distributing the population as it exists at a given time into the various functions. A program of applied eugenics and a program of control of the process of differentiation must always exist as distinct problems.

QUESTIONS

1. Do biological traits definitely predetermine social position? Explain.
2. Why is not free competition an adequate basis for social distinctions?
3. What is the goal of an adequate social control of competition?
4. Explain what is meant by removing certain groups from the competitive struggle and fixing a minimum standard for all.
5. Is our present control of the conditions of competition adequate? Explain.
6. How may society counteract the forces working toward crystallization?
7. Why do we need vocational guidance?
8. What limitations and difficulties exist with respect to vocational guidance?
9. What are some possible accomplishments of a well developed system of vocational guidance?
10. What machinery seems necessary for such a system?

EXERCISES

1. Do you know any situation in which a person or group of less social worth is out-competing one of greater worth? What do you think should be done about it?
2. What are some ways in which government in the United States has somewhat successfully controlled competition?
3. Are there any groups in your community maintaining a standard of living below what is essential for good citizenship? What do you think should be done about it?

XVI

DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL DIFFERENCES

SOCIAL rank and function have, during the greater part of the historical period of human society, been chiefly determined by privilege. In general, rights and occupation have grown out of some special set of circumstances, such as military authority or economic advantage, rather than out of one's worth as a citizen or one's ability to contribute to the common welfare.

Those who suffered from this system have always chafed under it, but have seldom been able to overcome it. Always, however, they have hoped and prayed and frequently have fought for a day when men would count for what they were worth. This dream they have called Democracy. In political and sociological usage the term has been used to designate a variety of forms of social order.[1] The Greek city state was the first to have the term applied to it. But there is little in common between the Greek social order and later ones that have gone by the name of Democracy. For the Greeks, the state was a comparatively small community with all the citizens living within easy reach of the central meeting place. All these citizens assembled at stated intervals to discuss the policies of government and make decisions. The personal participation of practically all the citizens in formulating laws and policies was therefore an essential part of the system. Representative government had not been thought of. Smallness of the group was therefore requisite.

Moreover, the citizenship included but a small part of the population. The laboring class were slaves and were excluded from the exercise of any political rights. There were also many others who had come into the

[1] See Godkin, *Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy*, chap. 1.

group and were merely dwellers in it, claiming no part in the assembly of citizens. That such a social order should be called a "rule of the people"is evidently a great exaggeration. The exclusion of many persons from citizenship was also true of the later free municipalities of medieval Europe and of Switzerland. Property holding was an essential to citizenship, and the burgesses in a sense owned the state and handed it down to their descendants. Much the same is to be said of the democracy of the early New England Colonies. By no means all who were dwellers in the community enjoyed citizenship rights. Property holding and ecclesiastical affiliations were essential qualifications.

The modern so-called democratic state represents a much different type of social order from any of these. It occupies a vast territory, in most cases has millions of members, and grants full citizen rights to practically all adult members. Its government is representative,—that is, carried on by a group which is chosen to represent the citizenship,—and face-to-face discussion by the citizens is as impossible as is their personal contact.

Since the term is used to describe such a variety of social situations, it is evident that if democracy is to have any generally accepted meaning we must find it in some common principle that runs through all those groups that have gone by the name. Although most generally thought of as a form of government, the real significance of the principle of democracy lies much deeper and is to be thought of as applicable to other phases of life as well as to the political, to the economic, religious, educational, sociable. Etymologically it implies control by the whole people of the conditions of life, and underlying this is the principle of equality of power enjoyed by all classes of people in the group. It is significant that "Equality" has been the watchword of so many movements that have been designated democratic. The French revolution was fought under the banner of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," and the American revolution in its declaration of principles held

that all men are "created free and equal." A demand for equality in one form or another may be said to underlie all democratic movements.

The critics of democracy have made much of this. They have pointed to the evident differences in moral and intellectual qualities of people and have held that an equalization of power means taking the determination of important questions out of the hands of the most fit and putting mediocrity and inferiority into control. They hold that such a doctrine as that all men are created equal is a manifest absurdity and that successful group policy can be maintained only by retaining power in the hands of the most capable.

Such criticism fails to take into account the conditions under which principles are enunciated in the heat of social conflict. Men have in mind some one or more particular things that they are seeking to have righted. What purports to be a general principle is enunciated, but the application of the principle is always thought of in connection with the particular aim of the hour and in terms of the philosophy of the hour. A later age in passing upon the validity of the principle does not have the same perspective as the authors nor does it think in the same language.

The particular wrong under which the American colonists were smarting was the imposition of unjust burdens upon them by an outside arbitrary government. They were, moreover, steeped in the natural rights philosophy of the eighteenth century. In seeking a justification for their revolt before the "opinions of mankind," they naturally couched their demands in that philosophy and sought to show that what they were seeking was a right in conformity with that general philosophy. What they proposed to fight for was not an abstract principle of equality but the very concrete right of controlling their own government. The statement of the abstract principle was merely an incident by way of publishing their justification to the world.

The French revolutionaries were confronted with quite a different thing,—namely an inequality of eco-

nomic burdens between the upper classes and the third estate. Equality to them meant equal responsibility on the part of all classes within the state to share the economic burdens of the state. The clergy and the nobility had succeeded in escaping all the economic burdens of government. To secure equality was to secure equalization of these burdens, and this was the equality that the French revolutionists sought.

In fact, it is impossible to find any two groups of democrats, separated by any considerable degree of time and circumstance, who have used the idea of equality in the same sense. Each has been striving for equality in some one particular aspect of life and that aspect has filled their vision to the exclusion of any other. With all, however, it has meant the removal of some form of privilege and the opening up to more people of a larger opportunity for life.

It is undoubtedly in this equality of opportunity that we find the essential principle of democracy. This is what democrats have always believed in and fought for, regardless of the particular philosophical or political terms in which their demands have been clothed. If it be true, which is very doubtful, that any important group of men ever thought that all persons are equally endowed with intellectual and moral capacities, it is certain that that is not the equality which has been placed in the forefront of great democratic movements. When we find men fighting for equality, what we really see is a struggle for equality with respect to some particular relation which at that time has become a vital issue and which to them means equality of opportunity.

If this equality of opportunity should be analyzed into terms of present day life in the western world, it would contain as its principal items the following: first, opportunity to earn and to receive such a share of material goods and of services as is consistent with one's contributions to the needs and welfare of the group of which one is a part; second, equality in all civil and personal rights and in the right of protection

of these by the laws of the nation; third, equality of participation in the political control of the group life to the extent of one's abilities, which involves freedom of the franchise and of the right to hold public office on the choice of one's fellow citizens; fourth, equality of right to believe and to express any and all opinions that we may choose to hold, so long as such expression does not directly incite others to the breaking of the law of the land; fifth, equality of opportunity to worship as one's conscience may dictate so long as such religious belief or worship does not directly contribute to the violation of established law; sixth, equality of opportunity to enjoy the companionship and sociable fellowship of all persons with whom it is mutually agreeable to do so; seventh, equality of access to all the educational and cultural resources of the nation, and equal provision for the education of all types of talent.

It is frequently urged that such equality of opportunity is, on practical grounds, impossible of attainment in any human society. For example, the land occupied by different families will be unequal in fertility, or the teachers of different pupils will have unequal teaching ability. This is undoubtedly true, as all human arrangements must ever fall short of perfection. But such impossibility of ideal attainment need in no way prevent the sincere effort of a society to approximate such ends, and actually to attain a reasonable degree of success from its efforts. But however close an approximation is attained, there is nothing in such a goal that makes for a dead-level of equality, since individual capacities are so unequal.

Another frequent characterization of democracy from a slightly different angle is that it is a rule of the masses, from which rule all the aristocratic elements of the community are excluded. Such a criticism sees in the democratic movement merely an effort on the part of the proletariat to transfer the privilege of superior power from one class to another. It is true that there have been many proletarian movements that have

savored of this spirit. The situation in some quarters of Europe following the World War shows some tendencies in that direction. But to call such a movement democratic is the height of misconception. Privilege in the hands of the proletariat is no less privilege than in the hands of the nobility or of the wealthy. Democracy aims, not at a relocation of privilege but at a complete destruction of it.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that Democracy is a form of society that gives complete scope for any and all members of the groups to rise to that station of usefulness or power in the group to which their abilities and efforts entitle them. On its negative side, democracy seeks to destroy any artificial advantage that one member or class may hold over another. On its positive side it seeks to develop all those opportunities that are essential to the fullest development of all its members. Whatever natural differences exist in the population will under a genuine democracy express themselves in differences of function, rank, culture and interest.

That there will be differences of functions, no one questions, and that under a regime of freedom varieties of cultural elements will appear in conformity with the various natural tendencies and capacities of the population is equally evident. But it is not always recognized that there must be in a democracy also distinctions of rank. Such distinctions, in proportion as artificial privileges are abolished and a real democracy appears, will be based upon the social worth of the individuals or sub-groups. "Honor to whom honor is due" is a safe maxim for democratic society. There is undoubtedly a difference in the evaluation which the group may put upon the work of the unskilled laborer, the artist, the scientist, the statesman, the industrial manager. There must also be a difference in abilities and worth between the individual members of any one particular occupational group. A democracy will therefore accord different degrees of appreciation to

different individuals and functional groups and assign differences in awards. But membership in the more preferred or less preferred class will depend entirely on the natural capabilities and efforts of the individual. From time to time the appreciation of democratic society may shift from one type of worker to another or from one type of ability to another, in accordance with social needs. At one time the artisan may be ranked higher, at another the artist, at another the statesman, at another the soldier. But that there should be at any time a dead level of rewards or of appreciation is no more a part of democracy than it is of any other form of society.

The entire problem of equality between members of a society and their participation in group life must in fact be thought of in different terms today than it was a hundred years or more ago. Theirs was an individualistic philosophy that thought of society as an aggregate of individuals. The natural rights philosophy endowed each of these individuals with a certain group of inalienable rights. It was entirely consistent that with respect to the possession of those rights all men should be thought of in terms of equality. And in thinking of the nation as an aggregate of individuals it was consistent to think that with every man possessing equal rights with every other the exceptionally capable man would stand no chance of exercising any more influence upon the life of his group than did the inferior one. The conception of democracy as a rule of mediocrity was a natural corollary of this individualistic mechanical conception of society.

The organic view of social life which dominates all our thought to-day makes such an idea of democracy impossible. The idea of an original group of rights clinging to or inhering in an individual as he comes into the world is supplanted by the idea that all rights are social in origin and have reference to the particular relation one occupies in the group. Moreover a society is seen to be something more than a mere aggregate of

separate persons. It is an entity with an organized life of its own. The functions that every member performs and the status that he occupies has reference to the life of the group. This life demands different types of functions and scarcely any two individuals can occupy exactly the same place in it. Each contributes a something that is unique, something which is essential to the whole and which for the time at least no one else can perform. This requires a great variety of talents, especially in the highly complex social life of today, and the members of a group must be thought of each with reference to the particular part that he is qualified to play.

To think of the members of such a group in terms of an abstract equality is manifestly foreign to this point of view. We think rather of the adaptability of the person to some particular social function. There must be leaders and there must be members of the rank and file. There must be those whose nearness to the humbler aspects of life give them a simplicity and candor, an unbiased view of life, while there are the seers and specialists who catch up the fundamental convictions and shape them to concrete ends. Professor Cooley[2] has well shown that the masses in a democracy have their definite part to contribute to social policy,—namely, sentiment and conviction. The part of the leader is to interpret this sentiment and, guided by it, to shape the detailed processes of the group. The masses, because of their living "more in the central current of human experience," are able to contribute that something without which the work of the leaders would be impossible.

As stated above, a democratic regime forbids any assumptions as to what particular position in this organic whole any individual is to occupy. This is for his talents, his native tendencies, and his efforts to determine. But that all should by any possible conception be fitted to occupy any one position is a theory that common sense indicates as absurd. So long as

[2] *Social Organization*, chap. 13.

each has a free field in which to develop his talents and to find scope for the exercise of his natural and acquired abilities, he has all that a genuine democracy can give him.

So much for the theory of democracy. But how does it actually work in practice? Does it tend to reduce the life of a group to the level of the majority and make distinction impossible in anything but an expression of the most crude sort of leadership?

That no complete democratic state of society has ever been attained in the civilized world is evident. In Greece and Rome, limited as it was in the numbers to which it applied, democracy referred only to equality of political privileges. Artificial economic distinctions were a matter of course. That complete equality of political rights exists in Western Europe or the United States today no one claims. One-half the adult population has been shut out from exercising the franchise until recently. The courts, in spite of efforts on the part of the judiciary to be fair, cannot render equal justice when one litigant has superior economic abilities over the other to employ talent and pay court expenses. Negro citizens are denied political equality even in those states of the United States where no laws exist especially to deprive them of it. In exceedingly few cases may a negro citizen hold any important political office in local government anywhere in the United States. In England distinctions of personal rank in sociable intercourse are maintained on a basis of birth as in the United States they are on a basis of the possession of wealth. Most important of all, economic absolutism prevails all through the Western world. The present industrial system is as much one of artificial privilege as was the French governmental system before the Revolution.

Complete democracy must therefore be regarded as an ideal or rather a goal toward which men have groped and which they have never yet attained. The name has been applied wherever men have succeeded in over-

coming some particularly obnoxious privilege and in opening up some new field of opportunity that was for them especially desirable. Having attained their particular goal, in the exuberance of their victory they called their result a democracy when it was merely a step toward the goal. These successive steps, chiefly of a political sort, that have been taken since the eighteenth century in Western Europe and America may all be regarded as milestones on the way toward the complete goal. After each attainment of some degree of progress, men have after a time realized that what has been attained was not as complete as they had thought in the hour of victory, and a period of pessimism and discontent has followed, furnishing the background for a new onslaught upon the entrenchments of privilege that bar the way to opportunities newly sensed.

At times the defenders of the *status quo* have assumed the aggressive, have counter-attacked, and have driven the forces of democracy farther back from the goal. The loss of the Revolution of 1848 in Germany is generally regarded as an incident that fastened the evils of political privilege more firmly upon the German people, until the Great War brought the upheaval. The growth of industrialism in America since the Civil War, and in Europe for the same period, has undoubtedly increased the strength of economic privilege. It is a truism in all circles of thinking men today that the forces of democracy all over the Western world are just gathering their resources for the contest that must be waged against this now most conspicuous relic of the old order.

But even though we never have had a complete democracy, the tendencies of these societies which have attained the largest measure of it, are subject to critical inspection. One type of critic of the actual operation of democracy is well represented by the English historian, Lecky.[3] This writer has maintained that among the other defects modern democratic governments have fallen into the hands of the ignorant

[3] *Democracy and Liberty*, chaps. ii and iii.

masses and have presented the spectacle of dishonest and predatory adventurers climbing by popular suffrage into positions of power;—that is, that democracy has not resulted in bringing the best elements of the population to positions of power and control, but some of the worst. In similar views more recent writers have referred to democracy in practice as the reign of mediocrity.[4] Democracy is accused of refusal to give recognition to the expert and to the exceptionally gifted individual in either intellectual and spiritual fields or in legislation and administration. The rule of the majority is held to discredit the person whose attainments lift him much above the average. The person who is able to reflect the opinion and point of view of the average mediocre mind is said to get himself put into the position of control where he shapes the policies of the group in accordance with this same undistinguished quality of thinking.

Several things may be said concerning such a view. In the first place, there is no evidence that democratic societies have degenerated to a level of mediocrity from some previous golden age of aristocracy. It is a question of fact whether other societies have in a given time produced more creative thinkers and artists and administrators and statesmen than have democratic societies, but the means for determining the fact in any conclusive fashion are not available. There is plenty of evidence, however, that autocracy has always resulted in holding many inferior persons in positions of prominence. One need not read many pages of history to gather evidence of the low intellectual and moral quality of many who have held power under regimes of political privilege. The policy of autocratic rulers in placing in power relatives and favorities and sycophants who have won their way to favor through flattery of the monarch and nobility is notorious. It is doubtful if any democratic nation ever in its days of most inefficient control could match the

[4]Faguet, *The Cult of Incompetence;* Leighton, "Democracy and Intellectual Distinction," *School and Society,* Vol. V, pp. 421-430.

shameless conferring of power on incompetent hangers-on that has been the custom in most non-democratic societies.

Again, the factors determining the appearance of persons of great powers of leadership and their distribution into the various fields of national life are exceedingly complex. To select any particular period in the history of a nation and account for the small number of great men in political, scientific, artistic, and religious fields on the single ground of a democratic order of society is to say the least a very unscientific procedure. For example, in the United States it is a recognized fact that during the period of her great industrial development, the greater number of her strongest men have been found in positions of industrial leadership. The same phenomenon in all probability would have occurred under a non-democratic form of government. While there is no way of correctly estimating the relative productivity of great personalities in different nations, there seems no reason for believing that present day autocratic societies have shown any more conspicuous leadership in the various works of life than have democracies. If Germany and England should be compared in this respect for the period from 1870 to 1914, it is exceedingly doubtful that any case could be made out for a greater degree of mediocrity in the democratic nation. In the United States, as Professor Cooley so well points out, there certainly has been no evidence of the repression of personality through the pressure of the mass.[5] Personality in America is exalted almost over everything else. "The augmenting numbers of the people, far from obscuring the salient individual only make for him a larger theatre of success; and personal reputation—whether for wealth, statesmanship, literary achievement, or for mere singularity—is organized on a greater scale than ever before. One who is familiar with any province of American life, as, for example, that of charitable and penal reform, is aware that almost

[5] *Social Organization*, chap. xv.

every advance is made through the embodiment of timely ideas in one or a few energetic individuals who set an example for the country to follow."[6] Professor Cooley shows further that if there is a deficiency in literary and artistic achievement in a democracy of this kind, it comes from other causes than from the submergence of personality in the mass.

But while no case can be made out against democracy in practice for suppressing personality or for making less use of exceptional ability than do autocratic societies, it is unquestionable that no democratic nation has yet made use of its full fund of talent. It cannot be denied that we are still greatly lacking in the largest use of the expert in most of the fields of national life and that we fail to provide facilities that would develop the latent talent of a large number in the population. Since democracies succeed in proportion as capable leaders are chosen by the masses, and are guided by an intelligent and self-controlled public opinion, they are more in need than other societies of utilizing to the fullest their whole stock of talent, both in the masses and in persons of special abilities for expert service or leadership.

There is almost no limit to the possibilities in the improvement of scientific legislation, administration, public health, education, recreation, religion, if we were prepared to make greater use of the expert to draft laws and advise in their administration, and direct local and national activities in these and other aspects of social life. The present state of inefficiency and waste in material resources, energy, and time, as well as waste of priceless human material, is due largely to the fact that public policy is not guided sufficiently by trained and intelligent specialists. But an increase in the utilization of specialists is always attended by a grave danger toward bureaucracy. Undoubtedly it has been the fear of this that has kept democracies from a greater dependence upon them. And the fear is justified as long as the public mind and will are not

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 161.

sufficiently informed and trained to exercise an intelligent voice in the selection of leaders and an effective control over them when they are once in position. Hobson remarks cogently on this point: "If a nation is incapable of developing this self-protective intelligence so as to transmit accurate stimuli to the governing brain, and to exercise quick, accurate checks and vetos, the form of Democracy which seems truly organic would inevitably lapse into a bureaucratic tyranny."[7]

What is needed to secure the services of such an expert class and at the same time protect the nation from bureaucracy is a further extension of the democratic principle. The truth of the popular maxim that the cure for the evils of modern democracy is more democracy is amply proved here. The further extension of the democratic principle that is needed is such an equalization of educational opportunities as will bring to the fore all latent talent for expert service and at the same time transmit to the masses that intellectual and moral improvement which will qualify them for more effectual shaping of public policy and control over their leaders.

The public educational systems now in operation in the western world go a very long way in the direction of such equalization of educational opportunity. Compared with the opportunities of a century ago they register the greatest single achievement of the democratic movement since that time. But that anything like a satisfactory goal has been attained is not believed by any thoughtful person. Such a goal will not be in sight until none are denied educational facilities because of poverty, or too short a childhood, or indifference of parents, or defective compulsory education laws or machinery to enforce them, or low standards in the teaching profession, or niggardly expenditures for educational purposes by some local communities, or antiquated methods and ideas of instruction. And all of these obstacles and more are still in the way of an

[7] *The Crisis of Liberalism*, p. 86.

approach to an approximate equalization of educational opportunities. The proportion of the population receiving anything beyond the barest rudiments of school education in any nation to-day is probably not over ten per cent at the most liberal estimate. To live successfully in the modern world and take advantage of its opportunities and responsibilities requires a knowledge of scientific laws and methods yet far beyond the masses. Ability on the part of the citizenship to choose leaders wisely and to exercise a careful control over them requires a knowledge of history and of social institutions and of the cultural achievements of the race that are acquired only through an educational system much more complete than any now in existence.

Moreover the production of an adequate leadership is dependent upon such a dissemination of educational facilities as shall allow all the potential leadership to come to actual leadership. The late Lester F. Ward[8] advanced an argument for equalization of educational opportunities that appears unanswerable. The proportion of great men in a population is shown to be in direct ratio to the existence of educational opportunities by means of which the potential genius of exceptional individuals is developed. Without the provision of proper material for the mind to feed upon, great talents never come to light. The wide dissemination of knowledge, therefore, accomplishes a double purpose: it raises the level of the intelligence of the masses and brings to the fore those whose special capacities fit them for unique services to the nation, and these are the fundamental requirements for the successful operation of a democratic society.

Undoubtedly the greatest constructive task of the modern democratic movement is such an improvement in the educational system as will result in an actual equalization of educational opportunities for all classes in society. Of all special privileges, the privilege of intelligence is the most fundamental in its ability to defeat an equal distribution of power among the classes

[8] *Applied Sociology*, chaps. 7-10.

in society. It enables the class possessing it to exploit those deprived of its advantages and to devise ever new ways of keeping them in subjection. Possessed of the fundamentals of scientific laws and of a sound knowledge of the nature of social institutions, the masses would be able to protect themselves against the selfish interests of any particular group. But without such intelligence the gaining of any particular democratic victory may turn out to be an empty shell. Much of the formal political democracy in the western world today does not in reality result in actual participation in control by the masses. The voting is frequently a mere ceremony, while behind the scenes the special interests manipulate the machinery of actual control, and the situation cannot be materially bettered until the voters are able to choose better leaders and maintain a more effective control over them through an intelligently guided public opinion. And these capabilities are the product only of a more efficient educational system.

The industrial democracy toward which we are moving will inevitably be subjected to the same limitations. A more complete machinery of control over the processes of production and exchange and distribution in the hands of an untrained laboring group must turn out to be as ineffectual for real democracy as much of our ceremonial political democracy, if not an actual menace to national welfare. If there is one thing that the political "reforms" of the past quarter-century should have taught us, it is that there is no substitute in the form of a social institution for intelligence and moral conviction on the part of the masses. Changed methods and instruments for registering popular will are valueless unless the will that is to be registered is a will that is informed and disciplined and under a control that resides in the human soul. The successful control of economic processes calls for similar intelligence and moral conviction. The complex organization of modern industrial life is in fact a much more intricate and delicate piece of machinery than is much

of the involved mechanism made of steel and dynamos. If it is unwise to intrust these pieces of mechanical matter to untrained minds and hands, much more is it impossible to expect satisfactory results in the control of democratic social institutions without intelligence and self-control in the rank and file, and expert skill in the leadership. A knowledge of the elementary principles of economic organization and process, and a disciplined will on the part of the laboring group are the only guarantees that the possession of the form of control will mean actual control. In short, democracy calls for the training of the masses of the people to a much more effectual degree than has yet been accomplished. Privilege will never be routed and individual men will never occupy the particular positions in their social group to which their inherent worth entitles them until the intellectual and spiritual resources of the race are made available to all. It is to the educational policy of a state that we must look, therefore, for its most important means of maintaining equality of opportunity. It is not merely a question of how excellent is its pedagogical technique, though this is of course important, but also a question of what measures are taken to insure that every individual shall have a chance at the training which will most effectively bring out his abilities.

A policy that will accomplish this must not only provide general fundamental education for all, but higher education for all who are capable of taking it. And it must so connect the elementary system with the higher education that capable youth of all social classes may pass easily up through the training that fits for the most important positions in the group. Any system that opens the higher education only to members of the upper class becomes an instrument for the perpetuation of privilege.

It will also provide variation of curriculum and discipline for all the various types of mind and of occupation within the state. The provision will, in addition to fundamental elements and a closely coördinated

higher education, be varied to some extent for city and country, for the sexes, for different vocations, and types of intellect. For, if anything is clear from our discussion of biological differences, it is that equality of opportunity must certainly be secured through variation of facility. A uniformity of educational provision must always mean a neglect of many parts of the population.

But this variation in type of educational facility will not mean variation in the quality, as now exists. The present failure to provide for the whole population the essential educational opportunities that are enjoyed by some cannot be regarded as anything but a lamentable mark of the distance we have yet to go in equalizing educational opportunities. Child labor legislation, enforcement of attendance, and increasing the age of required attendance are, of course, but parts of the general system that is desired.

The hopeful aspect of the present situation is that we need no new principles in the shaping of this general educational policy. We have already entered upon their application. What is required is a further extension of the application of educational principles already accepted in American public policy.

QUESTIONS

1. What essential principle has been at the bottom of all democratic movements? What is democracy?
2. Does democracy mean a leveling process? Would an ideal democracy have social classes?
3. Explain the statement that democracy is an ideal goal.
4. What is to be said of the criticism that in practice democracy results in a rule of the mediocre?
5. How can we secure a greater use of the expert and at the same time escape a bureaucracy?
6. What becomes of formal opportunities without intelligence to use them? Explain.

EXERCISES

1. To what extent do you believe that equality of opportunity exists for the people of your community?
2. Are the persons chosen for positions of power in your community the most competent that could be found? If not, how could better ones be secured?
3. In what respects do the schools of your community need to be improved in order to fulfil the requirements of a real democracy?

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